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iv 
Summary 
 
This thesis investigates long-run financial dynamics in Sweden in order to understand how 
changes in the constitution of housing finance have both shaped and been shaped by the Swedish 
housing system from the mid-nineteenth century to the present era. Once heralded as one of the 
most effective housing models in the world, Sweden’s housing system is, today, widely considered 
to be in a state of acute crisis. Housing scholars often attribute the current state of housing 
dysfunction to a ‘system switch’ which saw Sweden’s social market system ‘rapidly transition’ to 
neoliberalism during the 1990s. However, by citing processes such as neoliberalism as core 
drivers of contemporary housing system dysfunction, scholarly appeals to what are largely 
perceived as exogenous ideological influences tend to obscure the path-dependant nature of 
housing and finance system development. As such, the behavioural legacies, norms, and 
expectations which a housing stock and attendant system of housing finance generate over many 
decades, and the sectoral actors and interests which help to shape the rules of the game vis-à-vis 
housing investment, production, consumption and distribution are, all too often, left empirically 
and theoretically unchecked. 
 
This thesis argues that the Swedish model of housing, which was for so long held up as a paragon 
of social market efficiency and stability, was in fact an ephemeral phenomenon and that, far from 
being a contemporary aberration of financialised neoliberalism, the current levels of precarity and 
dysfunction in Sweden’s housing system have a longer pedigree than many scholars assume. I 
show how a unique model of political economy and industrial relations created a housing 
industrial complex, producing one of the most concentrated and powerful construction and finance 
sectors in the world.  How speculative housing dynamics and changing attitudes to financial risk 
generated from outside formal banking channels undermined the basis of this complex and, with 
it, traditionally decommodified housing forms. How the state moved from attempting to mitigate 
the risk-taking behaviours of financiers, investors and households, to promoting speculative 
housing dynamics and embracing the development of a housing finance complex. And how, 
sponsored by the state, debt-fuelled housing consumption has been a central feature of the Swedish 
model of housing for over 40 years.  
 
Adopting an actor-centred, historicist approach, this thesis studies housing systems as complexes 
of production, distribution and exchange, which are inextricably linked to long-run evolutions in 
finance. Exploring longitudinal patterns and trends relating to credit flows to the housing sector, 
tenure composition, household debt, housing construction, and institutional governance, the thesis 
emphasises the centrality of housing finance system development – and the state’s role therein - 
in engendering particular practices and behaviours which, in turn, shape housing system dynamics 
and attitudes to housing risk on both the demand- and supply-side. In so doing, it positions housing 
and finance systems as proper objects of historical enquiry, whose path-dependent, co-
evolutionary dynamics can never be fully appreciated in isolation of each other, or, indeed, of 
broader political-economic trends.  By examining the co-evolution of housing and financial forms 
in Sweden, this thesis seeks to answer fundamental questions such as: What impacts do changes 
in the constitution of housing finance have on housing system development? Which actors and 
expressions of interest have most influence over housing system outcomes? And: Why do housing 
policy regimes change?  
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1 
Introduction. Swedish housing under pressure 
 
I think there's been a change in public thinking that is driving a temporary increase in home 
prices […] The change in thinking is of housing as an investment. And there's a perception 
that home prices have gone way up in lots of other countries so why not in Sweden as well? 
They think that there’s more value than there really is. 
 
           Robert J. Shiller, 2013 
 
The average indebted Swede has three loans, is 50 years of age, and has a debt ratio of 296 
per cent1.  
 
Sveriges Riksbank, 2014 
 
 
When reading Sweden’s popular dailies, it is almost impossible for the discerning reader to escape 
the conclusion that the European Union’s third largest country by area is in the midst of a severe 
and protracted housing crisis. Whole volumes have been written on the topic (CRUSH, 2016), 
and it is not difficult to understand why. In 2017, nearly 90 per cent of Sweden’s municipalities 
reported the existence of a housing shortage (SvD, 2017). Queues for rental accommodation in 
Sweden’s major cities can number in the hundreds of thousands (Bostadsförmedlingen, 2017), 
and residents on waiting lists in inner-city Stockholm can expect to wait as long as 20 years for a 
rental apartment2. Meanwhile, with the exception of one year, Sweden has experienced over 
twenty years of robust house price growth, with prices rising almost 6 per cent a year on average 
since 2007 (FT, 2017); far ahead of incomes. Despite unprecedented house price growth and 
incessant demand for rental housing, however, supply has not acted as a function of demand. 
Housing construction output during much of the last 25 years has been lower than at any point 
since the 1930s; overcrowding among low-income groups is worse than in Croatia or Greece 
(OECD, 2017a)3; and levels of private mortgage debt have eclipsed those of most mature 
industrial economies (EMF, 2016).  
 Sweden today is a nation of homeowners, with the proportion of Swedes owning their 
homes (either as freeholders or tenant-owners) higher than in Great Britain or the United States, 
but this status has come at a price. With no legally enforced limit on mortgage durations prior to 
2016, Sweden’s Financial Services Authority (Finans Inspektionen) memorably estimated, on the 
basis of 2014 data, that it would take 140 years for the average Swedish homeowner to pay down 
                                               
 
1 This refers to the ratio of debt to disposable income. 
2 This figure applies to the most oversubscribed inner-city districts. The average waiting time for an apartment in 
Stockholms County is over 9 years. For an apartment near the city centre, this figure increases to 13.5 years 
(Bostadsförmedlingen, 2017). 
3 Sweden has some of the highest rates of overcrowding among low-income groups in the OECD, with 30 per cent of 
low-income groups living in overcrowded conditions (OECD, 2017a). 
 
 
 
 
2 
their mortgage (SvD, 2014). With the Swedish central bank’s (Sveriges Riksbank) deposit and 
lending rate having been set at zero or below for much of the last four years, mortgage credit has 
been cheaper and more accessible to Swedish households than ever before, but the era of 
unprecedented mortgage liquidity has assisted in generating a crisis of affordability. Ever greater 
volumes of mortgage debt have created a virtuous cycle of asset price and debt inflation and, 
according to a survey conducted at the end of 2017 by the Swedish real estate agency, Svensk 
Fastighetsförmedling, nearly 50 per cent of Swedish homeowners would be forced to move if 
their mortgage servicing costs rose by more than 3,000 kronor (€300) a month (Dagens Industri, 
2017). Contemporaneously, as the nationwide rental housing shortage has become more acute, 
tenure security has waned, and renters are increasingly finding themselves in a rental market that 
is inaccessible, expensive, and precarious (Baeten et al., 2017). The Swedish housing system that 
was once underpinned by the belief in housing as a social right has, then, become dysfunctional 
and monstrous (Christophers, 2013). 
 Explanations pertaining to the sources of the present housing system dysfunction are 
manifold, but where many scholars and pundits concur is in emphasising the importance of recent 
changes that have ostensibly transformed Sweden’s housing system. The opening excerpt to this 
chapter, taken from a statement by Robert J. Shiller in a televised interview with Sveriges 
Television (SVT), provides a case in point. The journalist interviewing him, when confronted with 
this statement, asked: “What would be a sound reflection to do [sic.]?” To which Shiller 
responded wryly: “Run!”. Shiller is not the only Noble Laureate to have cast grave assertions 
about the residential housing market in Sweden, either. The economist, Paul Krugman, has 
commented, in his usual unassuming manner, that: “Prices [in Stockholm] have gone up quite a 
lot and household debt is quite high”, adding that, “Those are normally the symptoms of a bubble” 
(International Business Times, 2014).  
 The perceived risks of a ‘housing bubble’ in Sweden’s metropolises4, and the 
macroeconomic implications of households’ housing-related debt therein, are warranting growing 
attention from international and domestic commentators (International Monetary Fund, 2017; 
Sveriges Riksbank, 2017); particularly so since the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis which 
- in stark contrast to the credit crunches experienced throughout much of the Western world - had 
little impact on house prices or the supply of mortgage credit in Sweden. Indeed, with Sweden’s 
National Institute for Economic Research (Konjunkturinstitutet) warning, for the first time in its 
history, of the potential for a housing crash (Dagens Nyheter, 2015b), and the European Systemic 
Risk Board (ESRB) - a division of the European Central Bank set up in the wake of the GFC to 
monitor macro-prudential oversight throughout the EU - claiming that Sweden’s housing market 
                                               
 
4 Throughout the project I refer mainly to Sweden’s three biggest cities: Stockholm, Malmö, and Göteborg. These 
metropolitan areas account for circa 50 per cent of Sweden’s total population (>10 million inhabitants).  
 
 
 
3 
is the most vulnerable in the EU (European Systemic Risk Board, 2016), there is broad consensus 
that the existence of a housing bubble in Sweden presents real and present dangers to 
macroeconomic stability. 
 
Figure i. House prices in a selection of OECD countries, 1990-2013 (nominal index, 1990=100) 
  
 
Source: Jordà, Schularick and Taylor, 2017 
 
 Notwithstanding certain institutional specificities peculiar to the Swedish case, the broad 
contours of the milieu I have described briefly here seem to conform to trends elsewhere in the 
OECD. Indeed, the first two decades of the twenty-first century may come to be remembered as 
the epoch of ‘housing crises’. Swathes of cities throughout the OECD face chronic housing 
shortages, and low- and middle-income households are increasingly confronted with a pernicious 
mix of worsening accessibility and affordability, tenure insecurity, and ever-increasing exposure 
to financial risk; a situation which has led Peter Marcuse and David Madden to claim that ‘the 
symptoms of housing crisis are everywhere in evidence today’ (Marcuse and Madden, 2016). Yet, 
the Swedish case represents a puzzling development. For the current crisis and apparent housing 
bubble seem to challenge long held assumptions about Sweden’s housing system.  To understand 
how and why, though, we need to delve a little deeper into Sweden’s political economy and 
housing timeline.  
 Throughout much of the post-War era, Sweden’s housing system was recognised as one 
of the most effective models of housing in the world (Grundström and Molina, 2016); an 
‘international leader of affordable housing policy success’, according to Deborah Kenn (1996, p. 
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4 
78), which was, ‘without parallel anywhere in the world’ (Headly, 1978, cited in Lundqvist, 
Elander and Danermark, 1990, p. 445). What this meant for households in terms of housing 
outcomes is summed up in the following passage by Bruce W. Headly, which is worth citing at 
length: 
 
In most countries – as in Sweden in the past – lower income groups are constrained to live as 
tenants of either private landlords or public authorities in relatively poor, run-down 
neighbourhoods. In modern Sweden, by contrast, working class people, like middle class 
people, have an effective choice of living in cooperative as well as tenant housing and also 
being owner-occupiers… The significance of this extension of opportunity should not be 
minimized. In most countries working class people are not able to choose where to live in 
town, close to work and entertainment, or to join the green wave living in simulated 
countryside. The Swedish worker is relatively fortunate in being able to house his family 
according to preference rather than according to the tyranny of what economists, accustomed 
to analysing “free” rather than socilaized markets term “effective demand” (Headey, 1978, 
pp. 52–53 emphasis added). 
 
The institutional features of this model of housing can be said to have been typified by a housing 
policy programme orientated towards universality and tenure neutrality; a large public rental 
sector owned by municipal housing companies characterised by centralised negotiations between 
landlords and a well-established national tenant movement; and a large cooperative housing 
sector (Bengtsson, Ruonavaara and Sørvoll, 2017, p. 74). Further, it was underpinned by a system 
of housing finance and state subsidies which, as Bengt Turner and Christine Whitehead (2002, p. 
204) note, emphasised, ‘…interest-rate subsidies to investment […] generous overall benefits to 
housing both in the form of general subsidy and income-related benefits, and low risks to 
financiers, investors and households alike’ (emphasis added). This system of regulation had been 
designed to keep speculative housing dynamics in check and, in theory at least, the stylistic 
features of the Swedish housing system outlined here should be inimical to the generation of 
housing bubbles. 
 The renowned housing scholar, Jim Kemeny, would come to define this distinctive model 
of housing as a social market system, operating what he termed a unitary rental market (Kemeny, 
1995), which acts as a mechanism to create competition between public and private rental 
housing, reducing rents, and thereby the incentives to own one’s home (see Chapter I). While 
others have referred to this model as a socialist market system, semantic differences do not detract 
from the widespread agreement that Sweden’s housing system constituted a core pillar of 
Sweden’s much lauded social democratic welfare state (Turner and Whitehead, 2002; Clark and 
Johnson, 2009). In terms of general outcomes, as Peter Dickens et al. (1985, p. 49) note, housing 
conditions in Sweden ‘…were among the best measured in terms of access, cost and quality’ 
during the 1970s. 
 There is little doubt that housing quality is still high in Sweden today by OECD standards; 
but, as noted above, so too are the entry barriers and costs to tenants and owner-occupiers alike. 
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According to Brett Christophers (2013, p. 3), ‘…the current Swedish housing system palpably 
does not ‘work’’. The juxtaposition, then, between the celebrated social market housing system, 
and the contemporary situation which I briefly outlined in the opening paragraphs could barely 
be starker. Indeed, the housing reality many Swedish households confront today (particularly 
those on low- and middle-income groups, single-parent households, immigrants, and the asset-
poor elderly and young), is defined more by precarity than universality; with the so-called black 
market for rentals5 (svartmarknad) estimated to be worth over one billion kronor (€100,000,000) 
in Stockholm alone (SvD, 2014); house price-to-income ratios for the country as a whole higher 
than in Great Britain; and with some of the highest levels of socioeconomic and ethnic segregation 
in Europe (Hübinette and Lundström 2014, p. 51; Sernhede, Thörn and Thörn, 2016). 
 What makes the Swedish case more puzzling is that, despite the manifest housing system 
dysfunction, Sweden still retains many of the core institutional facets which underpinned its 
much-vaunted social market system throughout the mid- to late-twentieth century. Tenure 
neutrality and universality are still guiding policy principles; albeit more at the discursive plane 
(Bengtsson, 2015, p. 13). Housing cooperatives, which emerged during the early-twentieth 
century in response to some of the worst housing conditions in Europe, remain core features of 
the Swedish housing landscape6. Corporatist-style rent negotiations, which have been in place 
since the early 1970s still maintain a core position in the organisation of the contemporary 
Swedish rental market; and the rental queuing system established in the aftermath of the Second 
World War remains (broadly) in place. How, then, can a system which, prima facie, still exhibits 
many of the institutional hallmarks of a decommodified, social democratic welfare housing 
system, heralded during the mid- to late-twentieth century as one of the most effective models of 
housing in the world, exhibit such dysfunction? What has changed? 
 Shiller provides one explanation for the current levels of housing system dysfunction. His 
contention that there has been a change in public thinking of housing as an investment is an 
acknowledgement that contemporary residential housing has become the focus of what Samuel 
Knafo (2009, p. 129) has termed, modern forms of speculation7. The change in public thinking 
which Shiller references, then, is representative of a much broader stratum of society than has 
been accommodated by the historical record hitherto and involves a greater range of investors 
(ibid.), whose outlook on housing has ostensibly changed to the point where they believe that 
there’s more value than there really is in their homes.  
                                               
 
5 A market consisting of non-regulated subletting and illegal trading in rental apartments (Hägred and Martinson, 2006).  
6 Sweden has the largest cooperative housing sector in the world today. 
7 That is to say speculative practices which ‘revolve around an increasingly collective form of speculation’ (emphasis 
added), as opposed to the premodern ‘elitist’ forms of speculation ‘linked to the development of arbitrage’ (Knafo, 
2009, p. 129). 
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 Disregarding his rather insouciant assessment of value and price determination for now, 
Shiller’s identification of a Swedish housing bubble raises several fundamental questions about 
house price growth in particular, and housing system development more generally. The dynamics 
underlying the household sentiment driving housing price bubbles have been famously articulated 
by Shiller with his co-author, Karl E. Case (Case and Shiller, 2003), and the following passage 
from this acclaimed collaboration is worth citing at length: 
 
During a housing price bubble, homebuyers think that a home that they would normally 
consider too expensive for them is now an acceptable purchase because they will be 
compensated by significant further price increases. They will not need to save as much as they 
otherwise might, because they expect the increased value of their home to do the saving for 
them. First-time homebuyers may also worry during a housing bubble that if they do not buy 
now, they will not be able to afford a home later. Furthermore, the expectation of large price 
increases may have a strong impact on demand if people think that home prices are very 
unlikely to fall, and certainly not likely to fall for long, so that there is little perceived risk 
associated with an investment in a home. 
 
If expectations of rapid and steady future price increases are important motivating factors 
for buyers, then home prices are inherently unstable (Case and Shiller, 2003, pp. 299–300, 
emphasis added). 
 
As interesting, and important, as these observed behavioural dynamics are, what Case and Shiller 
neglect to do is couch these phenomena historically or interrogate the determinants which gave 
rise to these dynamics in the first place. Furthermore, by psychologising financial bubbles (Knafo, 
2009, p. 129) in this way, they isolate demand-side dynamics from the wider workings of housing 
and finance system development.  
 Housing scholars have attributed the current state of housing system dysfunction in 
Sweden to a ‘system switch’ (Clark and Johnson, 2009, p. 184) in which Sweden’s social market 
housing system witnessed, ‘…a rapid transition from a regulated and subsidised, social 
democratic housing system to a deregulated, market-based system’ during the 1990s (Andersson 
and Magnusson Turner, 2014, p. 4). Such accounts have emphasised the centrality of policy 
changes and ostensibly exogenous ideological influences and processes which are often placed 
under the unifying banner of neoliberalism (Clark and Johnson, 2009; Hedin et al., 2012). 
Political economists, too, have argued that successive ‘powerful doses of neoliberalisation’ 
(Christophers, 2013, p. 3), have contributed to the present housing dysfunction in Sweden, with 
Claes Belfrage and Markus Kalifatides (2018, p. 17) arguing that ‘pre-neoliberal and neoliberal 
elements’ have produced ‘strong, financialising dynamics in the economy’. These accounts are 
not necessarily incompatible with Shiller’s. Indeed, much like him, the vast majority of housing 
scholars with an interest in Sweden contextualise the present levels of housing system dysfunction 
by citing relatively recent changes, albeit at the politico-ideational and policy planes.  
 It is not possible to visually encapsulate the behavioural, ideological and policy dynamics 
which the aforementioned authors describe, but if we want to conceive the changes of which they 
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refer within a temporal frame, a look at the development of real house prices probably represents 
the best, albeit imperfect, proxy. House price rises in contexts where the growth of mortgage 
credit outstrips the net growth in the supply of new houses and incomes, generally implies a 
situation of worsening housing affordability, which, ceteris paribus, has implications for a range 
of housing outcomes such as accessibility and social mix. Real house price developments also 
give us an inexplicit insight into housing supply, as Michael Ball (2010, p. 943) notes: ‘House 
price rises at best have zero-sum outcomes and, at worst, show that far too little housing is being 
built’. A perfunctory glance at nearly a century and a half of house price data in Sweden reveals 
that real house prices have risen to a degree that is unprecedented in a historical perspective 
(Edvinsson, Jacobson and Waldenström, 2014, p. 51). Indeed, such is the scale of house price 
growth in recent decades, that the housing ‘bubbles’ of the pre-1970s era are imperceptible in 
Figure ii (below).  
   
Figure ii. House prices in Sweden, 1875-2013 (nominal index, 1990=100) 
 
 
Source: Knoll, Schularick and Steger, 2017  
 
 A perfunctory glance at Figure ii gives credence to the notion that a change or switch in 
Sweden’s housing system may have occurred during the 1990s and, as I explore in Chapter V, 
the early 1990s did indeed represent a critical juncture in Sweden’s housing and finance timeline. 
However, critical junctures do not occur in vacuums, and by citing demand-side behaviours and 
processes such as neoliberalism and financialisation as the core drivers of contemporary housing 
system dysfunction, scholars often obscure the path-dependant nature of housing and finance 
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system development8. Steffan Kofner argues of ‘housing market interventions’ that ‘[t]he history 
of intervention has to be taken into account, as the path of interventions through time shapes 
market outcomes at least as much as the current institutional setting’ (Kofner, 2014, p. 260, 
emphasis added). Indeed, by appealing to ‘system switches’, ‘rapid transitions’ and ‘changes in 
public thinking’, scholars largely gloss over the behavioural legacies, norms, and expectations 
which a housing stock and attendant system of housing finance generate over decades. As such, 
the sectoral actors, interests and capacities which help to shape the rules of the game, vis-à-vis 
housing investment, production, consumption and distribution are, all too often, left empirically 
and theoretically unchecked. 
 A closer look at Figure ii revels that, while house price growth has indeed been 
unprecedented since the mid-1990s, the upward trend did not begin then. Indeed, prices more 
than doubled throughout the 1970s and, in the context of subsequent growth, the calamitous boom 
and bust cycle of the mid-1980s and the early 1990s looks like a mere glitch in an otherwise 
meteoric house price trajectory. What, then, enables such phenomenal and enduring house price 
growth beyond buyer sentiment? What can historical developments in finance, institutional 
governance, and housing supply tell us about the propensity of firms and households to resort to 
debt in order to finance the production and consumption of housing? What is distinctive about the 
Swedish housing system of the post-1960s era which marks it out from the previous century? 
And, finally, if the answer to any of these questions is neoliberal regulation or financialised 
growth regimes, then what are the specific, concrete practices and processes by which actors in 
Sweden’s housing and finance systems filter and (re)produce these phenomena?  
 This thesis attempts to address these questions by engaging with a broad range of 
literature from a variety of disciplines. I draw upon a vast array of primary and secondary sources, 
and unique data series, in order to provide (to my knowledge) a more detailed and comprehensive 
empirical survey of housing and finance system development in Sweden than has been attempted 
hitherto. In the pages that follow, I explore how class and sectoral cleavages have shaped housing 
and finance system development in Sweden; how the state (both local and national) has 
historically negotiated and mediated speculative housing dynamics; and how the methods and 
means of mobilising housing finance inexorably condition housing system development, 
providing the fulcrum whereby class and sectoral dynamics play out. I argue that the Swedish 
model of housing during the twentieth century, which, for so long, was held up as a paragon of 
social market efficiency and stability, was in fact an ephemeral phenomenon and that the current 
levels of precarity and dysfunction in Sweden’s housing system have a longer pedigree than many 
scholars assume.  
                                               
 
8 Christophers (2013) and Belfrage and Kalifatides (2018) are notable exceptions here. 
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 I show how a unique model of political economy and industrial relations created one of 
the world’s first housing industrial complexes9, producing one of the most concentrated and 
powerful construction and finance sectors in the world. How, as this complex developed, housing 
supply came to be totally decoupled from demand from the 1970s onwards. How speculative 
housing dynamics and changing attitudes to financial risk generated from outside formal banking 
channels undermined the basis of the housing industrial complex and, with it, traditionally 
decommodified housing forms. How the state moved from attempting to mitigate the risk-taking 
behaviours of financiers, investors and households, to promoting speculative housing dynamics 
and embracing the development of a housing finance complex. And how the state-sponsored 
‘explosion’ of house prices and housing related debt, far from being a contemporary aberration 
of ‘financialised neoliberalism’, has been a central feature of the Swedish model of housing for 
over 40 years. By resituating contemporary speculative housing dynamics in their broader social 
and historical contexts, then, this thesis seeks to uncover the socioeconomic context in which 
housing in Sweden came to be constituted as an object of speculation (Bryan, Martin and Rafferty, 
2009, p. 471).  
 It should be noted here that the housing situation I have described in these opening pages, 
and the housing crisis innumerous scholars and commentators decry in Sweden, is one in which 
house-price volatility, financial system crisis, and economic dislocation are currently not features. 
As noted above, Sweden has stood almost alone in the OECD in experiencing a period of over 
twenty years of nigh uninterrupted house price growth and has performed better than most 
European economies since the GFC. This could all change rapidly, of course, but predicting the 
timing of crises is folly. What is more interesting for our purposes is to understand the hitherto 
robustness of the institutional arrangements supporting housing speculation in Sweden, and how, 
unlike previous eras, these speculative dynamics have interacted with the nature of regulation and 
industrial activity vis-à-vis housing and the built environment to a point where, as Samuel Knafo 
(2009, p. 137) notes in relation to the USA, ‘…regulating authorities have come to tailor 
institutions and regulations to the requirements of sustaining […] bubbles rather than stemming 
them’. 
 
Rethinking the relationship between housing and finance 
 
The central objective of this thesis is to explore how long-term financial dynamics in Sweden 
have shaped and been shaped by the Swedish housing system on both the demand- and supply-
side from the mid-nineteenth century to the present era. The following pages investigate the 
historical co-evolution of housing and finance systems, telling the story of how Sweden 
                                               
 
9 I adapt this concept from Lars Jonung (1994, p. 358). 
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transitioned from a poor agrarian economy with the worst housing conditions in Western Europe 
during the nineteenth century era of industrial urbanisation, to becoming a social market pin-up 
for progressive housing scholars and commentators throughout the course of the twentieth 
century. In telling this story, the thesis charts the development of Sweden’s political economy 
through the prisms of housing and finance system development, seeking to understand the 
confluent sectoral interests and state capacities underlying the creation of a housing industrial 
complex during the mid-twentieth century; how this complex of production and exchange was 
undermined from the 1970s onwards; and how, since the 1980s, the emergence of a housing 
finance complex has seen Sweden’s housing system become one of the most precarious and 
dysfunctional in the developed world; predicated, as it is, upon debt-fuelled housing consumption, 
low levels of housing production, speculative investment, and the residualisation of traditionally 
decommodified tenure-forms.  
 Throughout, I adopt a historicist approach to housing and finance system development 
which seeks to unpack not just contemporary housing processes and outcomes in an era of so-
called financialised neoliberalism, but also the socio-historical and politico-economic contours 
which gave rise to Sweden’s celebrated social market housing system. The impetuses for this 
historical focus are twofold. The first is practical: If we want to truly understand how phenomena 
such as neoliberalism and financialisation transform housing systems, then, first and foremost, 
we need to understand the systems they are said to be transforming. The second reason is more 
based on a concern for future pathways: If the Swedish housing model of much of the twentieth 
century was as exceptional as scholars such as Headly, Kenn, and Kemeny describe, then 
understanding what gave rise to such a system, and learning how past struggles shaped it, is of 
uttermost importance during an era where housing systems throughout the developed world are 
considered to be in state of crisis (Marcuse and Madden, 2016). 
 Where this work differs, in my view, from other research into housing is that this is not 
strictly an exercise in housing research per se, but more an attempt to fashion a political economy 
approach to the study of housing systems. I am not the first to attempt this (Schwartz and 
Seabrooke, 2009; Christophers, 2013; Aalbers and Christophers, 2014). However, housing 
researchers and political economists have generally paid far too little attention to the institutional 
complexion of housing finance systems (Boleat, 1985), and less still to the role of housing finance 
in the constitution of housing system development historically. Instead, housing scholars have 
had a tendency to isolate housing developments from the wider financial systems they inhabit, 
citing political ideology as the core driver of housing system change; with little consideration for 
the path-dependant nature of said systems, or the formative impact of finance therein.  
 While ideological concerns are, of course, important, I argue that these factors should not 
be propagated at the expense of examining financial processes and capacities, and their impacts 
on the constitution of housing systems on both the demand- and the supply-side. While political 
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actors may decide the rules of the game, how that game is played, and, importantly, who helps 
decide the rules, is dependent upon a range of historically and socio-economically contingent 
factors, which interact through time and space. Sweden’s largest cooperative housing association, 
HSB, once noted that, ‘[a] basic prerequisite for the provision of housing is access to capital’ 
(HSB, 1975, p. 56). It is, therefore, quite intriguing that the role of housing finance (how it is 
mobilised, over what time period, and by whom) is so often ignored in the study of housing system 
development, both in Sweden and further afield (Blackwell and Kohl, 2018a). 
 
The thesis is organised around four main research questions.   
 
1. What impacts have changes in the constitution of housing finance and 
household debt had on housing system development in Sweden on both the 
demand- and supply-side? (Chapters I-V). 
2. Which actors and expressions of interest have had most influence over housing 
policy and housing outcomes, both historically and contemporarily? (Chapters 
II-V). 
3. Why do housing policy regimes change? (Chapters II-V). 
4. What role has institutional governance played in bringing about and sustaining 
a housing system increasingly predicated upon debt-fuelled housing 
consumption, growing wealth inequality, low levels of housing production, and 
the residualisation of traditionally decommodified tenure-forms? (Chapters IV 
& V). 
 
In order to address these questions, I adopt an actor-centred, historicist framework of analysis, 
which explores how the distribution of preferences (Huber and Stephens, 2001) and housing and 
finance system outcomes evolve path-dependently. I adopt such a framework, supported by 
longitudinal data analysis and an array of comparative descriptive statistics, in order to understand 
the geneses of housing and finance system forms and the social forces that brought them about 
(which contemporary housing scholars so often take for granted), as well as the constellations of 
interests and preferences which continue to sustain and mould them via institutional conduits.  
 Such an approach involves taking seriously the collective engagements of actors on both 
the demand- and supply-side (and their interactions), differentiated at the level of policy-making 
(local and national), financial intermediation and governance, households, and housing 
production. Particular attention is paid to the role and development of speculative housing 
dynamics and practices during the various phases of Sweden’s politico-economic development, 
and the state’s role in sustaining these dynamics therein. By examining the co-evolution of 
housing and financial forms in Sweden, charting their emergence and developmental trajectories 
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through time, and the distribution of interests shaping housing and finance system change, the 
thesis seeks to challenge several core assumptions proliferating in much housing studies and 
political economy literature.  
 The first such assumption relates to the juxtaposition many scholars propagate between 
forms of liberal and social market governance vis-à-vis housing market interventions. While this 
intellectual debate is much broader than the issue of housing in Sweden, an analysis of Swedish 
housing and finance system development, I argue, provides the ideal case study to challenge 
preconceptions about the nature of liberal and social market governance. It is so often assumed 
that liberal market governance takes a passive, non-interventionist form, while social market 
governance is active and pro-interventionist. This liberal-social market dichotomy, as I argue in 
Chapters II and III, in the context of Swedish housing system development during the late-
nineteenth and early to mid-twentieth centuries, is thoroughly misleading.  Indeed, upon closer 
inspection of the historical record, it is only if one totally ignores the sphere of housing finance 
and the state’s role in mobilising said finance, that one could convincingly draw such conclusions 
in Sweden. However, as I show, even then, the idea that the pre-1930s liberal state was somehow 
passive and ‘hands-off’ in relation to housing policy is highly questionable. This speaks to my 
method of analysing housing and finance, not as exogenous variables which may interact now 
and then, but as endogenously related phenomena. 
 Another assumption this thesis seeks to challenge concerns the relationship between 
housing and welfare systems posited by housing scholars. There is a long-established tradition in 
housing studies of relating housing system typologies to welfare systems and/or varieties of 
residential capitalism (Kemeny, 1995; Schwartz and Seabrooke, 2009; Wood, 2017). The basic 
premise underpinning this tradition is that housing system difference within Europe and the 
OECD can be explained along the lines of differences in welfare state constitution. This logic is 
most famously articulated by Kemeny in relation to rental market composition, but there are 
numerous iterations of this. By examining the longue durée of housing and finance system 
development in Sweden, I cast doubt on this supposed association. Whilst the constitution of 
welfare states is by no means inconsequential (Western European welfare states generally have 
much more universalist housing policies than elsewhere in the Western, and particularly the non-
Western world), I argue that the case of Sweden illustrates that housing typologies causally 
derived from welfare state typologies are ill-suited to explaining housing system logics within 
Europe. Indeed, as Chapters IV & V make clear, any supposed link between housing and welfare 
typologies during the twentieth century in Europe were largely ephemeral. 
 A final assumption, which I deal with in detail in the final and concluding chapters, relates 
to the ostensible associations between neoliberalism and household debt. It has become a core 
assumption in political economy literature that a confluence of declining welfare provisions and 
stagnant real-wages have contributed to the need for low and middle-income groups to resort to 
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credit in order to sustain basic living standards10. This hypothesis, which views the dramatic rise 
of household debt as an economic corollary of declining living standards, has become a defining 
feature of prevalent understandings of the associations between neoliberalism and household debt 
in the field of IPE11. Again, Sweden provides an ideal case study to challenge such causal logics. 
I show by focusing on housing in Sweden, that these theorems are unsuited for understanding not 
just the build-up of household debt in Sweden, but also in Anglo-America, and elsewhere.  
 Why, the reader may enquire, would one select Sweden to conduct a historical case study 
into housing and finance system dynamics in order to challenge these scholarly assumptions? And 
what about wider generalisability? A good case could be made for adopting a comparative-
historical approach in this thesis in order to address these themes; for as Marc Bloch (1954) notes, 
‘…there is no true understanding without a certain range of comparison’. In light of this 
observation, many of the descriptive statistics presented in this thesis are cross-sectional, and 
throughout, reference is made to housing and finance system developments elsewhere in Europe 
and the OECD, as well as to geopolitical events. However, whereas a strictly comparative-
historical framework would provide breadth, it would necessarily compromise depth. The 
following citation from Bent Flyvbjerg superbly highlights the value of in-depth case study 
research: 
 
When the objective is to achieve the greatest possible amount of information on a given 
problem of phenomenon, a representative case or a random sample may not be the most 
appropriate strategy. This is because the typical or average case is often not the richest in 
information. Atypical or extreme cases often reveal more information because they activate 
more actors and more basic mechanism in the situation studied (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 229). 
 
Sweden represents an extreme case. As noted above, it is considered to be the most advanced 
social democratic welfare state and social market housing system in the developed world, yet, 
simultaneously, exhibits some of the highest levels of household debt, housing price growth, 
segregation and residualisation. As I explore in more detail below, this combination of features 
confounds the expectations of much mainstream political economy and housing studies literature, 
and the task of this thesis will be to understand why this is so; for, as I explore in the pages that 
follow, Sweden has not been entirely true to the script that housing scholars and political 
economists have long written for it.  
 
                                               
 
10 Various iterations of this argument proliferate throughout IPE literature, tacitly or otherwise. For explicit articulations 
see: (Cutler and Waine, 2001; Brewer, Clark and Wakefield, 2002; Montgomerie, 2007, 2009, 2010; Lapavitsas, 2009; 
Panitch and Gindin, 2011). 
11 An adjunct of this thesis, the asset-backed welfare theorem, argues that the augmentation of home and asset-
ownership has been supported by, ‘…coercive mechanism[s] linked to state retreat in the provision of welfare-
enhancing resources’ (Watson, 2009, p. 61). According to this theorem, households are said to leverage themselves via 
housing conduits in order to increase their future consumption potential in the face of declining state support. 
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Structure  
 
The thesis is organised as follows. In the first chapter, I survey the field of housing studies and 
explore literature pertaining to housing and housing finance in Sweden. Here I also flesh out the 
theoretical and methodological components of the thesis briefly outlined above. This chapter 
serves to anchor the thesis’ problematic, showing how housing scholars, by isolating housing 
system developments from the wider financial and production systems in which they are 
embedded, create problematic causal inferences. I also outline the conceptual merits of a 
historicist, actor-centred approach to the study of housing and finance system development. 
 The second chapter begins the historical survey of Sweden’s housing and finance system 
development. In this chapter, I return to events which shaped Sweden’s financial system and show 
how developments in agrarian finance would have ramifications for Sweden’s urban housing 
finance for nearly two centuries to come. Here I argue that we cannot fully understand the 
emergence and significance of the state sponsored urban mortgage banks of the early-twentieth 
century, without reference to the development of the rural, bond-based mortgage banks in the 
nineteenth century. I also show how, from the late-nineteenth century onwards, the state was 
much more involved in the functioning of the Swedish housing and finance systems than is 
commonly supposed, and how local authorities engaged in speculative land trading in order to 
augment their fiscal power. In so doing, I challenge the dichotomy some scholars posit between 
the so-called passive liberal state and the so-called interventionist social democratic state. I also 
show how, during this period, institutions emerged which would form central pillars of the 
housing industrial complex and the social democratic housing programmes of the mid-twentieth 
century. 
 The third chapter explores the age of social democratic hegemony in relation to the build-
up of state capacity during the previous century and the establishment of a housing industrial 
complex. Here I argue that, far from departing radically from the housing system of the interwar 
years, the social democrats used the pre-existing nexus of actors and institutions to build the 
People’s Home (Folkhemmet). As I show, however, there was significant lag between rhetoric 
and the emergence of a bona fide people’s home. Indeed, it was not until radical changes in the 
pension fund system in the late-1950s and early-1960s that the Swedish Social Democrats would 
be able to make their indelible mark on Sweden’s housing system. This was the age in which 
Sweden developed its housing industrial complex, the likes of which the world had never seen. 
 In Chapter IV, I examine the tensions and contradictions which built up within the 
housing industrial complex and how speculative dynamics in urban rental markets, in an era of 
low productivity and rampant inflation, put the Swedish model of housing onto a different 
trajectory from that which had characterised its development during the immediate post-War 
decades. While I consider demand-side factors and household demand, the focus of this chapter 
 
 
 
15 
is predominantly on the housing supply-side. Specifically, I explore the changing dynamics 
between local authorities and construction capital. I argue here that insuperable tensions and 
contradictions in Sweden’s housing industrial complex lead to the collapse of the model of 
housing predicated on the mass production of housing and low marginal rates of profit, and that, 
from the mid-1970s onwards, construction firms and developers were having a greater say over 
what was being built than at any time since the early-1930s. 
 The final chapter explores how the tensions and contradictions in Sweden’s housing 
system during the 1970s and 1980s led to an era of so-called neoliberalism. My account here 
differs from others in that I identify the roots of housing system dysfunction (which critical 
scholars label ‘neoliberal’) as predating the banking crisis of the early-1990s. By analysing the 
temporal dynamics of this crisis and its ‘resolution’ (the build-up, dénouement, and recovery) I 
argue that the crisis was a growing pain in the development of what I term a housing finance 
complex. That is to say, a system of housing and finance in which high marginal rates of profit 
and low levels of production on the housing supply-side, are combined with speculative housing 
investment, and a system of bank lending which privileges lending to households and financial 
services over lending to non-financial corporations. 
 Finally, the concluding chapter summarises the key findings of the thesis and attempts to 
couch them in relation to more general observations about the nature of the contemporary Swedish 
political economy. While I am aware of the limits of analysing a single case, and of making 
broader claims about the dynamics of housing and finance system development, I hope that the 
theoretical and methodological approach that I build throughout this thesis, will prove coherent 
and instructive enough to be applied and adapted to other cases, and even to more explicitly 
comparative housing research and political economy studies. Many of the problems and questions 
this thesis raises are bigger than the issue of housing and finance in Sweden; but this is not to say 
that a thoroughgoing analysis of these phenomena, and the mechanisms by which they co-evolve, 
cannot shed light on broader historical and contemporary dynamics elsewhere in the post-
industrial world. 
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Chapter I. Housing, finance and theory 
 
A basic prerequisite for the provision of housing is access to capital  
 
Hyresgästernas sparkasse - och byggnadsförening (HSB) 1975 
 
1.0. Introduction   
 
Sweden has long been held up as a prototypical social democratic welfare state, with a housing 
system that is seen broadly to reflect its welfare state tradition (Turner and Whitehead, 2002). The 
image of Sweden’s housing system as the social market ideal type - with tenure neutrality, 
universality, strong tenants’ rights, accessibility, and affordability at its core - has been challenged 
somewhat of late, however, with some scholars recognising that Sweden’s housing system has 
not always held true to the expectations attributed to its social market ideals and characteristics 
(Clark and Johnson, 2009; Christophers, 2013). Accounts of recent housing transformations have 
often explained contemporary housing system outcomes in relation to neoliberal housing reforms 
but, as this chapter explores, all too often, such accounts fail to accommodate core processes and 
events which begged questions of the salience of the ‘Swedish model’ even prior to the era of so-
called neoliberalism.  
 Part of the reason for this oversight is that scholars have tended to focus overwhelmingly 
on housing-as-policy (Aalbers and Christophers, 2014), while treating developments in the 
spheres of housing finance and housing supply as inconsequential; or even ignoring them 
altogether. This chapter explores how and why this is so problematic for housing scholars’ and 
economists’ attempts to account for housing system change. The chapter’s objectives are twofold. 
First, I engage with a range of literature pertaining to contemporary housing and finance 
developments in order to couch the themes outlined in the introduction more concretely in relation 
to the project’s central research questions. Second, building upon this engagement, I lay the 
conceptual foundations for the thesis, and advance a historicist, path dependence framework 
which attempts to accommodate both the determinants of short-term events and the longue durée 
(Huber and Stephens, 2001) into the study of housing and finance system development. 
 Despite the epistemic diversity of the scholarly approaches I explore in the following 
pages, they all share a common object of study: housing. And whether explicitly acknowledged, 
or not, these works are situated within the multi-disciplinarily field of housing studies. A striking 
theme in much of this scholarship (whether explicitly comparative or not) is the cross-sectional 
juxtaposition of two ostensibly discrete housing system forms: social market versus (neo)liberal. 
Even those scholars who do not articulate housing system difference explicitly in this manner, 
often engage with these binaries, to greater or lesser degrees, by deploying subtly different 
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grammars (regulated versus deregulated; liberalised versus controlled; centralised versus 
marketised, to name but a few), and such approaches make a series of a priori assumptions about 
how each of these systems of housing ought to behave in light of their stylised characteristics.  
 Much debate has been generated within the field of housing studies from the binary 
distinction between (neo)liberal and social market housing systems and, derived from this, the 
question of whether, and the extent to which, housing systems in Europe and the OECD can be 
said to be converging along neoliberal lines (Harloe, 1995), or perpetually diverging (Kemeny, 
1995), looms large. This discussion stretches back to the late-1960s (Donnison, 1967), and very 
much mirrors research into comparative institutional change in the fields of political economy, 
political science, and sociology (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Albert, 1993; Hall and Soskice, 2001; 
Streeck and Thelen, 2005). For our purposes, what is significant here is the special position 
Swedish housing occupies in this research tradition.  
 Jim Kemeny (1995; 2005), and Herman Schwartz and Leonard Seabrooke (2009) 
recognise Sweden’s housing system as the social market ideal type, characterised by low levels 
of homeownership, tenure security, universality, a large non-profit (unitary) rental sector 
bolstered by a strong tenant’s movement, and, according to Schwartz and Seabrooke (2009, p. 
10), an ability to target sectors due to the state’s leverage over financial markets. More recent 
research by Roger Andersson and Lina Magnusson Turner (2014), and Karin Hedin et al. (2012, 
p. 460), however, has claimed that there has been a transition to a neoliberal housing system, and 
Hans Lind and Stellan Lundström (2007) argue that Sweden has ‘…gradually become one of the 
most liberal market-governed housing markets in the Western world’ (translated in Hedin et al., 
2012, p. 444).  Nuancing these assessments, Brett Christophers (2013, p. 4) claims that the 
Swedish housing system represents a monstrous hybrid of regulated and deregulated forms, which 
acts as a ‘decisive mechanism for the creation, reproduction and intensification of socio-economic 
inequalities’.  
 While the jury may still be out vis-à-vis the scale and scope of neoliberalisation and 
deregulation in the Swedish housing system, a common difficulty many such analyses face when 
attempting to account for contemporary housing system change, is that, all too often, they say 
little more than: ‘housing in country y has been neoliberalised along the lines of country x’. By 
way of example, Eric Clark and Karin Johnson (2009, p. 179) identify the ‘‘system switch’ in 
Swedish housing policy’ as being a product of ‘the concerted neoliberal restoration of class 
power’, emanating ‘From Chicago and Washington via Santiago, New York and London’ (Clark 
and Johnson, 2009, p. 179). However, central to such an assessment is a curious paradox which 
assumes that neoliberalism as an outcome (‘system switch’), however ‘circumscribed’12, can be 
                                               
 
12 The phrase ‘circumscribed neoliberalism’ is taken from David Harvey (2007). 
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explicated by citing neoliberalisation as a process leading towards said outcome13 (‘the concerted 
neoliberal restoration of class power’). In other words, neoliberalisation explains neoliberalism. 
Often amalgamated into this somewhat tautological logic is the idea that ostensibly both process 
and outcome can be theorised as an importation from other institutional contexts (principally 
Anglo-America, or the EU14). The explanandum, then, seamlessly morphs into the explanans, 
with an added layer of institutional diffusion, which is seldom expounded beyond references to 
ideational change. But what, exactly, is a neoliberal housing system and how does such a system 
come to be? 
 Depending on the analytical focus, neoliberalism (or neoliberalisation) can imply 
increasing segregation (Andersson and Magnusson Turner, 2014); growing socioeconomic and 
spatial inequality (Hedin et al., 2012); a reduction in supply-side housing subsidies (Christophers, 
2013); or even greater levels of homeownership (Holmqvist and Magnusson Turner, 2014, p. 238; 
Ronald, 2008, p. 117; Kemeny, 1995). Yet, as noted above, in most of these cases, the very 
phenomenon (neoliberalism) these scholars explore in relation to housing system outcomes (i.e. 
segregation, spatial inequality, or greater levels of homeownership et cetera), also becomes the 
process which explains the outcome of said phenomenon. To be clear, this logical tautology does 
not necessarily negate or detract from the importance of the theoretical or empirical findings in 
much of this body of research, but it certainly creates a problem if we wish to understand how 
and why the processes and outcomes they assess have come about in the first place. 
 In the case of Sweden, then, any change or supposed deviation from the ideal type which 
the Swedish housing system ostensibly represents (or at least used to ostensibly represent), is 
necessarily seen as a sign of neoliberalisation. As I explore in this chapter and the chapters that 
follow, however, the problem such accounts face is that, all too often, they compartmentalise 
developments in Swedish housing to a ‘before’ (social market housing) and ‘after’ stage15 
(neoliberal housing). Indeed, instead of interrogating how neoliberal housing transformations 
gained traction, there is a tendency to treat these developments as a sudden rupture; something 
unleashed, rather than something that developed more gradually, dynamically, or even unevenly 
(both spatially and temporally), over a longer time period. 
 The same can be said for historical research into Swedish housing during the pre- and 
interwar years (see Chapter II), whereby the inverse transition is cited. Scholars have a tendency 
to neatly compartmentalise ‘before’ (liberal housing) and ‘after’ (social market housing) phases 
                                               
 
13 I have adapted this formulation from Justin Rosenberg (2000, p. 2). Rosenberg’s object of critique was the scholarly 
operationalisation of globalisation, but this critique also aptly applies to operationalisations of neoliberalism in housing 
studies, and beyond. 
14 Clark and Johnson (2009, p. 181) and Hedin et al. (2012, p. 445) both reference the ‘adaptation to the new 
supranational order’ in relation to neoliberal housing reforms. 
15 In Hedin et al. (2012, p. 445), Table 1, ‘Swedish housing politics: From general welfare to market liberalism’ omits 
the 1980s altogether. We go from ‘general welfare’ housing programmes in the 1960s and 1970s, straight to the era of 
‘market liberalism’ in the 1990s.  
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of housing development (see: Hedin et al., 2012). As a consequence of such reasoning, the role 
of contingency is omitted, and, in the process, core events, policies, innovations, and practices 
generated by norms, expectations, and path dependent behavioural and institutional logics (on 
both the demand and supply-side), are often obscured or reduced to mere outcomes (or 
processes?) of top-down phenomena. This is not to say that periodisation and typology are not 
useful analytical and methodological tools; more that thoroughgoing comparative historical 
works should be complimented, not driven by these methodologies16.  
 It is this tendency towards compartmentalising discrete eras of housing system 
development along typological lines in housing scholarship that, I believe, forces scholars to fall 
back on the tautological logic outlined above. The reasons scholars do this can be manifold, but 
there is one unifying facet which reinforces, and arguably even augments, this tendency in much 
housing studies and political economy literature: that is the general conceptual and empirical 
disconnect between the study of housing and housing finance both contemporarily and through 
time. Put simply, ignorance of the sphere of housing finance on housing demand and supply, often 
precludes scholars from joining the dots (as it were), resulting in a collective failure to see how 
the constitution of housing finance and the generation of financial capacities (whether by state or 
non-state actors) influences housing system outcomes in time and place. This relationship 
between housing and finance, and how these spheres co-evolve, then, becomes a blind spot 
common in most of the works reviewed here.  
 Even those studies which claim to take finance seriously when examining housing system 
outcomes tend only to do so by falling back on the concept of financialisation17, which is all too 
often treated as a given, axiomatic phenomenon, which requires little explanation or evidence 
(Christophers, 2012). As with neoliberalism, scholars have been far too keen to derive their 
explanatory power from this concept, without so much as interrogating the basics of financial 
market dynamics18 or explaining how and why these dynamics have come about; let alone how 
said dynamics influence housing system change. In so doing, they replace one tautological logic 
with another, or even combine the two19. 
 This general state of analytical disconnect is particularly observable in the field of 
housing studies in the context of Sweden20. Each category, it seems, is treated as disciplinarily 
discrete and Swedish housing research has generally paid little (if any) attention to the 
                                               
 
16 In other words, authors should be mindful of uncritically recycling typologies in both time and space. See: (Blessing, 
2016). 
17 See Wood (2017). 
18 As Brett Christophers argues, ‘the accumulated body of analytical (as opposed to anecdotal) evidence for ‘actually-
existing’ financialisation is, for such a shibboleth of contemporary scholarship, remarkably and curiously thin’ 
(Christophers, 2012, p. 272). 
19 One such example is financialised neoliberalism: “neoliberalism is a stage in the development of capitalism 
underpinned by financialisation” (Fine and Saad-Filho, 2017, p. 685). 
20 Bengt Turner’s works are notable exceptions here. See: Turner (1999). 
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institutional apparatuses relating to housing finance; and less still to the implications of 
institutional restructuring for housing policy, household borrowing, and housing supply. 
Consequently, the distinctive institutional mechanisms and capacities that have helped facilitate 
rising household debt and consumption via housing conduits, and which have enabled developers 
to build lower volumes of housing at higher rates of profits (Örstadius, 2016), over the past four 
decades are often left unchecked. The task of this chapter is to illustrate why such oversights are 
problematic in both contemporary and historical research. 
 The chapter is comprised of two sections, each with two subsections. I begin with a 
survey of literature emanating from the field of housing studies, which relates specifically to 
contemporary housing developments in Sweden. Here, I review the contributions of housing 
scholars emanating from (mainly) Scandinavian research institutions in an attempt to identify the 
core features which are commonly said to have characterised the Swedish housing system over 
the past three decades. This is accompanied by a subsection in which I attempt to integrate the 
Swedish housing studies literature with that of broader literature concerning Swedish finance. 
Here I broaden the analysis to include economic assessments about the relationship between 
housing, tenure choice, and household debt, arguing that it is only by theorising the historical co-
evolution of housing and finance systems that we can begin to understand the changes in Swedish 
housing over the past 40 years, and move closer to a political economy of housing. This subsection 
acts both as a constructive review of the main contributions of economics and finance scholars, 
and as a conceptual bridge between the literature on housing and the final, theoretical concern of 
this chapter. 
 The second section of this chapter begins with an engagement with the general 
(predominantly Anglo-centric) literature on neoliberalism and financialisation. Here, I provide a 
critical outline of the operational uses of these concepts vis-à-vis housing system development 
and seek to unpack some of their perceived dynamics. In so doing, I demonstrate how these 
concepts (as currently operationalised) are ill-suited to the study of contemporary developments 
in Swedish housing and finance, and how the scholarly fixation with these phenomena obscures 
supply-side dynamics within housing systems. I argue that, if these terms are to be used, then they 
should be treated as proper objects of historical and social enquiry (Knafo, 2009, p. 129), which 
are produced and reproduced by the practices of actors (both state and non-state) over time; and 
not as catchalls to explain everything and anything that is dysfunctional about housing in twenty-
first century Sweden. I suggest a different (but not necessarily mutually exclusive) lens through 
which to view contemporary and historical dynamics in national housing and finance systems; 
one which views housing not as an institutionally isolated sphere, but as a complex of production, 
distribution and consumption (Dickens et al., 1985, p. 1), inextricably linked to the evolution of 
finance through time. 
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1.1. Housing & housing finance in Sweden: Surveying the field of housing 
research 
 
For some time now, there have been calls to fashion a more holistic approach to the study of 
housing from within the field of housing studies. Michael Harloe and Maartje Martens (1984, p. 
268) argued over thirty years ago that: ‘Much […housing] literature is superficial’, adding that, 
‘…often it […] abstracts housing policy developments from their broader economic and political 
context, and even from the workings of the housing system as a whole’. This is, clearly, a damning 
indictment of the field. They continue: 
 
Housing policies cannot be understood without locating them in the working of the housing 
sector as a whole and the housing sector itself cannot be understood as something which 
develops according to a purely internal dynamic, in isolation from broader social 
developments and struggles (Harloe and Martens, 1984, p. 268). 
 
Others have echoed these sentiments (Kemeny, 1981, 1995; Aalbers and Christophers, 2014). 
This section now considers contributions from housing scholars emanating from Scandinavian 
academies and scrutinises them on the basis of Harloe and Martens’ criteria of relevance: Do 
these analyses provide a broader economic and political context about the Swedish housing 
system as a whole, or do they, instead, theorise housing developments according to purely 
internal dynamics, in isolation from broader social developments and struggles? 
 
Soziale Marktwirtschaft  
 
 I turn now to a work of comparative housing research, which focuses predominantly on 
Sweden, in order to understand some of the institutional facets that have traditionally been said 
to characterise housing in Sweden. In his seminal monograph, From Public Housing to the Social 
Market, Kemeny (1995) argues the existence of two discrete housing system typologies based on 
the composition of national rental markets. His main focus, Sweden, represents an ideal-type, 
operating a mass welfare-housing model (or soziale Marktwirtschaft), based on a unitary rental 
system21. Access to public housing (allmännyttan22) is universal and this tenure-form competes 
directly with the private rental sector (hence unitary) on a cost rental basis. Rents are mediated 
by the existence of this competition, in conjunction with other institutional configurations, 
including a strong tenants’ union (Hyresgästföreningen) with an almost corporatist influence on 
the rental policy (Bengtsson, 2009, p. 6)23 and rent pooling, which dilutes the effects of 
                                               
 
21 Kemeny notes that this system is present in germanophone countries too. 
22 Allmännytta literally means “public good”. In theory, allmännyttan is public housing open to all and not social 
housing for economically marginal households, but practice over the last decade and a half suggest that it is increasingly 
for the latter, especially Sweden’s burgeoning immigrant and refugee populations (see Chapters IV & V). 
23 Bruksvärdes systemet traditionally involved rent negotiations between municipal landlords and tenants associations.  
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maturation24. This system ostensibly keeps rents low, meaning that incentives to own one’s home 
diminish.  
 Conversely, Kemeny argues that the ‘Anglo-Saxon’, profit-maximising model (or dualist 
rental system) residualises social housing, hiving it off (Kemeny, 1995, p. 51) from competition 
with the private rental sector. As access to public housing is restricted in such a system, Kemeny 
argues that demand is syphoned into commodified tenure-forms, such as private rental 
accommodation and owner-occupied housing. In the absence of rent ceilings, private rents are 
augmented and landlords, not tenants, reap the benefits of maturation. In such contexts, owner-
occupation becomes the most attractive tenure form. This generates a commodified housing 
regime, which Kemeny labels neoliberal. A corollary of such a regime is that households are 
jolted into homeownership (ibid. p. 55). Although the causal association is not always clear, 
Kemeny infers that the level of commodification within a country’s housing system is inextricably 
linked to the constitution of its welfare state (Kemeny, 2005). 
 Kemeny does not explicitly formulate the relationship between the Swedish housing 
market and households’ exposure to debt and financial risk (an intriguing omission, as I discuss 
later), but he does acknowledge that, by nature of its composition, the dualist rental system forces 
marginal buyers into owner occupation and that this, in turn, might have implications for 
household borrowing and financial stability (Kemeny, 1995, p. 54). Referencing the Right-to-Buy 
scheme championed by Margaret Thatcher in Great Britain, Kemeny argues: ‘It […] takes 
progressively larger and larger subsidies to bring about progressively smaller and smaller 
decreases in the ever more marginalised and impoverished rump of non-buyers’ (ibid.). He 
continues: ‘…the growing proportion of marginal buyers in the owner-occupied sector creates 
increasing instability in the owner-occupied housing market’, adding, ‘[w]ith high proportions of 
marginal buyers in the tenure owner occupation becomes more sensitive to economic boom-
slump cycles’ (ibid. p. 55). 
 It has been necessary to outline Kemeny’s theoretical and methodological premises here, 
principally because his work has been so influential, but also because, if we adapt Kemeny’s 
analytical insights, we can infer that the compositional organisation of a housing system has 
profound implications for households’ tenure choices and, consequently, borrowing decisions 
over the life cycle. The latter insight, although underdeveloped in Kemeny’s research, is important 
and will form a pillar of this thesis’ conceptual analysis.  
 Despite numerous merits, and the influence Kemeny’s typologies continue to have on 
contemporary housing research (Malpass, 2008; Schwartz and Seabrooke, 2009; van der Heijden, 
                                               
 
24 Kemeny defines maturation as the ‘declining real value of the outstanding debt on a stock of dwellings’ (Kemeny, 
1995, p. 42). This can be expressed as a ratio between the average debt per existing dwelling and the average debt per 
newly acquired dwelling (ibid.). 
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2013; Wood, 2017), his analysis suffers several problems. First, at the methodological level, his 
use of typologies leads him to make rather generalised assumptions. On the one hand, the 
packaging of Swedish housing as an ideal type, alongside germanophone countries, glosses over 
the inherent institutional differences within this grouping. On the other, irrespective of their place 
within the dualist model, a perfunctory inspection of the British, Australian, and US housing 
systems reveals chasmic historical and contemporary differences in their respective rental 
markets; the latter two marked by a distinct lack of social rented housing (<5%). Second, the 
claim that housing systems are inextricably linked to societal predilections towards ‘solidarity’ 
and ‘mass welfare’ under corporatism is conceptually nebulous and readily falsifiable25.  
 Third, the supremacy Kemeny’s framework awards to the power of ideas and the ability 
of ideologically motivated policy makers to fashion housing systems is problematic. His theory 
is attractive for analysing differential outcomes in housing systems, and for understanding how 
different compositional configurations mediate tenure choice, but his analysis is conducted with 
little regard for the historical evolution of housing systems or the core events, innovations and 
social constellations that brought such systems into existence in the first place!  
 Finally, at the empirical level, Kemeny neglects entirely the impacts of financial and 
regulatory developments on Swedish housing in the decades preceding his publication, and their 
implications for housing, borrowing and housing supply.  He thus ignores the structures of 
housing finance and the circuits of capital feeding into the Swedish housing system, which, I 
argue, fundamentally condition the behaviours of actors on both the demand- and supply-side, 
and the process of maturation. Indeed, the ratio between the average debt per existing dwelling 
and the average debt per newly acquired dwelling is not only affected by inflation and building 
costs, but also interest rates and mortgage liquidity. In the decade before his writing, liquidity 
ratio requirements were abolished; bank-lending ceilings loosened; and capital controls were 
removed. Sweden also experienced its most protracted economic dislocation since the Great 
Depression in the early-1990s, which Kemeny overlooks. This omission is troubling considering 
that the source of this economic dislocation was the collapse of an asset-bubble in the commercial 
and residential housing sectors (see Chapters IV & V). 
 Kemeny’s framework cannot explain the volatility that the Swedish housing system 
exhibited throughout the 1980s and early-1990s. Nor can it explain the concomitant fluctuations 
in household debt in Sweden. Either the typology is poorly matched to the case, or the ways 
scholars theorise housing system change and the impacts of so-called neoliberal reforms on 
households therein needs to be revised. Either way, Kemeny’s assumption that Sweden’s housing 
                                               
 
25 If it were the case that, causally, the composition of a welfare regime influences the composition of the housing 
sector, why would Norway, a prototype of the social-democratic welfare regime (Stamsø, 2009) operate a dualist rental 
model, with high levels of homeownership, akin to the so-called ‘Anglo-Saxon’ model? 
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system reflects the nature of its welfare state creates a misleading picture of housing in post-1970s 
Sweden. I explore the period leading up to the crisis of 1990-1993 briefly below. For now, though, 
we turn our attention to analyses of housing in Sweden published since the Global Financial 
Crisis, with the aim of understanding changes which Kemeny’s framework struggles to 
accommodate. 
 
Towards a comparative political economy of housing? 
 
 Since the Global Financial Crisis, political economists have attempted to understand the 
dynamics between housing and welfare systems and how the interactions between these spheres 
structure household borrowing. Of these attempts, Herman Schwartz and Leonard Seabrooke’s is 
the most renowned (Aalbers, 2015). Schwartz and Seabrooke (2009) attempt to construct new 
typologies centred on what they term ‘varieties of residential capitalism’. Drawing intellectually 
on the works of Gøsta Esping-Andersen (1990), and Kemeny (1981, 1995) they argue for the 
existence of four distinct typologies: corporatist market, liberal market, familial and statist-
developmentalist. These are schematised below in Figure 1.1, where countries are grouped in 
accordance to their deviation from mean levels of homeownership and mortgage debt. 
 Sweden is grouped within the statist-developmentalist assemblage, alongside France, 
Austria, Japan, Finland and Czech Republic. This grouping is apparently characterised by low-
levels of homeownership and securitisation and high levels of financial repression, which is 
defined as: ‘…systematic state control over the volume, direction and price of credit’ (Schwartz 
and Seabrooke, 2009, p. 2). 
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Figure 1.1. Relative Deviation from Mean Mortgage Debt and Homeownership 
 
 
 
 
Source: Schwartz & Seabrooke, (2009, p. 9) 
 
The first point to note is that there have been no such systematic state controls in Sweden since 
1985; Schwartz and Seabrooke are more than two decades late with this observation. Second, the 
timeframe they adopt is peculiar. Had they applied similar metrics using data between 1998 and 
2008 (which would have made considerable sense) instead of 1992-2002, this schema would have 
look very different and these categories would break down (as evidenced in Figure 1.2). Third, 
Sweden’s position in these typologies is empirically questionable. Dramatic household 
deleveraging took place in Sweden after the property bust of the early 1990s. The timeframe 
adopted by the above authors therefore ignores the high debt-levels prior to this period and the 
spectacular build-up of debt from 1998 onwards. Schwartz and Seabrooke, thus, recreate the same 
errors as Kemeny: these categories may be convenient, but they are not, on the whole, 
methodologically or empirically sound for the study of housing, finance and mortgage debt in 
Sweden. Indeed, more contemporary data reveals that these typologies simply do not hold. 
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Figure 1.2. Relative Deviation from Mean Mortgage Debt and Homeownership (2002-
2012) 
 
 
Sources: Blackwell & Kohl (Forthcoming) 
 Figure 1.2 reveals is a clustering of high-homeownership/low debt housing systems in 
the bottom right quadrant (predominantly in Southern and Eastern Europe and moderate-
homeownership/moderate debt clusters in the top left (much of North-Western Europe and the 
USA). It further reveals that the relationship between homeownership and debt is weakly negative 
(r2 =0.186) but, more importantly, it illustrates the problems of theory generation based on cross-
sectional snapshots. Indeed, Mark Stephens, Martin Lux and Petr Sunega (2015, p. 1212) have 
labelled Schwartz & Seabrooke’s framework as ‘substantially defective’. This criticism is perhaps 
a little too strong. Schwartz & Seabrooke’s contribution to the development of a political economy 
of housing was most timely and it has generated much welcome debate. While we may debate the 
(de)merits of their empirical contribution, their theoretical contribution, then, has been important. 
 
The Rapid Transition  
 
 More contemporary housing scholarship emanating from Sweden acknowledges changes 
to the Swedish housing system that Kemeny’s (1995, 2005) and Schwartz and Seabrooke’s 
analyses ignore. Roger Andersson and Lena Magnusson Turner (2014) analyse the impacts of 
tenure conversions in Stockholm since the early 1990s on social mix, noting that the Right-to-
Buy-style policy has increased levels of socio-economic segregation. They argue that this policy 
has been part of a ‘…rapid transition from a regulated and subsidised, social democratic housing 
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system to a deregulated, market-based system’ (Andersson and Magnusson Turner, 2014, p. 4). 
This begs the question: how did a ‘regulated and subsidised’ housing system transition to a 
volatile, market-based system predicated on mass homeownership, segregation, and higher levels 
of mortgage-related debt than either Great Britain or the USA?   
 Andersson and Magnusson Turner argue that, ‘[f]rom the 1930s and into the 1990s, 
public housing (allmännyttan) in Sweden was a key element in the Social Democrats’ ambition 
to construct a housing system that would secure high-quality, affordable housing for all’ (ibid. p. 
3). This appraisal echoes Kemeny’s. However, they depart from Kemeny, and Schwartz and 
Seabrooke, arguing that this system was dismantled by the Liberal-Conservative coalition in 
1991, under the stewardship of Karl Bildt. Curiously, there is no mention of one of the most 
significant changes enacted during this period: the implementation of the so-called Danell System 
(Danellsystemet)26, in 1992, which implemented the phasing out of supply-side interest subsidies 
on new residential construction (see Chapter V). According to Bengt Turner and Christine 
Whitehead, this system, ‘…turned out to be the first decisive step in reducing general subsidies 
and moving towards more targeted subsidies for both households and localities’ (Turner and 
Whitehead, 2002, p. 205)27, which (one would expect) would have implications for housing 
affordability, borrowing and, in turn, social mix. 
 Whilst the general findings and conclusions of these authors (that Sweden’s major cities 
are becoming increasingly segregated) are important and empirically sound, a closer look at 
Sweden’s housing timeline reveals that the transition of which they speak was anything but 
rapid.  Indeed, a study by Anna-Lisa Lindén (1989) found that, throughout the 1980s, low income 
groups, women, young people, and the elderly became increasingly overrepresented in Public 
Housing. Further, as I explore, housing affordability for homebuyers, and renters was put under 
strain from the mid-1970s onwards, as middle class households began taking on extraordinary 
levels of debt and opting for owner-occupied single-family housing to an extent hitherto 
unprecedented28; a form of what Ann Rodenstedt has termed self-segregation among privileged 
groups (Rodenstedt, 2014). I analyse these processes in more detail in the next subsection. For 
now, though, suffice to say that we would not expect a regulated and subsidized housing system 
to exhibit the price volatility (in both owner-occupied and rental sectors) that we witness in 
Sweden during the 1980s and early-1990s, or engender such high volumes of household debt, 
both of which have implications for social mix.  
                                               
 
26‘The Danell System’ was the implementation of a commission into housing led by Housing Minister, Georg Danell. 
based on the principle that construction companies should be exposed to the full interest rate risk. See Chapter V for 
detailed analysis. 
27 This, in essence, led to transference of risk from central government and municipalities, to Sweden’s extraordinarily 
narrow clique of domestic construction companies. 
28 Indeed, between 1968 and 1981, owner occupation increased by ten percentage points and the increase in the 
production of single-family dwellings accounts for much of this increase (Olsson, 1986, p. 53). 
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 In another article by Magnusson Turner, co-authored with Emma Holmqvist (2014), a 
direct claim is made about the associations between housing system composition, neoliberalism 
and debt. They argue that household liabilities are so high in Sweden today because of the 
neoliberal metamorphosis of housing (2014, p. 242). To their credit, they also mention 
macroeconomic factors. However, their analysis cannot explain the extraordinarily high historical 
levels of household debt in Sweden, or the abnormally low levels of amortization. If neoliberalism 
can explain all this, it is not clear how. The above authors, then, seem to use neoliberalisation as 
a catchall to explain anything that is dysfunctional with the Swedish housing system, ignoring the 
fact that dysfunction in the Swedish housing system predated the Conservative-Liberal coalition 
of the early 1990s. Rents (as early as the late-1970s) began to pull rapidly away from consumer 
prices and, in terms of the differential rate of change, the 1980s witnessed a more than doubling 
of real rents. This is de facto worsening affordability (even when adjusting for rising incomes), 
yet in the drive to compartmentalise periods of regulated and subsidised, soziale Marktwirtschaft, 
and marketised, deregulated, neoliberalism, the events, policies changes, innovations, social 
practices and supply-side dynamics which emerged in the 1970s and 1980s are almost completely 
ignored29. 
 
Monstrous hybridity 
 
 As deservedly influential as they are, what the above works lack is an analytical 
framework which can accommodate both gradual, accreted housing system change, and the role 
sectoral interests play therein. Housing system development is sticky and although changes may 
appear dramatic prima facie, they often rarely are upon closer inspection. Thus, to characterise 
Sweden’s housing system as neoliberal or marketised would suggest that it has changed beyond 
all recognition from its ideal type configuration to one which more closely resembles the US 
housing system (or any other housing system which scholars identify as neoliberal). Yet, this is 
palpably not the case.  
 Brett Christophers (2013) endeavours to fashion a political economy of housing in early 
twenty-first century Sweden in an attempt to resolve the convergence-divergence dichotomy 
referenced above. Christophers argues that contemporary institutional reforms have produced a 
monstrous hybrid. Housing in Sweden, thus, represents a unique combination of de-commodified 
and commodified housing-forms, which is highly dysfunctional: 
 
…the Swedish housing system […] represents a complex hybrid of Weberian ideal types. It 
is neither one thing (centralised and regulated) nor the other (marketised and deregulated), 
                                               
 
29 Andersson & Magnusson Turner (2014, p. 5) comment that, ‘…many of the politically induced changes in 
regulations, taxation, and the housing allowance system since the 1980s have affected all Swedish cities’, but do not 
elucidate further. 
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but a hybrid that has certainly received numerous powerful doses of neoliberalisation, and yet 
which remains, in key areas, regulated and, as such, relatively isolated from market forces 
and configurations (Christophers, 2013, p. 3). 
 
Distilling Christophers’ argument, housing systems exhibit path-dependencies, and elements of 
the social democratic housing system in Sweden still exist, but they do so alongside other, so-
called neoliberal elements. The reason Swedish scholars overlook this hybridity is because they 
implicitly adopt a convergence hypothesis, whereby it is assumed that the Swedish housing 
system has been transformed along neoliberal lines. As a consequence, they overlook some of 
the complex combined forms of housing system regulation, their interactions, and (importantly) 
the implications for household borrowing. Christophers’ contribution, then, is an important one.  
 Christophers’ asserts that Sweden has moved more towards Kemeny’s Anglo-Saxon, 
dualist rental system model (if only partially and unevenly) arguing that the current system leaves 
home-seekers with but one option: to buy (Christophers, 2013, p. 21). Here, like Kemeny, he is 
mindful of the discursive institutional frameworks that mediate tenure choice, and how housing 
systems are often arranged to favour tenure x over (and often at the direct expense of) tenure y (in 
this case homeownership over renting). He notes that the housing reforms privileging 
homeownership have brought the Swedish housing system close to ‘breaking point’ (ibid. p. 23). 
 Despite important conceptual and empirical insights, Christophers’ analysis omits a vital 
part of the equation: finance. Christophers analyses the residualisation of public housing and the 
conversion of allmännytta into cooperatives (à la Right-to-Buy), but there is no mention of the 
financial practices and processes which helped to facilitate such policies. This omission, in my 
view, makes it more difficult to understand the traction of the policy changes he describes. 
Christophers’ analysis, then, privileges the institutional configuration of housing tenure over 
financial developments and, by so doing, leaves the build-up of household debt in Sweden and 
supply-side dynamics (and how these factors, separately, or in combination, influence tenure 
composition) relatively unchecked. In this sense, the workings of the housing system as a whole 
are somewhat overlooked. 
 A more general criticism about the methodologies adopted by the authors considered here 
is that (with the exception of Christophers) they create static portraits, which continue to promote 
a vision of housing in Sweden that is inaccurate; what Robert Cox has referred to as the path-
dependency of an idea and the “stickiness” of reputation (Cox, 2004). The problem, then, appears 
to be similar to the one which Wolfgang Streeck and Kathleen Thelen (2005, p. 1) identify in 
relation to welfare state literature more generally: that ‘…most prominent theoretical frameworks 
employed in the analysis of the welfare state and of contemporary political economy more 
generally seem singularly ill-equipped to capture significant developments underway in most if 
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not all of them’. Whilst there are signs that this is beginning to change30 (albeit slowly) in much 
comparative housing research these ill-equipped frameworks remain alive and well (Wood, 
2017). And, yet, the portrayal of Sweden’s housing system as de-commodified largely endures (at 
least in the imagination of scholars and commentators outside of Scandinavia). The error here 
(again) is that scholars believe that the ideal-type characteristics of the Swedish welfare state 
should translate into housing outcomes. This is plainly not the case, and this is (in part) what 
makes the Swedish case so intriguing: it confounds expectations. In the words of Erin Metz 
McDonnell (2013, p. 308), however, if conventional categories ‘confound more than they reveal’  
then they need to be revaluated. 
 It should be noted here that the above analyses are all welcome and important 
contributions to the field of housing studies. Despite certain problematic features, Schwartz and 
Seabrooke’s work has undoubtedly moved the debate about the role of housing in political 
economy forward, and so too has Christophers (2013). However, all of the above analyses (with 
the exception of Schwartz and Seabrooke) omit a core part of the equation when thinking about 
housing: housing finance. Failure to comment on financial developments that have occurred in 
Sweden since the late 1970s, and how these affect the consumption and production of housing - 
in combination with a general reticence to expand the economic time horizon and engage with 
economic and financial history - means that the criteria of relevance set out by Harloe and Martens 
(this chapter’s litmus test) can only be partially met by the research considered above. I now 
explore why ignorance of financial developments in housing research is such a conspicuous 
omission.  
 
Housing Finance and Household Debt in Sweden  
 
 My argument thus far has been fairly simple: Swedish housing has not entirely remained 
true to the script written for it by housing scholars and political economists. I laid out possible 
reasons for this, but the roots of these problems, in my view, lie in the fact that most of the above 
studies are guilty of what Harloe & Martens’ (1984, p. 268) term abstracting housing policy 
developments from their broader economic and political context, and from the workings of the 
housing system as a whole. This section analyses contributions from the fields of finance and 
economics in an attempt to highlight the importance of theorising financial and macroeconomic 
developments. Whilst the following contributions might not be said to belong to the field of 
housing studies proper, they all have the potential to enrich our understanding of developments 
                                               
 
30 Anita Blessing (2016, p. 1) has argued the need for conceptual renewal in comparative housing research, criticising 
the repeated recycling of Kemeny’s models. She notes that ‘Despite empirical change, these models are still used to 
describe liberal welfare regimes, and to theorise international policy convergence’. 
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in housing and to give us an insight into how said developments shape and are shaped by housing 
finance.  
 This section serves to highlight three things. First, that the transition of Sweden from a 
regulated, subsidised housing and financial regime (with affordable rents and a minority of 
households in the owner-occupied sector) to a full-blown housing economy (predicated on mass 
homeownership, an increasingly residualised public rental sector, and huge volumes of mortgage 
debt) was anything but rapid. Second, financial developments in the 1970s and 1980s in Sweden 
were often the products of attempts by a range of financial intermediaries, developers and 
households to circumvent strict financial controls that existed prior to the 1980s. As such, we 
witness significant institutional lag, and this level of regulatory arbitrage, and corresponding 
regulatory change, impacted on housing and the built environment long before most housing 
scholars acknowledge.  
 Finally, the current conjuncture needs to be analysed in terms of the historical importance 
of the boom and bust cycle (1984-1994), which led to the banking crisis and deep recession of 
1990-93. By so doing, we will be able to understand that a fundamental shift in attitudes to 
housing and household debt took shape; akin to that described by Robert Shiller in the 
Introduction. This was not merely as a result of a Conservative-Liberal alliance, which was in 
power for a mere three years (1991-94), or demand-side behavioural changes (although these 
were necessary). More, it was a consequence of cumulative processes, changes in practice at the 
municipal level relating to building and planning, and governance initiatives, which at first 
attempted to constrain, but then later promoted, speculative building and financial practices 
geared towards lending to households and developers. The following only provides a primer on 
these themes, but I take them up more comprehensively in Chapters IV & V. 
 Most accounts of the Swedish banking crisis (1990-93) centre on one theme: financial 
liberalisation leading to speculative property dynamics; curiously ignored in the above analyses. 
Jonas Agell & Lennart Berg (1996) present a compelling case, countering the assumptions made 
by many scholars that the financial deregulation of the mid 1980s was the prime motivating factor 
for the build-up in household debt and macroeconomic instability in the early 1990s. Key to the 
argument against this overview is the fact that high levels of household debt in Sweden predate 
the era of financial deregulation. They argue the following: 
 
The sharp increase in the average propensity to consume constitutes the prima facie case for 
the view that consumption behaviour changed in the wake of financial deregulation. But 
some facts bark in another direction. A first observation is that the debt to income ratio 
increased from such a high initial level (Agell and Berg, 1996, p. 584, emphasis added). 
 
Agell and Berg argue that the fact that Swedish households had levels of household debt of over 
100 per cent of their disposable incomes in the early 1980s (significantly higher than rates in other 
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countries, including the USA and Britain) does not sit comfortably with the notion of Sweden as 
a social market economy with widespread regulations (ibid.).  
 Their analysis highlights the need to look at patterns of financial development and their 
interrelationship with consumption, as well as the role of wages. This position poses an important 
challenge to the mainstream conceptual associations between neoliberalism, housing and 
household debt, which the literature on housing (tacitly or otherwise) either broadly accepts or, 
in certain cases, neglects entirely. If debts were so high before the era of neoliberalism in Sweden, 
what then, if not neoliberalism, was driving housing-related debt-fuelled consumption and 
consumer behaviour?  
 Agell and Berg argue that one of the main reasons households accrued such large volumes 
of debt leading up to the crisis of the early 1990s was because of robust income growth - the 
inference here being that expectations of future income gains will give households confidence 
(justifiably or otherwise) in their ability pay down debts later on, thus smoothing out consumption 
over the life cycle. Their econometric findings are supported by longitudinal data analysis, which 
convincingly illustrates that, ‘…the consumption boom was in fact accompanied by a trend shift 
in the growth of wage income’ (Agell and Berg, 1996, p. 584) and not necessarily the product of 
regulatory change in the first instance. Due to their choice of methodology (case-study), their 
model is supported by more nuanced analysis of norm creation and future expectations vis-à-vis 
income gains; in contrast to much of the analysis emanating from housing studies and political 
economy. 
 Another important contribution made by these two scholars relates to the inefficacy of 
the existing regulatory frameworks governing bank lending ratios and credit ceilings. These can 
be seen as de facto restraints on the ability of banks to lend and consumers to borrow – akin to 
what Schwartz and Seabrooke (2009) refer to as systematic state controls, which they wrongly 
suppose lasted until at least 2008. However, even in the face of these controls, Agell and Berg 
point out the following: ‘There were […] ways of avoiding the constraints implied by the formal 
rules’ (Agell and Berg, 1996, p. 596). They do not elucidate this point fully, but do argue that a, 
‘…variety of financial intermediaries operating outside the traditional banking system’ and 
‘borrowing within families’ (Agell and Berg, 1996, p. 580), played an important part in 
overcoming regulatory constraints.  Interestingly, and in contrast to the housing research 
considered above, they make a key assessment vis-à-vis regulatory change which had a core 
impact on household borrowing and tenure choice: ‘As regards deregulations of direct relevance 
for household borrowing, most changes took place between 1983 and 1985’ (Agell and Berg, 
1996, p. 583). Note that this change in regulation happened much earlier than any of the above 
housing scholars acknowledge. 
 The reforms and the concomitant credit expansion of the 1980s provided a huge economic 
stimulus to an otherwise ailing economy. This credit was not only directed towards households, 
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but also developers and the construction sector. These reforms thus had significant demand-side 
and supply-side consequences which housing scholars have broadly ignored. Agell & Berg’s 
analysis ignores this also. They argue that the financial reforms of the mid-1980s were necessary 
for the creation of market efficiency: ‘Abolishment of the requirements that banks hold bonds in 
1983 implied that bank lending could be geared to the needs of new categories of borrowers’, 
adding, ‘the deregulation of banks' lending rates in May 1985 provided the prerequisite for a 
competitive market’ (Agell and Berg, 1996, p. 583). Necessary, or not, however, the medium and 
long-term effects of this unprecedented expansion of the credit base and the provision of a 
competitive market was, in retrospect, not benign.  
 By the time the reforms of 1983 and 1985 were enacted, the financial landscape had been 
comprehensively transformed; and with this, Swedish households entered a new phase of debt-
fuelled consumption. Englund comments that, ‘[n]ow that banks [had] entered into the markets 
previously in the domain of the finance companies, [they] were pushed into higher-risk markets’ 
(Englund, 1999, p. 85). This led to aggressive credit expansion and asset inflation which pushed 
the Stockholm Stock Exchange to levels that would not be eclipsed until the tech bubble of the 
late 1990s; sent commercial real estate prices soaring; and facilitated historically unprecedented 
house price growth (Englund, 1999, p. 88). It also transformed housing finance instructions (see 
Chapter V). As a result, aggregate household debt continued the precipitous rises initiated in the 
late-1970s and early-1980s, creating a pressure cooker effect on housing demand. Whilst Swedish 
households’ proclivity towards debt-fuelled consumption may not have been caused by these 
reforms, these reforms certainly amplified previous tendencies.  
 The period of debt-fuelled consumption would not last, however and, as Steffen E. 
Andersen comments, the consequences of the housing bubble’s dénouement would be 
extraordinary. He notes: ‘[t]he 2004-2007 property bubbles in the US, the UK, and in the rest of 
Europe were minor in comparison’, adding, ‘The halving of Swedish property prices over the 
next three years was also more dramatic than the 2007-2009 decline in the US, UK, and the 
Continent – where property prices dropped “only” 30-40 per cent from their respective peaks’ 
(Andersen, 2011, p. 265). That these dynamics, and their long-term legacies vis-à-vis housing and 
the built environment, are omitted from the majority of contemporary Swedish housing research, 
then, is intriguing. Especially so when one considers the centrality of finance both to the 
consumption and production of housing. 
 Accounts which theorise housing and financial developments (predominantly) through 
the lens of neoclassical economics have been helpful in filling some of the gaps in the literature 
which focus on what Aalbers and Christophers (2014) have termed housing-as-policy (that is 
housing scholarship with a focus on policy, not housing markets). However, they are not without 
their faults. Despite claims about the wealth effects created in the housing market (Agell and 
Berg, 1996, p. 581) and how this might affect consumption, housing – and the impacts of 
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speculative investment therein - remains very much an afterthought. A more general problem with 
the literature reviewed here then, lies at the theoretical plane: both housing studies literature and 
neoclassical accounts of household behaviours fail to properly accommodate each respective field 
and, notably, housing and finance history are curiously absent. By failing to accommodate a 
historically couched theory of process formation, then, scholars neglect to consider not just the 
agency of financial elites, and those within the housing supply chain, but also of households. By 
so doing, they create a blind spot which obscures the dialectical relationship between housing and 
finance systems. The nature of this relationship is now explored theoretically. 
 
1.2. Historicising housing and finance systems  
 
Finance is now a central conduit of risk shifting and social change. 
 
R. Martin, M. Rafferty and D. Bryan (2008)31 
 
This chapter has attempted to do three things thus far. First, to challenge the theoretical and 
methodological frameworks underpinning much comparative housing scholarship; arguing that 
the stable descriptions of housing systems, which scholars tend to uncritically reproduce (often 
typologically in relation to social policy traditions) are largely ill-suited to enhance our 
understanding of both historical and contemporary housing system dynamics. Second, to 
challenge the associations between neoliberalism and the burgeoning levels of household debt we 
witness in Sweden (and elsewhere in Northern Europe) today; arguing that high volumes of 
household debt have been central to the Swedish housing model for over forty years, and that 
rising incomes (initially) and house price appreciation, and a decline in the cost of borrowing 
(latterly), better explain these trends. Third, to argue the importance of theorising changes in the 
constitution of finance in order to understand housing system change, both contemporarily and 
historically. Here, I depart from Martin, Rafferty and Bryan (2008), above, and their contention 
that the socially transformative nature of finance is predominantly a contemporary phenomenon. 
Indeed, the shifting of risk is the central driver of financial development in genere and 
transformations in finance necessarily transform society: sic semper erat, et sic semper erit. 
 In this final section, I build upon the analysis of the previous sections, arguing that the 
terms neoliberalism and financialisation (as operationalised in the accounts above) are 
conceptually poorly suited to understand contemporary dynamics in Sweden’s housing system. 
Instead, I believe that housing scholarship analysing contemporary housing system dynamics 
needs to be much more receptive to historical frameworks in order to understand contemporary 
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housing system change, both in Sweden and elsewhere. As Christian Lennartz (2011, p. 15) 
argues: ‘…if we want to achieve a full understanding of how power structures can lead to a certain 
housing system, meticulous historical analyses on [sic.] how housing systems evolved in 
individual countries are necessary’. Only by adopting such a historicist approach, will we be truly 
able to understand contemporary dynamics within national housing systems and place the 
phenomena of neoliberalism and financialisation in their broader historical and social contexts 
(Knafo, 2013, p. 10). This is not to say that all housing research should be explicitly historical or 
historicist; more that housing scholarship should, at the very least, be historically sensitive and 
cognisant of the drivers of housing system change beyond housing policy. 
 Some will, no doubt, be critical of such a position, and the charge will be waged that 
there have been movements towards a neoliberal, marketized, deregulated politico-economic 
model in Sweden since the 1990s. This assessment may not be incorrect per se. However, it is not 
wholly adequate either. As eminent housing economist, Christine Whitehead puts it, ‘[b]laming 
neo-liberalism is far too easy a way out’ (Whitehead, 2014, p. 23). Indeed, generalised references 
to neoliberalised or financialised housing systems ignore the uniquely path-dependant trajectories 
which housing systems follow and relegate the influence of finance (and history) on the evolution 
of said systems to an analytical afterthought. Such accounts, by focusing purely on policy and 
ideology, also tend to exaggerate the power of state actors. Such top-down causality, by 
privileging state actors and ignoring sectoral actors in the spheres of finance and housing 
production, is what enables scholars to neatly compartmentalise phases of housing system 
development, often along party-political or ideological lines but, by so doing, said developments 
are conveniently reduced to products of mere ideational change.  
 As I have attempted to show, such analytical approaches are problematic for the analysis 
of housing system development. Ideology and political decision-making are, of course, important 
determinants worthy of analysis in their own right. However, as Stuart Corbridge (1992, p. 299) 
notes, ‘[t]o signal the power of ideas is not ... to ignore the power of events in shaping the 
production of ideas’ (emphasis added). Social scientific scholars’ faith in the ability of policy 
makers to turn ideology into reality, then, is generally overplayed and, often, misreads the 
dialectical relationship between ideas and events. As Kristina Boréus (1997, p. 5) notes, when 
underlying economic and sociological circumstances change (as they have a tendency to do), 
struggles over the interpretation of these changes are what produce ideological change.  
 As I show in Chapters II & III, there was (initially at least) no coherent social democratic 
housing program before, during, or (arguably) for some time after, the Second World War. The 
policies enacted by the Social Democrats during the Second World War were largely reactionary 
(such as the rent controls of 1942). Such policies were considered necessary (as in other 
countries), due to the spiralling costs of building materials and the credit liquidity constraints 
brought about by a warring continent. However, it took a ten-year housing review to lay down 
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the objectives of housing policy for the Social Democrats and, even after this reported in 1946, 
the policies were not enacted to the letter, and the Social Democrat Prime Minister, Tage Erlander, 
was frustrated by what he perceived to be a marked lack of housing progress during the 1950s 
(see Chapter III). It was the development of the state’s financial capabilities (i.e. the ability to 
raise revenue and administer financial support for the housing system as a whole) that allowed 
them to pursue certain goals. This development was not planned per se in the way many scholars 
assume but was an ancillary product of the Swedish wartime economy. As I argue in Chapter III, 
the policies enacted during the beginning of this period were very much ad hoc. The ideological 
rationalisation and justifications came somewhat later simply because political actors do not have 
the foresight scholars usually accredit to them32; they generally operate within much shorter time 
horizons. More often than not, then, ideology is used as an ex post rationalisation of changes in 
socioeconomic conditions, which seeks to lend coherence and cogency to a new or developing 
socio-economic paradigm; and housing and finance systems are no exceptions here. 
 The operational uses of the concept of neoliberalism is interesting here, for it reminds us 
that struggles over the interpretation of socioeconomic changes also create problems for scholars. 
According to the logic of swathes of Anglo-centric political-economic and housing scholarship, 
it is a genuine puzzle that households in Sweden should be holding so much housing-related debt 
(see Introduction). The reason for this is that this detail does not fit neatly with the impression of 
a socially democratic, decommodified housing system, which ostensibly seeks to minimise 
financial risk (Turner and Whitehead, 2002). To make sense of this, then, they cite neoliberalism, 
as an ex post facto rationalisation for a process which is, in fact, very much historically 
entrenched. Indeed, even if/when we accept the charge that neoliberal governance has penetrated 
the apparatuses of the Swedish state and housing policy, this still does not account for why levels 
of household debt have been so high in Sweden for so long. What such scholars overlook, then, 
is the generation of financial capacities (both public and private); and these cannot be read off 
welfare state configurations or varieties of capitalism (welfare, residential, or otherwise).  
 Much like the concepts of globalisation, neoliberalism tends to be associated with supply-
side economic logics such as deregulation, tax reforms, a reduction in the size of the state, 
flexibility, and liberalisation (Antoniades, 2007). Within the field of housing research (as 
elsewhere) this term has become a synonym for general housing market dysfunction (Holmqvist 
and Magnusson Turner, 2014); an observation which, whilst not necessarily inaccurate per se, 
offers little in the way of conceptual rigour. Such tendencies within mainstream housing research 
and political economy, as has been discussed, are problematic. We need to move beyond such 
accounts and, as much as possible, return to the historical record in order to understand 
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contemporary housing systems dynamics. I now seek to situate these dynamics historically. 
Following this, I theoretically expound the thesis’ main concern: the co-evolution of housing and 
finance systems in Sweden. 
 
General comments on housing, finance and society 
 
 Shelter has always been a most fundamental of human needs. What constitutes shelter; 
how it is constructed (materially and socially); how it is socio-politically and legally imbedded; 
how it is financed; and (importantly) who benefits from a particular system of provision at any 
given point in time is, however, in constant flux and spatially and temporally contingent. How 
people have historically gained access to shelter (and how it has been distributed) has depended 
upon a plethora of factors affecting property rights including (but not exclusively): general 
societal organisation (whether pre-feudalist, feudalist, capitalist, or socialist et cetera); the degree 
of societal representation (absolutist, liberal democratic, social democratic, totalitarian et cetera); 
the maturity of the financial system (whether gift economy, payments in kind, payment in labour, 
promissory notes, bond issues, securitisation e tcetera); the level of assistance  (material and/or 
financial) provided under any one of the above societal configurations; the material and 
geographical circumstances; and the level of technological advancement within a given society 
at any given time. All of these factors, to greater or lesser degrees, fundamentally influence 
housing provision and the multiplicity of interactions between these factors in time and space 
helps to explain why no two housing and finance systems are ever truly alike33. 
 The erection of shelter (of any kind) requires materials, labour (with varying degrees of 
expertise), land, and time. All these factors imply upfront costs and the ability to exercise power. 
This has historically created a dilemma for those wishing to build, as costs are generally 
frontloaded and, traditionally, power has only ever been held by a numerical minority. As Paul 
Pierson  notes, ‘[a]lthough housing is a necessity, very few can afford to purchase their shelter 
outright’ (Pierson, 1994, p. 74). Since the dawn of industrial urbanisation, those (the majority) 
without means have either become tenants, vagrant, or homeless. Tenants pay (in one form or 
another) for the right to dwell (however loose that right may be), and the costs incurred by tenants 
(whether labour-costs, monetary costs, or some other kind) will, ceritus paribus, reflect the costs 
of building and maintenance (the standards of which vary immensely through time and space), 
and the privileges or benefits bestowed from living there (quality of the land and environment; 
the level of subsistence; sanitation; amenities; job opportunities; and transport et cetera); as well 
as the extractive nature of the economic system at any given point.  
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 As populations burgeon, urban areas can either expand, or force those without shelter to 
seek it elsewhere. How they expand (and the rate at which they expand) will be contingent on 
multifarious social and material factors. In the modern era, industrialisation has been the main 
driver influencing rural-urban migrations. This combined with increasing life expectancies, and 
higher birth rates since the late eighteenth century, has brought about rapid and unprecedented 
societal change, forcing towns and cities throughout Europe (and elsewhere) to evolve and adapt 
in remarkable ways. Where problems and barriers have presented themselves, human systems 
have shown an extraordinary capacity to find solutions34. However, even in the age of democratic 
representation, the benefits of these solutions have very rarely been felt in equal measure. And, 
more often than not, solutions to one problem, or set of problems, often provide the foundations 
for others. 
 One of the main problems facing actors in industrial urban societies concerns housing 
supply, access and affordability. These interrelated factors are felt most acutely during periods of 
robust population growth and geopolitical or economic crises. Those with means and power 
within the existing system will be able to negotiate these problems, often creating barriers to 
newer entrants35. However, if pushed to extremes, an entire tranche of society may become 
marginalised and forced to the fringes of an urban housing system or excluded altogether. Under 
such circumstances shantytowns may develop, and with them, an increased propensity for social 
unrest and disorder. Historically, under such circumstances, states, municipalities, landlords, or 
other administrative bodies have found it difficult to control, tax or police such areas efficiently 
and The Housing Question (as formulated in many countries) then becomes a core concern, first 
for social commentators, and, then, for governments.  
 This will appear in different industrial urban societies, at different times, but the question 
always appears in one form or another where there is a perceived societal threat emanating from 
those ‘excluded’ or marginalised. The assessed threats (and the solutions deployed) may be 
different in various different locations, but iterations of fear for the social order vis-à-vis housing 
and social stability have echoed throughout the industrialised world36. The motivations behind 
these iterations and the courses of action pursued will, of course, be varied and country specific.  
                                               
 
34 See Glaeser (2011) for a rather hubristic appraisal of humankind’s urban achievements.   
35 So-called ‘entry barriers’ to new entrants (i.e. residents) can take almost an infinite number of forms, as the ability 
to construct said barriers will depend upon the socio-institutional constellation of actors and regulations present within 
any given geography. Contemporarily, scholars and commentators have identified NIMBYism as a process whereby 
housing insiders (i.e. those established within a given urban context) have created barriers to new entrants (i.e. new 
residential building and infrastructure work) through the planning system. Despite the English-language origin of this 
acronym, it has been applied to a variety of Western contexts, not least Sweden (Barlow, 1995). 
36The Conservatives in Britain after the First World War made homeownership a central pillar of their economic policy, 
hoping that a home owning society would provide a bulwark against bolshevism (Ronald, 2008). Likewise, Herbert 
Hoover in the USA claimed, ‘|t]he present large proportion of families that own their own homes is both the foundation 
of a sound economic and social system and a guarantee that our society will continue to develop rationally as changing 
conditions demand’ (cited in Gilderbloom, 2008, p. 42). 
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 One solution to The Housing Question is to ease affordability and, as Pierson (1994, p. 
74) notes, ‘…various arrangements have to be made […] to spread the costs of housing over 
time’. Economic and financial development can assist in this endeavour to certain extents, 
although some form of state involvement is often a prerequisite. The Swedish state, for instance, 
began subsidising homeownership loans as early as 1904 (one of the earliest countries to do so), 
in order to stem the seemingly inexorable tide of emigration. The reasons were simple: households 
could not acquire credit to build housing, and the flow of rural migrants to the cities was proving 
socially disruptive. Even though this benefitted mainly rural peasant households, it was not long 
before initiatives to promote urban mortgage lending (at subsidised rates) were enacted with state 
support (see Chapter II). 
 This is, obviously, not the only means of easing housing supply and affordability. Britain 
resorted to council housing as early as the late-nineteenth century as a top-down solution for the 
working poor. But households (those usually of means) can organise collectively (bottom-up) 
without state assistance to mobilise financial resources. The first building societies emerged in 
Birmingham in the late-eighteenth century and, towards the middle of the nineteenth century, 
permanent mutual building societies were established allowing households to pool their savings 
in order to finance housing production and consumption (without an obligation to build). This, in 
turn, provided collateral to finance further construction and mortgage loans. Sweden developed a 
slightly different bottom-up system in the form of housing co-operatives; the earliest versions of 
which pooled tenants’ savings to collectively build rental accommodation37. Such bottom-up 
initiatives, however, rarely helped the very poorest households (Daunton, 1990, p. 26), and even 
as (from mid-nineteenth century onwards) philanthropists and religious organisations began to 
take a bigger role in housing provision throughout Europe, these were mere palliative efforts, 
which would barely scratch the surface of the housing problems and destitution of the poor 
throughout Western Europe.  
 The common theme linking all the above endeavours is that actors (either individually, 
collectively, or at state-level) attempt to overcome financial impediments created by maturity 
mismatch, which Herman Schwartz describes as the process of borrowing on a short term basis 
in order to reinvest the proceeds into less liquid, longer duration assets (Schwartz, 2012a, p. 43). 
This mismatch, and how it is overcome, fundamentally affects the way housing is produced and 
consumed. The core premise underlying this thesis is simple: economies construct capacities for 
the production of housing in various different ways and this, in turn, affects housing system 
outcomes. By capacity, here, I refer to the ability of actors (state and non-state) to raise revenue 
                                               
 
37 As Hannu Ruonavaara (2005, p. 218) notes, ‘[t]here were experiments of co-operative housing dating back to the 
rental housing co-operatives in Stockholm and Gothenburg, formed as a response to the acute housing crisis of the 
1870s’ 
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and administer financial flows. Changes in the constitution of finance inexorably alter the nature 
of housing provision and consumption, in that the mobilisation of financial resources (whether by 
individuals, communities, private enterprises and financial intermediaries, or states), to greater or 
lesser degrees, determines the range of possibilities vis-à-vis what housing is built, by whom, and 
for whom. Housing politics and housing policy is, thus, a means of mediating these processes. 
The logical inference here is that as finance systems change, so too do housing systems, as the 
actors operating within them develop new methods and means of financing the production and 
consumption of housing. I now explore this relationship. 
 
The co-evolution of housing and finance systems 
 
 This study adopts an actor-oriented, path dependence framework to the study of housing 
and finance system development. Such a framework requires us to understand how actors relate 
to the societal contexts (or systems) they inhabit. Following Priemus (1983), I understand a 
housing system as constituting a ‘[c]omplex of actors, including their many relationships and 
interactions, that are involved in housing’ (translation in van der Heijden, 2013, p. 5). However, 
these relationships and interactions are not formed in a historical vacuum; they are produced and 
reproduced continually through the practices of actors that interact in time and space (ibid.). No 
single method, in isolation, can begin to satisfactorily capture the complexities of the complexes 
of production, distribution and exchange which comprise a housing system and, therefore, this 
study endeavours to integrate both qualitative and quantitative methods into its historical 
methodology.  
 As well as drawing upon archival material, rare monographs, pamphlets, and accounts 
from key actors within Sweden’s housing and finance systems (both historical and contemporary), 
I also rely heavily on longitudinal data series and analysis, supported (where appropriate) by 
cross-sectional descriptive statistics. These data series are harmonised and have been selected in 
order to chart the long-term development of Sweden’s housing and finance systems, and their 
interactions, through time. I have already emphasised the importance of understanding the means 
by which housing finance is mobilised, and by whom. As such, particular analytical emphasis is 
placed on the flow and direction of housing credit on both the demand- and supply-side; its 
sources; its evolution through time; and how changes in credit market dynamics relate to patterns 
and trends in construction, tenure composition and household debt. 
 Whilst not immutable, housing systems are inherently sticky (Weber and O’Neill-Kohl, 
2013). Put differently the logics and norms which actors within housing systems continuously 
produce and reproduce, are structured by societal power balances which have a tendency to 
change but sluggishly. As Evelyne Huber & John D. Stephens (2001, p. 30) note: ‘…the 
distribution of preferences […] cannot be read off existing policy arrangements, societal power 
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balances, and production regimes on a one-to-one basis. They are also in part the historic creation 
of past struggles’ (Huber & Stephens, 2001, p. 30). Indeed, this chimes with Karl Marx’s famous 
remark that: Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make 
it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and 
transmitted from the past (Marx, [1852] 2008, p. 1). This describes the ontological essence of 
path-dependence. 
 One must be prudent with such a framework, however. Many scholars have fallen into 
the trap of assuming that path dependence creates almost immutable logics. Epsing-Andersen 
(1996, p. 24), for instance, argues in relation to the effects of global restructuring on welfare states 
that, ‘…in most countries what we see is not radical change, but rather a "frozen" welfare state 
landscape’. This is an example of strong path dependence (Matznetter and Mundt, 2012, p. 277), 
and adherence to the idea of frozen institutional landscapes (particularly in relation to the housing 
and welfare regime literature which Kemeny’s work personifies) might help to explain why the 
scholarly contributions reviewed in the previous section struggle to accommodate or, in some 
cases, even recognise contemporary housing system change.  
 Only very rarely will an urban housing system change beyond recognition within the 
purview of one generation, principally because the physically and spatially fixed nature of a 
housing stock itself creates powerful legacies (Blackwell and Kohl, 2018b). However, housing 
systems change nonetheless, and it is important to stress here that even though elements of a 
housing or finance system may, prima facie, look similar throughout time (particularly at the 
institutional plane), the manner in which actors relate to these systems changes. While, as Bo 
Bengtsson and Hannu Ruonavaara (2010, p. 193) note: ‘A housing stock produced during several 
decades, sometimes hundreds of years, of building activity creates a powerful historical heritage’, 
this rarely produces a frozen landscape.  
 Following Bengtsson and Ruonavaara, this thesis ascribes to a weak concept of path 
dependence, the dynamics of which they describes thus: ‘The general idea behind the concept is 
that if the historical development takes one direction at one point in time, certain, otherwise 
feasible, alternative paths will be closed – or at least difficult to reach – at a later point’ (Bengtsson 
and Ruonavaara, 2010, p. 193). What this implies practically is that, while certain features of 
housing system x might be attractive to housing system y, importing features from y to x will not 
necessarily translate into the outcome envisaged, because the social context (i.e. the distribution 
of preferences) and the fulcrum around which sectoral and class dynamics and conflicts express 
themselves will create different logics, processes and outcomes. As Josef Schumpeter once 
famously claimed (expediently in relation to Sweden), ‘…it is so absurd for other nations to try 
to copy Swedish examples … the only effective way of doing so would be to import the Swedes 
and to put them in charge’ (Schumpeter, 2013, p. 325).  
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 Schumpeter’s characteristically sardonic comment here highlights an important point; 
that social and historical specificities bring about unique and contingent outcomes (intended or 
otherwise). The German housing scholar, Stefan Kofner (2014, p. 256), relates this logic to the 
principles of housing system development, arguing that ‘…the formal and informal institutional 
arrangements which have developed over time play an important role in explaining the structure 
of housing systems and in the way ‘‘external’’ developments influence them’. External influence 
could come in a variety of forms, ranging from ideology and political upheaval through to 
financial innovations and geopolitics.   
 That policy makers, lobbyists, academics or practitioners may have been inspired by 
‘neoliberal practices’ which may (or may not) have originated outside of their national setting, is 
not to say that the transmission and fusion of these ideas and practices onto a different context 
will produce the same (or even similar) effects; and even if they do, the process of implementation 
will differ. This is simply because said effects will be conditioned by the distribution of 
preferences via the existing socioeconomic and institutional edifices which may (or may not) be 
conducive to said intentions or ideas. In other words, policy makers and actors within housing 
systems principally do not tend to reinvent the wheel. This is true not only of ideas and policy, 
but also of housing finance. 
 This leads me to the definition of a housing finance system, which I have left conceptually 
unchecked thus far, and how these systems interact with housing systems. In its most basic sense, 
as Peter King notes,  
 
[h]ousing finance is what allows for the production and consumption of housing. It refers to 
the money we use to build and maintain the nation’s housing stock. But it also refers to the 
money we need to pay for it, in the form of rents, mortgage loans and repayments (King, 
2009, p. 3). 
 
Housing finance (even in the absence of formal financial intermediation) is central for the 
production and consumption of housing in contemporary urban societies. King makes an 
important distinction here, in that he recognises that housing finance has implications for both 
housing demand and supply. Changes in the constitution of finance, then, necessarily affect both 
consumers and producers. When analysing the complex of actors that are involved in housing, 
then, we need to acknowledge that financial actors and the institutions in which they operate are 
inextricably part of these relationships and interactions on both the demand and supply-side.  
 Kemeny’s core insight that the compositional organisation of a country’s rental market 
has profound implications for tenure choice and, consequently, borrowing decisions, is important 
and will be taken forward in this thesis. However, by adhering so strictly to his hypothesis 
concerning the relationship between welfare and housing, and how declines in welfare will 
necessarily transform countries such as Sweden into monotenural (sic.) home owning societies 
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(Kemeny, 2005), he obscures the role of housing finance in shaping the very transformations his 
theory attempts to account for. The task going forward, then, will be to demonstrate how, by 
taking this dimension seriously, and historically couching housing system developments within 
their broader economic and political contexts, a thoroughgoing analysis of the interactions 
between housing and finance systems can augment our understanding of housing development. 
 This thesis seeks to explore how housing systems evolve historically in tandem with 
phases of financial development, and to explore how (more contemporarily) an era of so-called 
financialisation is reshaping housing in Sweden, producing a system, which, today, leaves 
households laden with debt and enormous financial risk; and which, concurrently, enables 
developers to build lower volumes of housing than ever before, at high marginal rates of profit. 
It is important to note that the argument here is not that finance determines housing outcomes per 
se. The causal relationship here is not linear in the direct sense that A⇀B, but rather A⇌B.  Thus, 
A is both derived and constituent of B. This is not to say that one can simply read off financial 
developments and predict their effects on housing systems in each and every national context with 
any great degree of certainty, however. This is, fundamentally, because finance is not exogenous 
to housing system development, but endogenous. Even if a system of housing finance is 
‘transplanted’ from one institutional context to another (which happens relatively rarely in 
Western housing systems), as was the case when Sweden first developed its bond-based mortgage 
banking structures (akin to the German Landschaften during the early- to mid-nineteenth century), 
the machinations of housing finance will be filtered through the pre-existing socioeconomic, 
sectoral and political edifices which constitute national housing and finance systems and will, 
thus, not necessarily create the same outcomes.  
 
1.3. Concluding Comments 
 
 There is a marked lack of knowledge about housing finance systems 
 
Mark Boleat (1985, p. 483)  
 
In this chapter, I sought to constructively engage with a broad range of literature pertaining to 
developments in Swedish housing and finance over the past three decades, and to explore how 
housing scholars and economists have attempted to account for contemporary housing and 
finance system change. I found, throughout this engagement, three problematic tendencies. First 
was the proclivity of housing scholars to derive much of their explanatory power from loosely 
defined concepts such as neoliberalism and financialisation. Second, was the notion that the logics 
of housing system development are derived (to greater or less degrees) from the composition of 
a country’s welfare state regime (if the welfare state changes, the housing systems change, or vice 
versa). Third, in line with Christophers’ & Aalbers’ (2014) findings, I found that there is a 
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propensity for housing scholars and economists alike to treat the spheres of housing and finance 
as discrete categories. These inclinations, I argued, preclude scholars from joining the dots, and 
understanding how the constitution of housing finance influences housing system outcomes, on 
both the demand- and supply-side.  
 I established strict criteria of relevance for assessing these contributions, based on Harloe 
& Martens’ (1984) indictment of the field of housing studies over thirty years ago and found that, 
with the exceptions of Schwartz & Seabrooke’s and Christophers’ analyses, most tended to 
theorise housing developments according to purely internal dynamics. Despite this, it bears 
noting that every scholar I engaged with here has provided valuable insights into contemporary 
developments in Swedish housing. Kemeny’s analysis provides an important framework for 
understanding the relationship between tenure structures and households’ preferences. Andersson 
& Magnusson Turner (2014), and Hedin et al. (2012), too, have provided rich analyses and novel 
datasets for observing patterns of segregation, and, likewise, the works of Schwartz and 
Seabrooke (2009) and Brett Christophers (2013) have helped to reposition the debate about the 
role and function of housing research within the field of political economy. Finally, the 
contributions from the field of economics allowed us to examine financial transformations, which 
the aforementioned housing scholars and political economists largely ignored.  
 The role of this chapter, then, has been to highlight why ignorance of the sphere of finance 
in housing scholarship can be so problematic for our understanding of housing system outcomes. 
As my analysis illustrated, the above lamentation by Mark Boleat about the marked lack of 
knowledge about housing finance systems seems, unfortunately, as accurate today as it was over 
thirty years ago. Political economists and housing scholars far too frequently conflate the growth 
of households’ mortgage related debt with the growth of securitisation in incongruous contexts 
(Montgomerie and Büdenbender, 2015)38, such as those where residential mortgage backed 
securities (RMBS) are either absent, or only comprise a relatively minor share of total outstanding 
mortgage debt (Fernandez and Aalbers, 2016), or claim, as Schwartz & Seabrooke do, that state 
financial controls and regulations that were abolished over twenty years ago still exist and bear 
influence over household borrowing today. Through these engagements, this chapter has sought 
to demonstrate how, by viewing housing and finance systems as discrete spheres of activity, so 
many housing scholars fail to appreciate how the constitution of housing finance systems is 
integral to housing systems outcomes. 
                                               
 
38 In this paper, the authors argue, in relation to the United Kingdom, that ‘the financialisation of housing signalled an 
important transformation; securitisation fundamentally re-shaped the socio-economic landscape […] and the politics 
of homeownership directly linked the domestic political economy to global financial flows through secondary mortgage 
markets’ (Montgomerie & Büdenbender, 2015, p. 388). This assessment, however, only really applies to the USA, 
where RMBS comprise over 70% of outstanding mortgages. Applying such logic to the UK is flawed, as deposits are 
still (by far and away) the main source funding for mortgage origination. Indeed, here, the share of RMBS in residential 
mortgage debt outstanding is less than 20% (EMF, 2016). 
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 Further to my review of literature, I advanced a theoretical lens for understanding the 
interaction between the spheres of housing and finance through time, drawing upon the concept 
of path dependency. It has not been my intention to create a deterministic logic of financial system 
influence on housing. More, the general argument here is that developments and innovations in 
finance create possibilities which translate into housing outcomes in various ways. These 
outcomes will empower certain actors, but they will also inevitably disempower others. This can 
create the impression that housing finance can act as a structure which reinforces and entrenches 
inequalities within housing systems. This is partly true, but not necessarily so. Housing finance 
systems are not structures with inherent determining logics per se. More, they provide the means 
for certain actors to promote their interests over, and often at the expense of, others. Knafo notes:  
 
When we focus on the restrictive nature of structures we limit ourselves to only one side of a 
social relation. What appears to be the product of structural constraints is always a product of 
agency when properly resituated within a social relation that takes into account the power of 
another actor exploiting these structural constraints (Knafo, 2010, p. 504).  
 
At all times, the state will try to negotiate these processes and power dynamics, but, as this thesis 
will make abundantly clear, the state is not the only player in town. Finance affects both the 
demand and supply side of a housing system in different ways, and it is at the intersection of the 
housing supply, demand (as well as the role of institutional governance in mediating this therein), 
where the body of the analysis in this thesis lies. 
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Chapter II. Great Transformations: Housing, Finance, the State, 
and Civil Society, c. 1860 – 1930 
 
Few developments during the century preceding the First World War were more dramatic than the 
population growth. It was a development which completely revolutionized the conditions of human 
life  
 
Eli F. Heckscher, 1954 
 
2.0. Introduction 
 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to return to the historical record in order to understand how a 
remarkable period in Swedish history shaped the institutional forms of housing and finance still 
recognisable in Sweden today. I explore how seismic demographic change, incremental advances 
in municipal power and state capacity, credit dynamics, and social struggle, concatenated to 
produce a housing system quite distinct from others in Western Europe. This chapter begins the 
historical survey of the co-evolution of housing and finance systems in Sweden exploring, 
arguably, the most dramatic period of socioeconomic transformation in modern Swedish history. 
Using secondary sources, historical accounts and archival material, I develop the actor-oriented 
path-dependency framework outlined in the previous chapter and, in methodological 
complementarity, analyse novel datasets, with the aim of providing a broader, and (to my 
knowledge) more detailed empirical survey of housing and finance system development during 
the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries than has been attempted hitherto in Swedish 
housing scholarship.  
 The period under investigation encompasses an industrial and financial revolution, which 
transformed Sweden from an agrarian economy (reliant upon informal domestic credit relations 
and primary goods exports) into a northern European economic powerhouse; producing corporate 
dynasties, which continue to play significant roles in the industrial and financial landscapes of 
Europe today39. From the mid-nineteenth century to the early-1930s, Sweden was one of the 
fastest growing economies in the world; with a per capita income growth rate higher than 
anywhere else in Europe (Chang and Kozul-Wright, 1994, p. 865). In, 1860, only two countries 
in Western Europe had lower levels of real per capita income than Sweden: Norway and Finland. 
By 1930, however, Sweden’s national per capita income was similar to that of France’s and 
Germany’s (Maddison-Project, 2013). 
 The accompanying scale and pace of Sweden’s financial development was no less 
                                               
 
39 These include Astra (now a constituent of Anglo-Swedish firm Astra-Zenica); Electrolux; Ericsson; Volvo; Scania; 
and Skanska. 
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dramatic. In the space of forty years (1870-1910) bank-based lending expanded over sevenfold 
(Nygren, 1985; Lindgren, 2002), superseding the informal credit sector as the main source of 
credit supply. The scale and pace of industrial, financial and urban development within this period 
was nothing short of phenomenal and had far reaching socio-economic and politico-institutional 
ramifications. Undeniably, as Eli F. Heckscher noted, Sweden’s great transformation40 
‘revolutionized the conditions of human life’ (Heckscher, 1954, p. 254); inexorably transforming 
housing and the built environment and creating financial and urban legacies which are visible to 
this day. 
 Surprisingly, however, contemporary scholarship relating to Swedish housing system 
development generally pays little attention to this period beyond descriptions of general housing 
conditions41. Consequently, such analyses ignore the formative role that industrialisation, rapid 
demographic change, and augmentations in state and municipal power, played in shaping housing 
and finance system development. Wherever reference is made pre- and interwar eras, analyses 
are all too often terse42, and tend to serve as neat accoutrements to particular analytical narratives, 
which fit broadly with the late-twentieth and early-twenty-first century views of housing in 
Sweden. These narratives (tacitly or otherwise) permeate many of the analyses I reviewed in the 
previous chapter, inasmuch as housing scholars tend to view the twentieth century Swedish 
housing system, prior to the so-called neoliberalisation of the 1990s, as a product of Social 
Democratic political hegemony. Kemeny goes even further, claiming that, ‘The outstanding – 
almost unique – characteristic of the urbanisation of Sweden was that it took place under a 
powerfully entrenched labour movement, represented by the Social Democratic party’ (Kemeny, 
1992, p. 129). This view, I argue, is highly misleading. 
 The notion that an urban working class and the formation of an ‘entrenched labour 
movement’ could have emerged prior to, or outside of, the process of industrial urbanisation runs 
contrary to the historical record. The scale, timing, and pace of industrial urbanisation during the 
mid-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries conditioned the processes and forms of urbanisation 
which, in turn, precipitated the so-called ‘entrenched’ labour movement, of which the Social 
Democrats were a central part, not vice versa. While the political hegemony of the Social 
                                               
 
40 Chapter six of Eli F. Heckscher’s celebrated monograph, An Economic History of Sweden, is entitled ‘The Great 
Transformation’. This is no-doubt a nod to Karl Polanyi’s The Great Transformation, written some ten years earlier. I 
borrow this formulation in the title of this chapter. 
41 These descriptions are, of course, important. But they should not obfuscate other housing system developments. As 
Henning Bro notes of housing scholars’ attention to developments prior to the Second World War that, ‘[i]n general 
you will find that housing conditions both within the private tenement constructions and in the earliest forms of building 
and housing societies from the last half of the 19th century and the years before World War I are well described in both 
domestic and, especially, in Western European research. But this is not the case as regards the public authorities’ 
political housing initiatives, both before World War I and particularly in the years afterwards which, especially in 
Denmark, has been a rather disregarded field of research’ (Bro, 2009, p. 3) 
42 There are notable exceptions here, chiefly any article by Bo Bengtsson (B. Bengtsson, 2004; Bengtsson et al., 2006; 
Bengtsson and Ruonavaara, 2010; Bengtsson, Ruonavaara and Sørvoll, 2017) and Claes Ramberg (2000). 
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Democrats during and (particularly) following the interwar years undoubtedly played an 
important role in Swedish housing system development (see Chapters III & IV), this role should 
be seen as one played in medias res in the longue durée of the evolution of housing and finance 
systems in Sweden. To argue that the Social Democrats, ‘…influence[d] the direction in which 
the urbanisation process could develop’ (Kemeny, 1992, p. 134), is thus highly problematic, as 
such a position ignores developments in housing and the built environment prior to the 1930s, 
where some of the most rapid rates of urbanisation occurred!  Indeed, by the time the Social 
Democrats formed their first full-term minority government in 1932, nearly 50 per cent of Swedes 
lived in areas considered urban43, and nearly one third of the population lived in towns and cities 
with over ten thousand inhabitants (SCB, 2011, p. 4).  
 This problematical historical oversight is present in much housing scholarship relating to 
Sweden, leading to an associated, problem: the apparent willingness of scholars to systematically 
underplay the role of the state (both nationally and locally) prior to the era of Social Democratic 
hegemony44. Many scholars assume the contemporary ‘social market’ housing system in Sweden 
to be a product of this unprecedented era of political hegemony (see: Kemeny, 1982; 1992; 1995; 
Hedin et al., 2011; Andersson, 2014), and while, unquestionably, important features of the 
Swedish social market housing system emerged and crystallised under the stewardship of the 
Social Democrats, maintaining such a position obfuscates key social and institutional 
transformations during the pre-WWI and interwar years, and the role of the state therein. In this 
chapter, I take my lead from Bo Bengtsson and Hannu Ruonavaara (2010), who argue that the 
formative period of housing system development in Sweden occurred in the decades leading up 
to the Second World War. They note:  
 
When comprehensive programmes of housing policy were introduced after the War it was 
often seen as efficient (or even taken for granted) that the already existing, if still 
undeveloped, organizations and institutions should be utilized to implement the new 
programmes (Bengtsson and Ruonavaara, 2010, pp. 197–198, emphasis added). 
 
Understanding the forms and institutional configurations of housing and finance before the World 
Wars is thus vital to our understanding of housing policy developments subsequently. The notion 
that the Social Democrats could transform the Swedish housing system upon assuming office and 
direct the processes and forms of urbanisation carte blanche is, I argue, to inflate the agency of 
the social democratic state.  
 So far, we have encountered two problematic positions within Swedish housing 
scholarship. First, that the social market housing model in Sweden was generated and orchestrated 
                                               
 
43 The Swedish definition of urban since 1960 relates to built-up areas with no more than 200 meters between dwellings 
and at least 200 inhabitants (SCB, 2011, p. 3).  
44 This era ran almost uninterrupted from 1932 right through to the mid-1970s. In no other Western democracy has one 
party been in government for so long. 
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by the Social Democrats, as they were elected early enough in Sweden’s rural-urban transition to 
dictate the condition and form of the Swedish housing system. Second, that the period before the 
Second World War is unimportant in exploring the housing system development of the latter half 
of the twentieth century because the state’s role was ostensibly nominal. This leads us to a third, 
and arguably more ingrained, problematic viewpoint: the analytical juxtaposition of the pre-War 
passive liberal state with that of the post-War active social democratic state.  
 This view holds that the state was somehow a passive agent in the Swedish housing 
system prior to the age of Social Democratic political dominance45. The core assumption here is 
that liberal governance is somehow hands-off and passive, whilst the reverse is true of social 
democratic governance. Ruonavaara, notes that, ‘Before the Second World War Swedish housing 
policy was rather limited in nature’ (Ruonavaara, 2005, p. 221, emphasis added) and, in so doing, 
makes a distinctly normative assessment. I argue that only a very circumscribed definition of 
‘housing policy’ could warrant such an appraisal. Limited, perhaps in terms of active state-led 
construction of housing (although the state and municipalities began to take an active role in this 
regard by the 1920s and, arguably, even as early as the 1910s), but the state’s involvement in 
housing and finance was substantial nonetheless46. The notion of a passive state prior to the Social 
Democrat’s political dominance, then, is misleading and ignores the enormous build-up in 
municipal power, state capacity, and the state’s role in the extension of housing finance during 
this period. Indeed, intellectual adherence to the social market-liberal dichotomy is, I argue, 
difficult to reconcile with the historical record. 
 As I explore, typifying forms of housing tenure such as public housing (allmännyttan), 
housing cooperatives (bostadrätter), and state sponsorship of housing finance all predate the era 
of social democratic hegemony. There are three main components to my argument here. First, I 
claim that state involvement in the Swedish housing finance system from the mid-nineteenth 
century onwards played a central role in the propagation of an organised housing finance system 
and that, from the start of the twentieth century, the central state’s role was crucial in shoring up 
urban mortgage markets, bolstering credit supply, and extending credit to previously marginalised 
socioeconomic groups. Second, I argue that municipalities had an active influence on housing 
and the built environment in urban areas during the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, 
and that local authorities’ role in promoting affordable housing (both cooperative and semi-
municipal) was well established before the 1930s. Third, I argue that it was broad-based social 
coalitions within civil society that brought forth successful housing cooperatives, not state-
                                               
 
45 Sölvi Blöndal (2015, p. 6), for instance, argues that, between 1870-1935, ‘…the [housing] market was virtually free 
of regulation’.  
46 As Henning Bro (2009, p. 13) notes: ‘While political science and historical research into the welfare state has 
characterized rather unequivocally the Northern universalistic welfare state of the post-war period which was developed 
during the years 1945 to approximately 1990, the research has been more cautious in characterizing in detail the form 
which the state assumed from World War I on and during the inter-war period’. 
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orchestrated housing policy in the first instance47. To ignore this period, then, is to ignore the 
social struggles and collective socio-economic and institutional processes which gave rise to the 
distinct forms of housing tenure which, stylistically at least, came to define Sweden’s social 
market housing model during the latter half of the twentieth century.  
 The chapter is structured as follows. I begin by extending the purview of investigation 
slightly beyond the period stated in the chapter title in order to contextualise Sweden’s industrial 
urbanisation and general financial system development. Following this, I explore the era of 
phenomenal urban growth, emigration, and crisis in the late-nineteenth century, and interrogate 
the socio-institutional and regulatory transformations in planning, housing, and finance which 
helped to determine the shape and form of urbanisation on both the demand and supply side in 
Sweden’s cities. Next, I examine the growth of municipal capacity and the central state’s financial 
support therein prior to the First World War. I then focus on the turbulent years of the Great War, 
and its legacies, and how housing policy (locally and nationally), the cooperative and union 
movement, and the state-sponsored mortgage banks helped to underpin a system of housing which 
is still recognisable today.  
 
2.1. Land reforms, agrarian finance, population growth, and the emergence 
of a rural proletariat  
 
In order to contextualise Sweden’s great transformation, this section explores agrarian 
transformations which would have significant ramifications for Sweden’s entire industrial and 
financial development, as well as the patterns and forms of the rapid urbanisation and mass 
migrations we witness from the 1860s onwards.  
 Land reforms in Sweden during the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries were 
central in reconfiguring property rights and, consequently, the conditions of rural and (later) urban 
life. The enclosure of common land throughout the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries 
had far-reaching implications, engendering new classes of people (squatters); the disintegration 
of traditional village communities (Fridlizius, 1979, p. 7); a wage-labour nexus (ibid.); and, 
ultimately, the proletarianisation of vast swathes of Sweden. It is to these reforms that I turn now 
in order to understand how the actions of a coercive state in an era of rapid rural population growth 
transformed the conditions of rural life and, in turn, how templates of agrarian finance which 
emerged during this period would have profound implications for developments in housing and 
finance in Sweden’s towns and cities throughout the nineteenth century and beyond. 
 
                                               
 
47 Indeed, the take-off of cooperative housing associations emerged as a result of the abolition of rent controls after the 
First World War (a policy supported by certain tranches of the Social Democrats) and, thus, much of the impressive 
expansion of cooperatives during the 1920s was in spite of the state’s efforts, not because of them. 
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Land reforms: opportunity and incentive, or displacement and dislocation?  
  
 According to the Swedish industrial economist, Andreas Bergh (2014), the institutional 
impetus underlying Sweden’s Golden Years (1870-1970), can be attributed to land reforms, which 
emerged first in the southernmost region of Skåne during the mid-eighteenth century, but which 
culminated nationwide in the Redistribution Act (Laga Skifte) of 182748. These developments, he 
claims, are a ‘…natural starting point for describing institutional reforms in Sweden’ (Bergh, 
2014, p. 9). Bergh here draws upon an intellectual tradition, of which the economic historian Eli 
F. Heckscher’s work is the most renowned. In his seminal monograph, An Economic History of 
Sweden , Heckscher relates the land reforms in Sweden during the early-nineteenth century to the 
experience of enclosures in England some two centuries earlier, arguing that the process in 
Sweden was less painful and lengthily. He notes that, in England, ‘…there was a strong attraction 
for the rural population of the rapidly growing industries in the cities’, adding that, ‘…one of the 
main causes of the disappearance of the peasants was simply that industry offered them better 
terms’ (Heckscher, 1954, p. 160, emphasis added). This ostensibly did not occur in Sweden to the 
same extent, because the inducements for flight from the countryside were weaker (ibid.). 
Intriguingly, Heckscher also suggests that the consequences of the Swedish land reforms were 
benign: ‘Neither a flight from the land nor a decrease in the small farmers’ holdings occurred in 
Sweden’ (ibid.).  
 While the observation that the process of enclosure in Sweden was more temporally 
compressed than in England, and that there was no sizable reduction in the number of small 
farmers hold empirically, Heckscher’s analysis is problematic. While he acknowledges that, to 
the rural poor, ‘…the loss of security and mutual help in the village community [following the 
dissolution of the commons] must have been a severe blow’ (Heckscher, 1954, p. 162), his 
framing of these processes within the neoclassical parlance of inducements, and his underplaying 
of the deleterious effects of these reforms, is questionable when we confront his assumptions with 
archival evidence. The following extract, taken from an article written in 1907 by agrarian land 
reformer Johan Hansson, on the topic of land reforms in the previous century, is worth citing at 
length: 
 
In our country […] we find ourselves coming up against the same momentous fact, that the 
growth of the towns and the blossoming of big industry originated in the countryside, with its 
unjust system of private land ownership. Everywhere the same fact stares us in the face. As a 
result of the short-sighted legislation and the power bestowed upon the big land-owners by 
the rights of land ownership, the rural population has been proletarianised. Any possibility 
the propertyless [sic.] farm worker has had to become independent of the land-owner and the 
dreaded workhouse […] has been taken away from him. This he has done all he can to find 
                                               
 
48 The region of Skåne had been at the forefront of the Swedish land reforms, with most arable land enclosed by 1815 
(Gadd, 2011, p. 152). 
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himself a better life either on the other side of the Atlantic or in the towns (Johan Hansson, 
1907; translated in, Öhngren, 1981, pp. 206–207, emphasis added). 
 
Hansson eloquently explores several interrelated themes here. What concerns us presently, 
however, is: first, the link between private land ownership and the proletarianisation of rural 
populations; and, second, the notion that land reforms may have contributed to the rapid 
urbanisation and mass migrations of the latter half of the nineteenth century. 
 The land reform Acts of 1803 (Enskifte) and 1827 (Laga Skifte), in essence, allowed for 
a single landowner or ‘market-minded’ peasant to have an entire village enclosed, as Gunnar 
Fridlizius notes: “A few peasants could now, if they so desired, force through enclosure and 
disintegration of villages” (Fridlizius, 1979, p. 7). Thus, the impact of the reforms in the early-
nineteenth century, by parcelling off land holdings, and consolidating strip farms into larger units, 
was to dissolve village communities (Magnusson, 2002, pp. 17–18); an outcome which can hardly 
be considered benign. While some peasants were receptive to these reforms (Rydén, 2013, p. 78), 
there was staunch resistance in certain regions49. Further, while it could be argued that the land 
reforms increased the relative power of the peasantry (Kananen, 2016), they also assisted in 
producing ‘social differentiation’ and a class of ‘non-landowning rural proletariat’ (ibid.); a 
situation that was exacerbated in an era of robust rural population growth (Hoppe and Langton, 
1994, p. 80). These reforms, then, were imposed upon rural communities by an autocratic elite, 
with the support of a small cadre of burghers and ‘entrepreneurial peasants’, who sought out 
advantage where it presented itself in the form what was, in practice, state sponsored land-grabs. 
 Following Laga Skifte, agricultural output increased, and agricultural land wealth bucked 
general Western European- and American-wide trends; increasing over several decades relative 
to national income, before returning to a general, European-wide, downward trajectory later in 
the century (Ohlsson, Roine and Waldenström, 2013, p. 39). Neoclassical economists such as 
Heckscher and Bergh, would argue that this provides resounding proof that the reforms were able 
to unlock the nascent entrepreneurial zeal of the hitherto trammelled peasant classes, inducing 
productivity gains and greater societal wealth benefits. In one sense, they are not wrong. However, 
as with any process of social change, there were winners and losers and, as such, scholars should 
be mindful of relegating the deleterious effects of political reforms in order to promote the 
beneficial outcomes. With this in mind, I now explore the financial means by which certain 
classes of peasants and burghers were able to reap the benefits of these reforms. Here I attempt 
to understand how agrarian financial innovation furthered social differentiation and, crucially, 
assess the legacies of these innovations. 
 
                                               
 
49 This was particularly the case in the county of Dalarna, where, as Lars Magnusson notes, ‘…there was no land 
redistribution in some of the villages in this area until well into the twentieth century’ (Magnusson, 2002, p. 17). 
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Figure 2.1. Agricultural assets as a share of national income, 1810–1930 
 
 
Source: Waldenström, 2015 
 
 
The Mortgage Associations 
 
 In the context of rapidly increasing agricultural production, land productivity and 
population growth during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries (Bengtsson, 2004, p. 
143), the aforementioned land reforms were followed by an upsurge in land prices, which partly 
explains the trajectory we observe in Figure 2.1 between the late 1830 and the early 1860s.  This, 
in turn, created a growing demand for mortgage credit among agrarian communities (Gadd, 2011, 
p. 161)50, and it is during this formative period of agrarian development that we witness the 
emergence of two very distinct types of financial institution: the rural mortgage associations and 
the savings banks. The emergence of these institutions would shape the development of the 
Swedish financial system henceforth and resonate in the sphere of housing finance in Sweden’s 
towns and cities for over a century and a half to come. 
 A mere six years after Laga Skifte, developments in Sweden’s southernmost region of 
Skåne would revolutionise Sweden’s financial system and have huge ramifications for the future 
development of Sweden’s housing finance system. In 1833, Carl Adolf Agardh, a professor of 
economics and botany in Lund, published a pamphlet entitled ’Om möjligheten af 
                                               
 
50 The Swedish central bank played a minor role in extending credit to agrarian communities during the early stages 
of the nineteenth century, but this role was short-lived (Andersen, 2011; Gadd, 2011). 
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hypoteksinrättningar för provinserne och synnerligen för Skåne’51. This pamphlet led to the 
foundation of Skånska hypoteksföreningen in 1836 (Lindström, 1986); Sweden’s first bond-
issuing mortgage association. Based on the principles originally proposed by Count Frederik 
Bogislav von Schwerin in 1815, who had wanted to establish a Prussian-style Landschaften 
system (Andersen, 2011, p. 154), Skånska hypoteksföreningen created the blueprint for similar 
associations throughout central and southern regions of Sweden over the ensuing two decades52 
(Lindström, 1986, p. 10) and, alongside the savings banks, played a major role in the growth of 
the agricultural sector following the enclosures (Nygren, 1985; Schön, 2012, p.38) 
 The mortgage associations relied upon the emission of bonds in order to originate 
mortgages, at first domestically, but later, increasingly abroad. The Skånska hypoteksförening 
limited its membership to owners of rural property valued at a minimum of 3,000 kronor and, 
thus, as Pontus Hansson and Lars Jonung (1997, p. 281) note, ‘[t]he main recipients of their credits 
were the owners of large- or medium-sized tracts of land, engaged in commercialized and export-
oriented farming’. By focusing on wealthier landowners, the associations were able to reduce 
transaction costs (ibid.) and mitigate against risk, but this meant that small landholders (as with 
the Prussian Landschaften) were actively discriminated against (Andersen, 2011, p. 154; 
Blackwell and Kohl, 2017). For those able to obtain mortgage credit from these institutions, 
however, the terms were attractive. The loans were long-term and, intrinsic to this model of 
mortgage lending, was that the need for profit maximisation was absent53. Indeed, as a 
government report from 1935 noted, ‘the mortage institutions in our country have, for a long time 
now, provided the nation’s famers with more favourable loan terms than those available to famers 
in foreign lands’ (Landshypotek Bank, 2016, author's translation). 
 This model of agrarian mortgage banking would ultimately lead to the creation of a 
centralised, bond-issuing mortgage bank, Sveriges Allmänna Hypoteksbank (Sweden’s General 
Mortgage Bank), in 1861. Created by an act of parliament Sveriges Allmänna Hypoteksbank 
established a common lending institution for the existing mortgage associations (Andersen and 
Kauko, 1996) and was supported by upfront capital from the state (grundfond) in the form of 
government bonds (statsobligationer) (Lindström, 1986, p. 15). The bonds were guaranteed by 
the state (Lundström, 1991, p. 185) and, as Stefan Andersen (2011, p. 154) notes, ‘The intention 
was that bonds issued by the Hypoteksbank should resemble government bonds as much as 
possible’. These measures were, in no small part, to make them desirable on foreign exchanges. 
While the process of consolidation met some resistance, not least from Skånska 
hypotkesföreningen (Lindström, 1986, p. 13), this proved relatively ineffectual to the eventual 
                                               
 
51 ‘About the possibilities of mortgage associations for the provinces and particularly for Skåne’. Author’s translation. 
52 Östgöta, Smålands, Mälarprovinsernas, Örebro, Wermland and Älvsborg (Lindström, 1986, p. 10). 
53 ‘The new mortgage associations offer long-term loans without the need for profit maximisation (Landshypotek Bank, 
2016, author's translation). 
 
 
 
55 
outcome of a more centralised system of mortgage associations. The Royal decree stated that the 
Chairman of Sveriges Allmänna Hypoteksbank was to be appointed by the King, the Vice 
Chairman of the board was to be designated by Sweden’s National Debt Office 
(Riksgäldsfullmäktige), and the three other positions on the board were to be drawn from members 
of the regional associations (Lindström, 1986, p. 15).  
 Sveriges Allmänna Hypoteksbank was then, to all intents and purposes, a state-controlled 
Public Mortgage Association, created in order to mobilise long-term capital for Sweden’s agrarian 
landowners, at favourable terms. Importantly, it set a precedent for state-sponsored mortgage 
lending in the decades to come; first with the rather inconsequential Allmänna hypotekskassan 
för Sveriges städer in 186554, and later, with the establishment of Konungariket Sveriges 
stadshypotekskassa in 1909. The latter, as I explore in Section 2.4, would play a central role in 
urban mortgage credit expansion.  
 
The Savings Banks 
 
 
 Contemporaneously, during the first half of the nineteenth century, a very different type 
of financial institution was beginning to flourish. Sweden’s first savings bank was established in 
1821 (Göteborg Sparbank) by a Prussian merchant in Gothenburg (Andersen, 2011, p. 154). 
Whilst the initial development was slow, these deposit-based institutions began to make headway 
during the 1830s and 1840s, and their absolute numbers grew over six-fold between 1840 and 
1900. Steffen E. Andersen characterises their management as ‘amateurish, sloppy and sometimes 
even fraudulent’ (Andersen, 2011, p. 152) but, irrespective of their firm-level structure, by the 
1860s, the combined deposits in Swedish savings banks exceeded those of commercial banks.  
 Due to the local nature of these institutions assets and liabilities, they constituted special 
circuits of capital (Blackwell and Kohl, 2018a) which were, according to Andersen, ‘of little use 
for the purpose of financing major projects’ (Andersen, 2011, p. 153). This had implications for 
housing and the built environment in areas where they became embedded. These institutions 
would play an increasingly important role in extending mortgage credit as the nineteenth century 
wore on, and served as a means of mobilising mortgage loans within local communities (ibid.), 
often, offering more favourable conditions to agrarians than commercial or mortgage banks 
(Rodriguez and Andersson, 2011, p. 36).  
 Unlike the bond-based mortgage institutions, the savings banks were not uniform in their 
lending patterns, as Tom Petersson (2000, p. 28) notes, ‘[s]ome lending against security of goods 
dominated totally, in others lending against real estate mortgages dominated’. Further, while this 
                                               
 
54 Forsell (2006, p. 150) notes that, ‘[t]his credit institution was never a significant factor and towards the end of the 
1880s ceased providing loans’. 
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was not uniformly the case throughout the country, compared to the mortgage associations, 
savings institutions were slightly less exclusive, and by 1900, savings banks had a share of the 
institutional mortgage market of over 10 per cent (see Table 2.1). Figure 2.2. (below) shows the 
compositional development of the Swedish formal credit market as a whole between 1835 and 
1875. While it does not disaggregate mortgage lending, it still illustrates the growing relative 
importance of the mortgage associations and the savings banks. 
 
Figure 2.2. The Composition of the Institutional Swedish Credit Market, 1835-1875 (% share) 
 
 
 
 Source: (Nygren, 1985, p. 140) 
 
 The growth of both the savings banks and the mortgage associations should be viewed in 
the context of the land reforms initiated during the early nineteenth century. The land reforms 
provided a boon to wealthier rural inhabitants, who were able to mobilise capital using new 
institutional conduits. Some of this filtered down to small landowners, but, on the whole, both the 
savings banks and (especially) the mortgage institutions generally ignored peasant farmers. It is 
difficult to quantitatively gauge precisely the extent to which the growth trajectories of these 
institutions were causally related to the land reforms of the previous decades, but the increase in 
agricultural land prices (which were part of a longer-run trend) and the growing demand for credit 
following Laga Skifte certainly created the opportunity for landowners of means to exploit the 
abolition of the open field system and to exchange and consolidate strips using new financial 
flows. 
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 The Land Reforms of the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries were part of a 
series of processes which would revolutionise agrarian life in Sweden. New forms of finance 
developed in the process which would have enduring significance for Sweden’s urban 
development henceforth. However, the majority of the rural poor, who were unable to exploit the 
opportunities offered by the land reforms, suffered as a result. Fridlizius notes that, ‘…rapid 
population growth and proletarisation during the enclosure period meant a worsening economic 
situation for the large groups of rural population who did not produce for the market or enough 
for their subsistence’ (Fridlizius, 1979, p. 33). This created very powerful imperatives for the 
burgeoning rural landless poor. Figure 2.3 demonstrates the extent of the remarkable demographic 
change in Sweden and gives the reader some insight into the sheer scale and pace of urban 
population growth.   
 
Figure 2.3. Annual population increase per decade (% change), 1800-1940 
 
 
 
Sources: SCB, 1929, p. 4; SCB, 1969; and author’s own calculations. 
 
 It is against the backdrop of radical changes in property rights earlier in the nineteenth 
century, and burgeoning rural population growth, that agrarian financial development and rapid 
urbanisation in Sweden should be viewed. Significantly, the state accrued benefits from these 
reforms. This was an epoch where the chief source of state income was derived from land and 
property taxation (Stenkula, 2014, p. 5), and these reforms, in combination with rising land prices, 
thus helped to yield significant revenues. By turning common land into private land and Crown 
tenancies into freeholds, former Crown tenants and commoners became taxpayers (Heckscher, 
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1954, p. 167). The enclosure movement in Sweden, then, should not be viewed romantically in 
terms of incentivising industrious peasants, as Bergh and Heckscher suggest, but in terms of 
increasing state revenue, and power; over both the rural population and the Crown. The 
coalescence of these factors had an indelible impact on the structure and form of Sweden’s 
urbanisation henceforth and this, in turn, had profound consequences for housing and the built 
environment in Sweden’s major towns and cities, as I now explore in relation to Stockholm.  
 
2.2. The Urban Spurt: Wolves and jackals in the city 
 
It might occur to some that the inner district of the town, which is now mainly inhabited by 
the lower and poorer classes, should be rebuilt to provide healthier and more efficient 
dwellings for these people. But further consideration should demonstrate the 
unreasonableness of this idea. The core of a town, the centre of industry and trade, where all 
communications meet, cannot possibly provide suitable dwellings for the poor, for the plots 
are too expensive [...] Thus the meaning here is not directly to provide the poor with healthier 
and better dwellings, but rather to deprive them of the wretched and unhealthy homes, which 
are offered them in the centre of the town. 
 
A.E. Rudberg, 186255 
 
David Harvey notes that, from their inception, ‘…cities have arisen through geographical and 
social concentrations of a surplus product’ (Harvey, 2012, p. 5). The growing concentrations of 
surplus product (labour) in Swedish cities during the latter half of the nineteenth century, as we 
have seen, was not a happenchance occurrence, but a consequence of displacement and 
dislocation from the land, in combination with the pressure created by increased birth rates and 
lower mortality rates. However, the cities were unable to absorb this surplus in its entirety, as the 
dramatic scale and pace of urbanisation in Sweden from 1860 onwards was also accompanied by 
a series of mass migrations. While millions migrated to Sweden’s major cities during the 
nineteenth century, from the mid-century onwards, nearly one million Swedes emigrated. 
Astonishingly, despite these mass emigrations, the population of Sweden still increased 
dramatically (particularly in the cities) over this period. For those who left, new challenges and 
opportunities awaited on the other side of the North Sea and across the Atlantic. Those who 
remained in Sweden, however, became the unwitting harbingers of radical societal 
transformation.  
 Swedish cities at the beginning of this period were ill prepared and poorly equipped to 
absorb the reserve army of the landless, rural unemployed, whom were migrating en masse in 
search for work. Workers in towns such as Stockholm and Gothenburg had little choice but to 
rent flats in jerry-built, overcrowded tenements and flimsy wooden terraces. In short, the housing 
                                               
 
55 A.E.Rudberg was a building magnate and city planner, with close ties to Stockholm City. Translated in Thomas Hall 
(2003, p. 338). 
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situation, as the building magnate and city planner A.E. Rudberg noted in 1862, was dire. His 
description of working class housing in Stockholm is worth citing at length. 
 
From this labyrinth of narrow, twisting, dark streets and alleys, dripping on both sides with a 
constant stream of stinking fluids [...] from these narrow courtyards surrounded by towering 
houses, wells of darkness [...] in whose depths all possible filth collects, whence poisonous 
fumes have risen for hundreds of years and still rise today, bearing the seed of innumerable 
diseases, penetrating with their stinking breath every corner of the surrounding dwellings, 
whose tightly packed inhabitants can open their windows and doors to let out the even fouler 
air from their rooms, but are denied any possibility of exchanging it for air that is fresh 
(Rudberg, 1862:7 translated in Hall, 2003, p. 338). 
 
Rudberg’s assessment, whilst loaded (he was a property developer), was not hyperbolic. In the 
late 1860s, Sweden’s capital was purportedly, ‘…surpassed only by St. Petersburg as regards 
mortality rates’ (Forsell, 2006, p. 126). The towering housing and wells of darkness were (more 
often than not) built by private speculators, who sought to reap the benefits from the acute urban 
housing shortages (SOU, 1945, p. 63 translated in Strömberg, 1992) brought about by insatiable 
demand. Around the same time, a Pauperism Committee, commissioned by the City of 
Gothenburg in 1865 to examine housing conditions in the city, described the life of the urban 
poor in Sweden’s second city thus: ‘In the dark and dank, and in dirty rags a wretched race is 
growing up here’ (translated in Strömberg, 1992, p. 240).  
 Carl Andrae (1977, translated in Strömberg, 1992, p. 239) notes that this era created a 
paradise for wolves and jackals to exploit the housing needs of the newly formed urban 
proletariat. The building regulations that were in place before 1874 dated back to 1763 and had 
only been modified slightly in 1842 and, thus, the infrastructure and town planning capabilities 
in Sweden’s cities were woefully impotent to adjust to the rapidly changing demographic realities. 
This was, as Thord Strömberg (1992a, p. 240) notes, ‘the epoch of urban fires’, where 
overcrowding, insanitary conditions, and disease prevailed.  
 
The Lindhagen Plan, the Building & Health Acts and the growth of municipal power 
 
 It is against this backdrop that the need for more rigorous urban planning was recognised, 
principally at the level of local government. The Lindhagen Committee Report of 1866, headed 
by the judge and local politician, Albert Lindhagen (expeditionschef), sought to ameliorate the 
deficiencies in town planning in Stockholm. Influenced in no small part by James Hobrecht’s city 
plan for Berlin (Hall, 2008, p. 69), Lindhagen’s design was based around a grid system with 
square blocks, intersected by avenues and boulevards, and with a plentiful supply of green space56. 
The chief aims, beyond building an impressive modern European city, were to facilitate rapid 
                                               
 
56 Today in Stockholm, parks make up more than one third of city. 
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population growth, improve the hygiene conditions of dwellings, and to reduce the risk of fires 
(Lundevall, 1992, p. 61). Based on the experiences of other industrialised countries, the 
Committee predicted that the population of Stockholm would more than double by 1890; 
Lindhagen’s plan, thus, was one of ambitious urban expansion. Despite Lindhagen’s grand 
ambitions, however, the inadequate legal and regulatory frameworks in place for municipalities 
to undertake such plans (coupled with a general lack of municipal financial clout) meant that 
Lindhagen’s Plan, for now at least, was to remain on the drawing board, holding little significance 
beyond elite circles in Stockholm.  
 In May 1874, the Building Act, which Lindhagen played a central part in drafting, was 
passed by the King’s Council, replacing the antiquated, pre-industrial regulations. This Act, 
according to the historian Håkan Forsell (2006, p. 128), marked the beginning of a new age. 
Whereas hitherto, there had been no general regulatory framework applicable nationally, this Act 
applied uniform building regulations across all towns and town-like communities in the Kingdom 
of Sweden. In regulatory complementarity, a general Public Health Act was also passed57, which 
stipulated minimum hygiene standards for rental dwellings. Symbolically, at least, these 
regulations were pioneering. The Building Act stipulated that accommodation at basement level 
should be banned; that the width of the street should determine the height of the building (Forsell, 
2006, p. 128); that courtyards should comprise at least a quarter of the building land (ibid.); and 
that planning permission should be withdrawn if a plot is not developed within five years. The 
latter statute was an attempt to disincentivise land hoarding by developers and to tackle the 
growing issue of speculation in building land (ibid.). However, this Act produced unintended 
consequences.  
 Much like Lindhagen’s Plan, the Building Act was ambitious, but ultimately limited in 
terms of what it could achieve. The statute stipulated that, ‘…there were to be town plans for 
towns and similar communities’ (Regeringen, 1920, p. 18). Yet, despite the promise and rigorous 
rhetoric, the hands of the municipalities were legally tied. As the Act was passed by the 
Government (the King’s Council) and not by Parliament, it was circumscribed by civil law 
(Deland, 2001, p. 68). A government commissioned delegation for the Inter-Allied Housing and 
Town Planning Congress in London in 192058, commented: 
 
[…] town plans […] frequently got no further than paper, because in carrying them into effect 
the community had not the support of legal rules, but was dependent on the goodwill and 
good faith of private landowners (Regeringen, 1920, p. 18, emphasis added). 
 
                                               
 
57 The Health Act was of a ‘very revolutionary nature’ according to a government commissioned report in 1920 
(Regeringen, 1920). 
58 Referred to henceforth as simply ‘Regeringen’ (The Government). 
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As Strömberg (1992a, p. 37) notes, ‘…neither the state nor communities had the power to force 
landowners to act according to plans’. This rather bizarre predicament led to what the delegation 
referred to as an impossible state of things (Regeringen, 1920, p. 18). Significantly, also, these 
statues had no jurisdiction outside the cities’ limits, which were rapidly developing along the lines 
of shantytowns (kåkstäder); due, in large part, to an active policy of displacement and slum 
clearance pursued by the City to make way for grandiose redevelopments in central Stockholm. I 
return to this shortly. 
 The impossible state of things in Stockholm (as elsewhere) prompted a very curious, and 
unexpected consequence. Faced with the disjuncture between the legal requirement to create and 
implement a Town Plan, and the fact that cities’ capacities to actually perform this requirement 
were severely circumscribed, municipalities began to innovate, particularly in Stockholm. 
Knowing that relying solely on the goodwill and faith of private landowners to implement the 
City Plan (finalised in Stockholm in 1879-80) was an act of forlorn optimism, Stockholm City 
began acquiring land on an unprecedented scale59. Forsell notes that, ‘…the city found it 
necessary with borrowed funds to go into the property market as a market player, and through 
buying and selling properties under street layout regulations to save the city planning 
implementation project’ (Forsell, 2006, p. 131). By buying up land, the City was able to 
implement vital elements of the Town Plan. Without relying on the acquiescence of private 
landowners, the City was able to build sewage systems, and other infrastructure, such as roads, 
trams, and rail and water systems (Hall, 2008).  
 
Speculation in the city 
 
 It is worth noting that, at this stage, Stockholm City did not take it upon itself to provide 
residential housing directly; which is not to say that residential housing was not catered for in the 
City Plan. Once plots that had been acquired were ready to be developed, they were sold to private 
developers, ‘…who were required to pay for the municipal facilities and were committed to build 
within a certain set time’ (Forsell, 2006, p. 130). The city discovered that it was profiting 
substantially from this arrangement, which led to systematic purchasing (Mörner 1997, translated 
in Forsell, 2006). The mechanism adopted by Stockholm City was quite simple: The City would 
pay for the new land (often purchased from the Crown) upfront, and then sell it on to private 
developers (often purchasing on credit). Revenues from those sales were then pumped back into 
land purchases, and the cycle began again60.  
                                               
 
59Thomas Hall notes that, ‘…by the end of 1895 the town had acquired plots amounting to a total area of almost 
5,000,000 m2 at a cost of something in excess of 32 million kronor’ (Hall, 2003b, p. 243); a truly phenomenal sum. 
60 Hall notes, ‘…the municipality could profit from part of the increase in land values, instead of being compelled to 
pay high compensation when streets had to be constructed, and making no profit at all’ (Hall, 2003b, p. 385). 
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 Thus, Stockholm City was able to finance infrastructure on the basis of rising land values 
and, in so doing, dominate the private property market. This strategy of implementing the town 
plan was novel and provides an example of growing municipal power. Far from acting as passive 
agents, then, Stockholm’s municipal authority was beginning to decisively shape the city 
according to the details of the Town Plan agreed in 1880. Astonishingly, by 1903, the City had 
acquired nearly half the aggregate area of designated building land in Stockholm (Forsell, 2006, 
p. 261). Exact data records for the City’s land trading are, however, sparse.  
 At this stage in Sweden’s industrial and financial development, bank-based finance was 
still marginal in relation to the informal credit markets (Lindgren, 2002). However, this was 
changing quickly, and private developers were increasingly turning to formal banking channels 
such as the private urban mortgage banks (inteckningsbolagen) and the inner-city savings banks. 
Stockholms Sparbank, for instance, supplied many developers with credit for the entire production 
process (Forsell, 2006, p. 134), but the credit supply was incredibly sensitive to macroeconomic 
factors. Indeed, whilst the 1870s and 1880s heralded the era of grand construction projects in 
Sweden’s major towns and cities, residential construction, for the most part, ‘…rest[ed…] on 
builders with no great command of capital, who build on credit with the  intention of immediately 
selling the house when completed and thus becoming free for new undertakings’ (Regeringen, 
1920, p. 39). Indeed, as Table 2.1 illustrates, over 50 per cent of the mortgage market in Sweden 
was dominated by the ‘informal market’ even as late as 1920. 
 
Table 2.1. Market Shares of Registered Mortgage Lenders 
 
 Insurance 
companies 
Savings 
banks 
Commercial 
banks 
Hypoteks-
banker 
Stadshypoteks-
bank 
Others    Total    
1880 - 6 2.7 20 0.6 70.7 100 
1890 5.3 9.6 3.6 17.7 0.8 63 100 
1900 6.4 11.4 7.7 12.7 0.6 60.2 100 
1910 6.8 12.6 13.7 7.5 2.3 57.6 100 
1920 5.3 15.1 17.9 4.7 3.5 53.5 100 
 
Source: Cramér and Fredricsson, (1942) in, Andersen, (2011, p. 156) 
 
 In a milieu where the supply of credit varied considerably, and was frequently far too 
scanty (Regeringen, 1920, p. 35), Stockholm City, soon became the biggest market player in town. 
It was thus the City, according to many commentators, who were land banking and speculating 
irresponsibly (Forsell, 2006). Ironically, it seems, instead of guarding against rapacious land 
speculators (one of impetuses behind the 1874 Building Act), the municipal authority in 
Stockholm became one.  
 According to Forsell, ‘The city administration soon became the biggest land speculator 
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within its own area’ (Forsell, 2006, p. 130). The speculative land trading activities of Stockholm 
City certainly had an effect. Land and property prices (and rents) in the city began to rise 
precipitously; and so too did production. During this period (from the late-1870s to the mid-
1880s), it was not uncommon for between 5,000 and 10,000 room units to added to the total 
housing stock each year in Stockholm (Hall, 2003, p. 243). According to a five-year report 
commissioned in 1887 by the Royal Commander of Stockholm, it was a rate of construction, 
‘…whose unparalleled magnitude our capital town has certainly never seen before’ (translated in 
Forsell, 2006, p. 173). Yet this phenomenal increase in units did nothing to suppress rents, or 
property prices.  
 It was not long before Stockholm City was publicly reprimanded. Emil Hjertstedt, of the 
Stockholm Municipal Association (Stockholms kommunal förening), expressed his frustration in 
a speech in 1886: ‘I say expressly that which has long been muttered in closed circles: it is the 
fault of the city administration that land racketeering has reached its present level – it is the actions 
of city that have brought the present crisis upon us’ (translated in Forsell, 2006, p. 136). 
Hjertstedt’s damning indictment was shared by many a property owner in the mid-1880s61. As we 
will discover, the solutions to Stockholm’s housing woes, according to property owner advocacy 
groups at the time, were to be found in the successful extension of secured credit, not the direct 
involvement of the City in land trading. 
 
The housing ‘crisis’, 1885  
 
 Whilst public utilities such as sewage and water networks, and tram and train systems, 
were built as a result of Stockholm City’s speculative trading strategies in the latter stages of the 
nineteenth century, it would be naïve to assume that the land trading in Stockholm City (and 
municipal authorities elsewhere in Sweden) were acts of altruism, for the greater good of the city. 
Whilst visionaries such as Albert Lindhagen (who died in 1887) and certain other affiliates with 
influence within Stockholm City (engineers and architects and the like) no doubt felt a desire to 
secure a legacy and to improve sanitation and public health, most of the land trading activities to 
improve the city managed to displace the working classes residing in the city centres, forcing 
them beyond the city limits; just as Rudberg had desired back in 1862. Furthermore, others were 
intent on profiting for their own means, not those of the City. Hall comments: 
 
All this happened quite openly; what went on in secret, using front men and so on, has not yet 
been investigated and will probably now never be completely uncovered. It seems probable, 
however, that many members of the municipal boards and committees exploited their 
positions and their ‘inside information’ for personal speculations (Hall, 2003b, p. 318). 
 
                                               
 
61 For a more comprehensive analysis of property advocacy groups during this period, see Forsell (2006). 
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This conforms neatly to what Samuel Knafo refers to as premodern forms of speculation (see 
Introduction). The elite insiders were those working within Stockholm City and their affiliates 
(usually engineers and building magnates). The City’s land trading activities provide an example 
of local state-sponsored arbitrage. However, this speculative behaviour was not benign. 
 
Figure 2.4. Real price house index for Stockholm and Gothenburg, 1875-1912 (1912=100) 
 
 
Sources: Bohlin, (2014); Söderberg, Blöndal and Edvinsson, (2014) 
 
 As Figure 2.4 illustrates, the period between 1875 and 1887 witnessed robust property-
price rises in Stockholm. A government report, from 1890, described construction output during 
this period as lively (Stockholm Municipality, 1891), but this is probably an example of Swedish 
understatement. Incredibly, ‘…in the 10-year period between 1876 and 1885, more dwellings 
were constructed in Stockholm than during the preceding 75 years’ (Forsell, 2006, p. 134). 
However, this boom in real prices for Stockholm properties was followed by contraction 
(Edvinsson, Jacobson and Waldenström, 2014, p. 71), and,  according to Blöndal (2015, p. 11), 
‘The price decrease wreaked havoc among property owners and contractors many of which went 
into default causing banks to withdraw lending and raise interest rates’. This did not lead to a 
banking or financial crisis per se, but the construction sector took a financial hit and it is quite 
clear that a speculative property bubble had burst62. During this period, credit flooded out of the 
                                               
 
62 As Blöndal notes, ‘[t]he housing crisis in 1885 was in many ways similar to a modern housing crisis coinciding with 
a credit squeeze resulting in a credit crisis among banks and other financial institutions’ (Blöndal, 2015, p. 11) 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
187
5
187
7
187
9
188
1
188
3
188
5
188
7
188
9
189
1
189
3
189
5
189
7
189
9
190
1
190
3
190
5
190
7
190
9
191
1
 
 
 
65 
construction and housing sectors and into industry. 
 This was a blow, albeit temporary, to the budding formal housing finance sector and to 
developers and construction magnates, but the city’s poor would have been little affected by this 
crisis; their plight was felt even before the start of this boom, when inner-city working-class 
dwellings were razed in order to make way for grandiose developments. The English art critic 
and social thinker, John Ruskin, once noted that, buildings speak. What he meant by this was that 
buildings (in both their form and constitution) have a tendency to reflect the prevailing social and 
moral order. The extravagant buildings, erected where slums inhabited by the poor once stood, 
spoke not only of an ambitious, increasingly wealthy city’s desire to become a preeminent, 
modern European capital, but also of an assault on the urban poor in order to achieve these ends. 
The implementation strategy of the Town Plans, thus, became active in aggressively gentrifying 
inner-city districts, such as Östermalm, and Norrmalm63. We can trace the nascent tenant’s 
movement to this period where, following the crisis in May 1886, Stockholms Hyresgästers 
Förening (Stockholm Tenants’ Association) was formed. It is worth pointing out that, as Forsell 
notes, it was only ‘…a sort of tenants’ movement’ (Forsell, 2006, p. 215) at this stage.  
 Stockholm City cannot take sole responsibility for the boom and bust cycle of the 1880s, 
but it was the most important player in stoking land values, and it should certainly take 
responsibility for the displacement of thousands of poor, inner-city residents. Throughout this 
period, Stockholm City (and its stakeholders) became rich and powerful. This was the first time 
in Sweden that a local (quasi) democratic authority was able to command such influence over 
housing and the built environment. This case, then, provides several important insights about the 
nature of housing system development in Sweden during the late nineteenth century. First, what 
this case illustrates is an extraordinary build-up in municipal capacity and power within a 
relatively short time period, and how these capacities were able to shape housing outcomes. By 
capacity here, I refer to the ability of the municipalities to raise revenue and administer financial 
support. Second, that this power was augmented via speculative trading strategies. Third, it 
demonstrates not only the intricate social construction of speculation64, but also how, in the face 
of what one might term structural impediments, municipalities throughout Sweden were able to 
innovate and negotiate these impediments in order to implement their plans. Finally, this case 
casts doubt on the notion that the state was somehow passive throughout this period, reminding 
us of the merit of analysing local actors (both state and non-state). As we shall see, these activities 
were merely a prelude to significant state involvement in the Swedish housing system at both the 
                                               
 
63 As Edvinsson notes, the fact that it was mainly the high-end building sector affected by the crash of 1885, probably 
explains why the recovery in construction and lending after the slump was relatively swift (Edvinsson, Jacobson and 
Waldenström, 2014, p. 71) 
64As Knafo notes, ‘[f]ar from being an option amongst many that financiers can simply pursue, speculation requires a 
complex set of institutions to be viable’ (Knafo, 2009, p. 130). 
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local and national level. 
 
2.3. The passive state? State capacity, credit dynamics, and homeownership, 
1904 – 1914 
 
Having explored Stockholm City’s response to rapid population growth, and how urban planning, 
development, and housing finance developed during the mid- to late-nineteenth century, we turn 
our attention now to the prodigious build-up in central state capacity and financial power at the 
beginning of the twentieth century. Following the crisis of 1885-86, vacancy rates remained high 
in Stockholm centre (as elsewhere) for several years. It wasn’t until the mid-1890s that demand 
began to increase again (Blöndal, 2015, p. 11), and prices and rents rebounded swiftly thereafter. 
The story was different beyond the city limits, in the kåkstäder (shanty towns), however, where 
overcrowded conditions and urban sprawl prevailed65.  
 As previously noted, the notion of a passive state in Sweden prior to the 1930s is one that 
this chapter challenges; principally because it confounds more than it elucidates about the nature 
of the relationship between housing, finance, civil society, and the state, and provides a limited 
conceptual basis for understanding housing and finance system change. There are, of course, 
many different forms of state engagement. We have seen that the central government took a 
central role in the extension of housing finance to agrarian and (somewhat later) urban and 
suburban communities, and that the local municipalities took an ever-greater role in city planning 
and the regulation of residential buildings. However, from the beginning of the twentieth century, 
we begin to see very different forms of state engagement, both quantitatively and qualitatively. 
This was, according to Bo Bengtsson (2006, p. 106), the first time that housing conditions become 
central political concerns. 
 Even though the pace of Sweden’s industrialisation was abounding at the beginning of 
the twentieth century, credit market conditions were less than optimal for a budding industrial 
society. As a government report noted: 
 
During periods of industrial prosperity, when the demand for new working-class dwellings 
[…] made itself specially felt, it was customary to witness the peculiar state of things that 
building operations diminished, mainly owing to the greatly increased cost of credit 
(Regeringen, 1920, pp. 39–40). 
 
There existed during this period, then, huge credit constraints, creating cleavages between the 
needs of various branches of the Swedish economy. These constrained credit market conditions 
imposed severe restraints. As noted above, the production of working-class dwellings hitherto 
                                               
 
65 Quantifying precisely the degree of overcrowding for this period is not possible, but data from 1905 and 1912 suggest 
that Stockholm and Malmö had some of the most severe overcrowding in Europe (Regeringen, 1920). 
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had rested on speculative builders and developers who were dependant on credit and rising 
property values and rents (Regeringen, 1920, p. 39). The buildings they constructed varied 
depending on the size of the city, but tenement buildings were increasingly taking the place of the 
traditional single-dwelling houses in city centres, and these buildings were greatly encumbered 
with debt and excessively sensitive to economic variations (ibid.). As a result, profit for developers 
and landlords, more often than not, depended on overcrowding, low maintenance and low taxes.  
 Surprisingly, and perhaps somewhat counter-intuitively considering the nature of the 
credit market restraints existing during this period, household debt was burgeoning at the dawn 
of the twentieth century, as Figure 2.5 illustrates. By the beginning of the twentieth century, the 
informal credit sector comprised roughly forty per cent of the total credit market (see Figure 2.6, 
below), and these liabilities were mainly on the balance sheets of Swedish households. This is a 
testament to the endurance of the informal credit system, which was characterised by extremely 
long maturities, but limited liquidity.  
 
Figure 2.5. The evolution of Swedish household debt as a share of national income, 1810-1914 
 
 
Source: Waldenström, (2015, 2016)  
 
 A note of caution is needed about Figure 2.5 before I proceed. These are aggregate data, 
which pool total private liabilities in relation to national income across Sweden. Figure 2.5 tells 
us nothing of the socio-demographic distribution of debt, and data before 1870 should be treated 
with a degree of caution. Nevertheless, it still provides an important indication of the aggregate 
volumes of debt in Sweden throughout this period. Despite the high levels of debt accruing to 
households, the credit system was still very illiquid at the turn of the century, making investments 
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of the type needed to either build or acquire housing difficult; even the upper-middle classes were 
struggling to obtain the necessary credit. Demands were being made from all quarters (property 
owners associations; tenants; businessmen and philanthropists et cetera) for both the state and 
local authorities to ‘intervene’ in the functioning of the credit markets; and intervene they did.  
 At the beginning of the twentieth century, there was increasing recognition, at both the 
state and municipal level, that the implementation of town plans in the late nineteenth century had 
adversely affected the poor, relocating the housing problem beyond cities’ boundaries, whilst 
doing very little (if anything) to solve it. In March 1904, Stockholm City began purchasing land 
outside its boundaries in order to prepare for a less dense, and altogether less grandiose, type of 
urban expansion (Deland, 2001, p. 68). This would not be a repeat of the speculative land trading 
that the City engaged with in the previous decades, however.  
 The impetus for these purchases contrasted quite markedly with the activities initiated by 
the City in the 1880s. As the 1920 government report notes, ‘[t]he motive for this acquisition of 
land was that the city might thereby obtain cheap and fairly well situated building-lots for the 
erection chiefly of working-class dwellings’ (Regeringen, 1920, emphasis added). Here we begin 
to see the municipality becoming actively engaged in the provision of housing for the working 
classes. This, according to the aforementioned report, ‘…formed the turning point in the history 
of the housing question in Stockholm’ (Regeringen, 1920, p. 24). It would be a few years before 
the emergence of what Anglophone scholars refer to as social or public housing, but this marked 
a highly significant intervention from the municipal authority in Stockholm. By 1908, the city 
had even begun the construction of Sweden’s first Garden City in Enskede on the southern 
outskirts of Stockholm (Regeringen, 1920, p. 25). This, much as in England contemporaneously, 
was seen as a viable solution for providing the city’s working and lower-middle classes with good 
quality, wholesome dwellings and formed part of the Egnahemsrörelse (Own home movement), 
of which the State’s Owner-occupier Loan Fund (Egnahemslånefond) would play a crucial role. 
 
The State Owner-occupier Loan Fund (Egnahemslånefond), 1904 
 
 The year 1904 was a critical one in the development of Sweden’s housing and finance 
systems. At the local level, as we have seen, Stockholm City began to turn its land purchasing 
strategies towards providing accommodation for the working classes on the city’s environs. 
Something more significant occurred at the national level, however, as Ödman and Dahlberg 
(1970, p. 59) note: ‘Realizing that neatly planned town centres were being suffocated by the 
unplanned sprawl of the workers’ suburbs, the State authorities offered to arrange Government 
loans in order to improve the workers’ housing situation’. Previously housing (particularly in 
suburban areas) had been built piecemeal as it was financed much in the same way as developing 
countries with low levels of financial development and large informal finance systems develop 
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today (Lea, 2009, p. 30). This, in combination with poor planning outside of central districts led 
to the proliferation of sprawling shanty towns.  
 A committee was set up in 1899 to look into the possibility of extending government-
sponsored loans to potential homeowners across Sweden, but once their findings had been debated 
in the Swedish parliament, the remit changed, and the establishment of the State Owner-occupier 
Loan Fund (egnahemslånefond) in 1904 came to be focused more on the needs of agrarian 
communities, despite the committee’s intentions (Öhngren, 1981, p. 206)66. However, 
municipalities soon found ways of circumventing the formal rules. Whilst the egnahemslånefond 
was (strictly speaking) intended for rural inhabitants prior to 1908, certain municipalities provided 
loans to households in the city’s environs. These were areas that were in close proximity to the 
city, but outside cities’ urban planning zones (Fälting, 2000, p. 39)67. In addition to this, certain 
municipalities also provided loan guarantees to those who set up egnahem associations68 (Fälting, 
2000, p. 44). This guarantee, as Lars Fälting notes, acted as a form of subsidy and encouraged the 
Savings banks to finance the production of single-family dwellings (ibid.).  
 The egnahemslånefond changed the climate vis-à-vis the state’s involvement in the 
extension of housing credit to working class households and also marked the beginning of a new 
era of state involvement in shoring up of the Swedish housing system via financial conduits. 
Whilst the logic underpinning this intervention in the functioning of the housing finance system 
was very much based upon the liberal principle of ‘self-help’, such an initiative was no less 
significant because of this. The egnahemslånefond also helped to change the built environment 
as, between 1904 and 1939, around fifty per cent of all residential construction in Sweden took 
the form of single-dwelling owner-occupied homes (Fälting, 2000, p. 39). To dismiss this as an 
era of limited state involvement and regulation, then, runs contrary to the historical record. Indeed, 
between 1905 and 1913, the state granted 15,500 home-ownership loans amounting to 
approximately 41,000,000 kronor (Silk, 1948, p. 17)69 and, when one considers that residential 
housing construction nationally rarely exceeded 8,000 units per annum during this period 
(Ekbrant, 1986), this figure is not inconsiderable. It was at this time, according to an article by 
the Swedish National Board of Housing, Building and Planning (Hedman, 2008), that the state 
began to take an active role. 
 Whilst the egnahemslånefond may have been partly designed to stem the depopulation of 
the countryside and emigration (Hedman, 2008), which so defined this era, mitigating the waves 
                                               
 
66 This decision can be seen, in part, as a consequence of the imbalance of representation between rural and urban 
communities in Sweden at this time. According to Öhngren, ‘…rural interests had a far greater influence than their 
share of the population justified’ (Öhngren, 1981, p. 206).  
67 Lars Fälting notes, ‘[l]ocal governments could evade these rules by not subjecting areas in close proximity to a city 
to urban planning. Potential home owners in those areas would thus be eligible for State loans’ (Fälting, 2000, p. 39). 
68 These functioned as a form of worker cooperative which ultimately produced owner-occupied homes. 
69 Approximately $11,000,000 at the then-exchange rate (Silk, 1948, p. 17). 
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of emigration to the United States was not only goal. The association between tenure status and 
moral improvement is one that was made consistently in late-nineteenth century and early-
twentieth century Europe (Harloe, 1995), and this was an initiative that, rightly or wrongly, sought 
to give disenfranchised, landless rural communities a stake in private property and, 
simultaneously, improve their moral condition by inculcating them in the ways of property 
ownership70, and the credit system was the means selected to achieve this goal. 
 
Town Planning Act, 1907 
 
 At this juncture in Sweden’s age of improvement, the state was not content to limit its 
involvement in the housing system merely to extending credit to the provincial working and 
middle classes, and bolstering credit markets. The Town Planning Act of 1907 was a 
groundbreaking piece of legislation, and a further example of developments in central state 
capacity. Where the Lindhagen inspired Buildings Act of 1874 had offered promise, it had also 
created several problems and contradictions, which local authorities across the land had struggled 
to redress. The 1907 Act, however, sought to redress this: 
 
The Town-Planning Act […] has the character of a civil law and was brought into existence 
chiefly with the object of regulating in a binding way the juridical relations between 
municipalities and private individuals with regard to the enforcement of the town plan 
(Regeringen, 1920, p. 18). 
 
This was not hands-off regulation, as many scholars assume characterised this period. The Royal 
Building Board, a central state organ, provided municipalities with the clout to enforce regulations 
regarding the design of the buildings (Hall, 2003b, p. 243), and provided municipalities with the 
powers to enforce stringent, systematic regulation of building (Regeringen, 1920, p. 21), giving 
local communities the rights to expropriate land for streets and public places (Larsson, 2006, p. 
244). It strengthened the power of municipalities across Sweden, creating a municipal planning 
monopoly, which, as a recent report commissioned by The Swedish International Centre for Local 
Democracy, notes ‘…is considered to be the cornerstone of Swedish urban planning and 
development’ (Andersson, Carlson and Larsson, 2012, p. 11). This Act, then, demonstrates a 
quantum leap in municipal capacity and power, facilitated by the central government, and left a 
significant legacy which continues to shape housing and the built environment throughout 
Sweden to this day.  
 
 
 
                                               
 
70 Whether misguided or not, this discursive tool would later be blunted during the two and a half decades following 
the Second World War (see Chapter III). 
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Urban Hypothec Fund for the Kingdom of Sweden, 1909 
  
 1909 was another landmark year for housing finance, with the central government making 
another significant foray into the functioning of urban credit markets. The Hypothec Fund for the 
Kingdom of Sweden (Stadshypotekskassan) was set up with paid-up capital, advanced by the 
State amounting to 30,000,000 kronor71 (Regeringen, 1920, p. 30), and loans were granted by the 
fund to financial intermediaries, Urban Hypothec Associations (Stadshypoteksforeningar), not 
directly to households. Loans were limited to 50 per cent of the value of the property (Silk, 1948, 
p. 17), and it was stipulated that, ‘…loans must be granted subject to the lowest possible interest’ 
(Silk, 1948, p. 33). The government also encouraged the establishment of special credit 
institutions (mortgage companies) whose primary purpose was to extend credit to the inhabitants 
of Sweden’s largest towns and cities72. This was about extending liquidity in order to ameliorate 
the chronic housing situation afflicting the country’s urban inhabitants. Within the space of 
merely three years, the Hypothec Fund, and the mortgage companies, became core constituents 
of the Swedish housing finance system, as illustrated in Table 2.2.  
 
Table 2.2. Composition of Building Credits in Sweden, 1912 
 
Lender Loans (Kr) % 
Urban Hypothec Fund 141,713,981   11.50 
Mortgage Companies 231,290,215 18.77 
Business Banks 187,220,856 15.19 
Savings Banks 290,791,012             23.59   
Insurance Institutions  237,979,619             19.31 
Pious Foundations 141,819,634             11.51 
Other Lenders  1,655,479               0.13 
Total 1,232,470,786           100.00 
Source: Regeringen, (1920) 
 
The state’s direct share in the extension of urban housing credit made up a total of 11.5 per cent 
of the entire market and, as shown in Figure 2.6 (below), this share would gain ground.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
 
71 Equivalent to about $8,000,00 in 1909 (Silk, 1948, p. 17) 
72 In fact, as a government report notes, these banks’ ‘…operations are restricted to a definite town’ (Regeringen, 1920, 
p. 33). 
  
 
 
 
72 
Figure 2.6. Composition of financial sector credits to households, 1810–1930 (% share) 
 
 
Source: Waldenström, (2015, 2016) 
 
 It is quite clear that, against this background, maintaining an academic position that posits 
that housing policy during this time was somehow negligible or unimportant, is untenable. Indeed, 
this was the time when, as Marquis Childs (1938, p. 83) notes, ‘…there was above all the 
realization that private business could not provide housing for the lowest income groups on the 
ordinary basis of private profit’. The state involvement which I have reviewed here, then, fits 
uncomfortably with the view of a Sweden as a passive, laissez faire state during this period. There 
are two possible competing explanations for this disjuncture: i) either the state was not liberal; or 
ii) it was liberal, but that the framing of the liberal state as passive is fruitless for understanding 
the nature of the relationship between housing, finance and the state. The latter explanation seems 
to be the most plausible.  
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2.4. Right to the City: The First World War and the Inter-War Years 
 
The right to the city is […] far more than a right of individual or group access to the resources 
that the city embodies: it is a right to change and reinvent the city more after our hearts' desire. 
It is, moreover, a collective rather than an individual right, since reinventing the city inevitably 
depends upon the exercise of a collective power over the processes of urbanization 
  
David Harvey,  2012 
 
Having focused on developments in state capacity up until the First World War, and having shown 
that, contrary to popular scholarly belief, the state (at both local and national level) was very much 
an active agent in the Swedish housing and finance systems throughout this period, the present 
section explores the role of non-state actors and the impacts of events which occurred outside of 
Sweden’s geographical boundaries on housing and housing finance. Clearly the divide between 
public and private, and national and international spheres, is not an absolute one and, thus, the 
state’s role will not be ignored here. However, the purpose of this section is to attempt to move 
beyond state-centric analyses in order to explore the power of actors’ collective ability to shape 
housing and finance system development, and how dynamics external to the housing system per 
se can impose keen imperatives. This section, then, explores how the outbreak of the First World 
War left an indelible imprint on the Swedish housing system, and how actors’ collective responses 
to the restraints imposed by a wartime economy radically altered the structure and form of the 
Swedish housing system.  
 In the year preceding the outbreak of the First World War, a system of national insurance 
was initiated in Sweden, which combined with the formation of, ‘…a considerable National 
Insurance Fund’ (Regeringen, 1920, p. 57). The purpose of this fund was to advance capital to 
local government authorities under the remit of promoting public health (ibid.). Within this remit, 
was also the promotion of what the government referred to as communal and semi-communal 
house-building (ibid.). During the War, ‘no less than about 30,000,000 kronor’ had been granted 
to local authorities for this purpose (ibid.). This marked the beginning of public housing in 
Sweden and, although modest in scope at this stage, it is worth noting that this foray into the 
construction of public housing was early by contemporary European standards.  
 Britain had completed her first council estate before 1900, but the project of building 
municipal housing in Britain did not gain significant traction until the Homes fit for Heroes 
initiative under David Lloyd George’s government following the First World War. However, in 
much the same way that the construction industry in Britain could not meet housing demand 
(partly) as a result of Britain’s dire Balance of Payments and foreign exchange position, private 
housing builders in Sweden could not muster the required capital to provide adequate housing for 
the working and lower-middle classes. Despite state and local authority efforts hitherto, credit 
conditions were still far too tight. This, as we have seen above, had always been a problem in 
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Sweden’s transition to an urban, industrialised nation, and the outbreak of World War I 
exacerbated these problems. Indeed, the price of raw building materials rose precipitously. By the 
end of the Great War, however, Sweden had amassed a significant domestic capital base which 
had been so lacking in the previous decades. This would have implications for housing and the 
built environment, and the role of the state and municipalities therein. 
 
War in Europe: Slump in residential building and the rise in effective demand for housing 
 
 Sweden’s neutrality, forged over a century beforehand, turned out to be shrewd 
economically during the 1910s. The world’s first industrial war provided ‘an immense financial 
bonus to Sweden’ (Schön, 2008) and, for the first time in decades, Sweden accrued BoP surpluses. 
It was at this stage that the formal domestic credit system really began to take shape; increasing 
state capacity and providing new instruments for economic policy (ibid.). Nevertheless, despite 
the favourable BoP position, the majority of Swedish society felt the impacts of war acutely; and 
not least in the sphere of housing. The responses to these impacts would alter the Swedish political 
economy inexorably; and with it, the Swedish housing and finance systems. 
 One of the most obvious and detrimental effects of the War on housing supply in Sweden 
can be illustrated with a brief statistical summary of the changes in raw material prices between 
1914 and 1920. 
 
Table 2.3. Percentage increase in raw building materials 1914-1920. 
 
Material % increase in raw material costs 
Timber 250% 
Bricks 280% 
Cement 230% 
Iron 300% 
Source: Regeringen, (1920) 
 
The price-increases evident in Table 2.3 and Figure 2.7 (below) had a huge impact on a 
construction industry that had historically struggled to acquire credit at what their western 
European counterparts would consider reasonable rates of interest. To relate these price-increases 
in more palatable terms, the government estimated that the cost of building per room in Stockholm 
had increased nearly five-fold in real-terms between 1914 and 1920 (Regeringen, 1920, p. 44). 
The War, then, brought Swedish housing construction to its knees:  
 
The rises in price for materials and labour have been aggravated by credit difficulties. It is 
obvious that the building industry requires a much greater capital than formerly, and the rate 
of interest is considerably higher in cases where it is possible to obtain loans at all. It is only 
thanks to the support that the production of dwellings during the War has obtained from 
public funds, chiefly the National Insurance Fund, that it has been possible to arrange 
secondary credit for newly-built houses (Regeringen, 1920, pp. 44–45) 
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The state at this stage was playing a central role in underpinning the mortgage market. The report 
even went as far as to say that the War had shown, in the context of Sweden, ‘…at once that it is 
impossible to count upon any private building activity with regard to working-class dwellings’ 
(ibid. p. 54). This situation was brought about as a result of constrained credit market conditions, 
which the War had exasperated73, and the state and municipalities had few options but to intervene 
and extend credit for the purposes of supplying working class accommodation by this stage, else 
residential housing construction would have simply collapsed. 
 
Figure 2.7. Construction costs and inflation, 1911-1932 
 
 
Source: SCB 
 
Rent Tribunals and Rent Control 
 
 As one might expect, rents in Stockholm (as elsewhere in Western Europe) had ballooned 
throughout the period under consideration as a result of increased demand from a growing urban 
population, constrained credit supply, skills shortages, and the ever-increasing cost of raw 
materials. By the outbreak of the Great War, Sweden had some of the highest rents in Europe, 
and there was no sign of this abating. The Swedish government was reluctant to impose rent 
controls, as had already been done in the belligerent countries. Britain had introduced rent ceilings 
in 1915 after rent strikes in Manchester and Glasgow forced Lloyd George to personally intervene 
                                               
 
73 Further fuelling inflation was wartime governments’ expenditure on defence. See Silk, (1948, p. 30). 
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and promise an angry crowd of Glaswegian women and children that rents would be frozen. On 
5th May 1916, the Swedish government introduced a system of rent tribunals, which were 
organized at the municipal level to arbitrate in rent disputes (Forsell, 2006, p. 247). This was seen 
as somewhat of a fudge, however, as these tribunals were not legally binding, and Forsell notes 
that these amounted to little more than talking chambers (ibid.). 
 Tensions were mounting throughout the land. Around the time that the United States had 
declared war on Germany, the working and lower-middle classes in Sweden were waging their 
own offensives. It is estimated that around 300,000 people took part in the so-called ‘hunger riots’ 
during the spring of 1917 (Sernhede, Thörn and Thörn, 2016, p. 153), which culminated in an 
urban uprising involving some 40,000 people in Gothenburg on 5th May 1917 (ibid.). Later that 
month, on 25th May 1917, a much-divided parliament, faced with the threat of working class 
militancy and haunted by the events in Russia, passed the Rent Control Act. This legislation had 
the effect of fixing housing conditions as they were in 1917 (Regeringen, 1920, p. 50). Nobody 
was legally allowed to be given notice of eviction, and thus few were able to obtain fresh 
dwellings. Consequently, as a government report noted, ‘no one dares to move voluntarily’ 
(Regeringen, 1920, p. 43). This legislation had the desired impact on rents, as is evident in Figure 
2.8, but did little to solve the underlying problem of affordable rental housing supply.  
 
Figure 2.8. Stockholm real rent price index, 1875-1935 (1875=100)   
             
 
Source: (Blöndal, 2015) 
  
 The situation for the majority of residents in Sweden’s main cities was still precarious. 
Rent controls sheltered those fortunate enough to have a tenancy agreement prior to 1917 but did 
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little to increase vacancies in the rental market. This initiative then, was a double-edged sword. 
This is not to say that rent controls cannot be effective but, as this case shows, in isolation of other 
measures, they are generally rather blunt policy instruments. It is worth noting here that many 
Social Democrats in the Riksdag were opposed to rent control at this point (Strömberg, 1992a). 
 
Building Subsidies & Credit Markets 
  
 By 1917, in spite of the State support for the secondary mortgage markets, the situation 
in the construction industry was dire. The numbers of dwellings produced each year in Sweden 
had more than halved from 1912 levels (Regeringen, 1920, p. 15) and more radical solutions were 
being considered. At this stage, as well as attempting to support liquidity, the state offered direct 
subsidies to building concerns to the tune of one third of the cost of building completion (ibid. p. 
55).  Of this building subsidy, the central government would assume two-thirds of the 
responsibility and the municipality one-third (ibid. p. 55)74. As well as this, strict stipulations were 
imposed, such as rent regulations and limits on profits (Silk, 1948, p. 33). It is worth noting that 
no rent controls were imposed on new buildings during Sweden’s brief flirtation with rent 
ceilings, unless the building had received subsidies (Silk, 1948, p. 34). These were exceptional 
and unprecedented supply-side interventions by the state, which would set a precedent for nearly 
a century to come75.  
 Of note here is the type of building construction that the state and local municipalities 
were supporting: 
 
In a considerable number of cases there has also been private building activity of what is 
called public utility enterprises - by co-operative housing associations and by companies with 
dividends limited and of a philanthropic character. Broadly speaking, it would seem that the 
semi-communal enterprises comprise somewhat more than half of the building operations 
subsidized (Regeringen, 1920, p. 55). 
 
Now the state was bolstering credit markets, underpinning the construction industry, building 
public housing and imposing rent ceilings. As Forsell (2006, p. 251) notes, ‘[m]unicipal housing 
agencies and the cooperative housing movement were given assistance through the extensive 
municipal support programmes of 1918 and 1919’. All this from a state that, according to swathes 
of housing scholars, did little in the way of regulating or assisting in the housing system. The state 
subsidy system was dropped in 1921, in part due to deflation (Silk, 1948, p. 34), but housing 
prices and rents rose as a result. In 1920, the state established the State Building Bureau (Statens 
                                               
 
74 The arrangement was conducted thus: ‘In practice, therefore, things assumed this shape: every town that desired a 
subsidy for itself or for some private builder had to apply to the proper Government authority and pledge itself to take 
the responsibility for one-ninth of the cost of building the houses contemplated. The State would then advance the 
remaining two-ninths, so far as the funds granted by the Riksdag permitted’ (Regeringen, 1920:55). 
75 In 1919, the Swedish Municipal Federation had produced a programme for future housing policy, in which state and 
municipal housing subsidies would play a major role. (Forsell, 2006, p. 253). 
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bostadslånefond). As Silk (1948, p. 37) notes, this Bureau ‘…issued secondary-mortgage loans 
of up to 75 per cent of the property value, in the case of large urban properties’ and were 
‘redeemable over periods of 20 to 40 years’. It was around this time that a cooperative housing 
movement, which would eventually become one of the largest and most successful in the world, 
began to thrive. 
 
Cooperative housing & the National Union of Tenants 
 
 One of the most significant, and unique, features of the contemporary Swedish housing 
system is the presence of a powerful national tenant movement and a large cooperative housing 
sector (Bengtsson, Ruonavaara and Sørvoll, 2017, p. 74). Whilst the institutional structure of these 
organisations has changed substantially since their inception (see Chapters III-V), Sweden still 
has the largest share of tenant union membership in the world, and one of the largest cooperative 
housing sectors in Europe. Both Hyresgästföreningen (The Swedish Union of Tenants) and the 
cooperative housing sector have been viewed by housing scholars to have constituted central 
pillars of decommodified housing provision in Sweden throughout much of the twentieth century 
(Ruonavaara, 2005; Bengtsson et al., 2006). Exploring the geneses of these housing forms, and 
how they came to feature so prominently in the Swedish housing system, then, will be a core 
concern going forward.  
 It is important to note here that the pressure exerted by disenfranchised working men and 
women during the War years on the state and municipalities in relation to housing and the 
development of cooperatives by the working and middle-classes were part of a much wider social 
movement and struggle which, as elsewhere in the developed world at this time, produced 
remarkable consequences. In 1918, universal suffrage was introduced in local elections and, with 
the spectre of bolshevism looming large over Europe after the First World War, the Riksdag 
legislated for universal and equal suffrage for women and men in May 1919. The following year, 
in March 1920, Hjalmar Branting became Sweden’s first Social Democrat Prime Minister. This 
was an historic moment, but much like Britain’s first socialist Prime Minister, Ramsay 
MacDonald, Branting’s premiership was ephemeral, lasting only until October 1920. Whilst he 
would serve twice more as Prime Minister between 1921 and 1923, and then again between 
October 1924 until his death in January 1925, the three governments he formed during this 
turbulent decade held little decisive sway over the housing question. This was a decade of weak 
minority government and parliamentary paralysis (Ruin, 1989, p. 65), where politics became a 
game of tactics (Davidson, 1994, p. 57). Branting’s legacy vis-à-vis housing and the built 
environment was mainly indirect. His historical significance, however, should not be 
underplayed: Branting was instrumental in the development of social democracy as a credible 
political force in Sweden. 
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 The macroeconomic, socio-political, and geopolitical context outlined above, and the 
state’s initial reluctance to introduce rent controls can be seen as prime catalysts for the 
cooperative housing and tenants’ movement in Sweden. Affordability issues exasperated by a 
combination of population growth and credit restraints had hit urban working and middle-class 
Swedes hard. Active mobilisation by tenants and housing cooperatives thus provided bottom-up 
solutions to the acute housing shortages which had beset Sweden since the early years of industrial 
urbanisation. Following the political fudge that was the rent tribunals, a group of residents in 
Stockholm were motivated to take matters into their own hands. One of the main inhibiting factors 
that had limited the formation of housing co-operatives hitherto had been the propensity for 
unscrupulous  businessmen to use the cooperative form of tenure as a vehicle for speculating with 
prospective tenants’ savings (Ruonavaara, 2005, p. 218). This problem, in combination with the 
building crisis during the Great War and the constrained credit conditions of the time, prompted 
the formation of Stockholms Kooperativa Bostadsförening (SKB) in 1916.  
 SKB claims to have been born as a ‘reaction to the miserable housing conditions that 
prevailed in Stockholm at the beginning of the century’ (SKB, 2013, p. 3, author's translation), 
with the chief aim of providing a buffer against rapacious speculators which had hitherto plagued 
the cooperative housing movement (ibid.). The premise was simple. Individuals (usually better 
off members of the working and lower-middle classes) pooled their savings in order to build 
apartment units which they would then occupy on a cost-rent basis. Whilst cooperative housing 
in Sweden can be traced back to the 1870s, and cooperatives became definite legal entities as 
early as 1895 (Ruonavaara, 2005), it was not until the foundation of SKB that co-operative 
housing really began to flourish.  
 The state was keen to support such ventures, which, in all probability, explains why the 
sector was able to develop so successfully. The building subsidies discussed above were very 
much directed towards cooperatives (as well as municipally built semi-public housing). As a 
Government report from 1920 notes:  
 
The largest housing association working in Stockholm is the Stockholm Co-operative 
Housing Association [SKB] which started its building operations in 1916. This association 
has so far built dwelling-houses containing altogether 638 rooms […] The yearly rent for a 
flat of one room and kitchen in the house first built amounts to 360—380 kronor (about £20—
£21) and in the houses most  recently erected to 630—660 kronor (£35 - £37). Almost all the 
houses of the association have been built with public subsidies (Regeringen, 1920, pp. 26–27, 
emphasis added). 
 
If we compare these rents to the average yearly rent in Stockholm of between £75 and £80 in the 
private rental sector, we can see why Sweden’s oldest functioning cooperative began as a rampant 
success. The profit-maximising rental model dependant on overleveraged development on behalf 
of developers and landlords, overcrowding, lack of maintenance, and low taxes was beginning to 
be challenged; and this challenge came from the bottom up, with support from the state. However, 
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as Table 2.4 attests, changes to housing systems generally occur piecemeal. In spite of state 
support on the housing supply side (and rent controls) rents between the mid-1910s and 1930 
increased more than anywhere else in Central and Western Europe.  
 
Table 2.4. Rent level in 1930 with 1913 as a base year (=100) 
 
Sweden 200 
Denmark 196 
Finland 192 
Switzerland 181 
Norway 175 
Great Britain 153 
Germany 126 
Hungary 86 
France 71 
Poland 58 
Austria 21 
Source: Lundevall, 1993, p. 16 
 
 Whilst wages in Sweden had been growing faster than any other Western European 
country between 1870 and 1910 (Schön, 2005, p. 219), the growth of rents prior to, and in the 
aftermath of, World War I far outstripped wage growth, and this squeeze on the cost of living 
entailed consequences. While the cooperative movement was in full swing, simultaneously, 
tenants throughout Sweden were mobilising to affect meaningful housing system change. Anders 
Victorin (1979, p. 235) notes that the tenants’ movement in Sweden has (much like the Social 
Democratic Party) always been divided into conservative and militant fractions. While both wings 
were united in pressing for rent controls and tenant protections, rent strikes, blockades, and 
picketing became increasingly common throughout the 1920s and 1930s (ibid.), most famously 
with the Gothenburg rent strikes of 1933 and 1936, where transport workers refused to assist local 
authorities in evictions (Anderman, Neal and Victorin, 1992, p. 7). 
 These developments were emblematic of an emboldened, newly enfranchised, workers 
movement and were the prelude to substantive housing system change. In 1921 the Swedish 
Central Organization of Tenant Ownership Cooperatives (Sveriges Bostadsrätts Centrum, SBC) 
was formed and, in 1923, Hyresgästföreningen (The Swedish Union of Tenants) was established. 
This was a relatively tardy mobilisation considering that the Stockholm Property Owners 
Association had been founded in 1870 (Forsell, 2006), and construction workers unions had 
emerged already by 1889. However, as Bengtsson (2007a, p. 17) notes, the decision to remove 
controls in 1923 was undoubtedly, a triggering factor behind the establishment of 
Hyresgästföreningen. Sweden was the last in and first out when it came to rent controls. Controls 
were abolished before England and Wales, Vienna and the major German cities. Neighbouring 
Denmark, even, retained rent controls during the entire post-War period (Bro, 2009, p. 18). The 
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rescission of rent controls in 1923, then, can be seen as a critical juncture, not just for the tenants’ 
movement, but also for cooperative housing movement and, in turn, for the entire Swedish 
housing system.  
 One need only look back at Figure 2.7 to see the impact the rent control decision. That 
very same year, Hyresgästföreningen created Hyresgästernas sparkasse - och byggnadsförening 
(HSB - literally translated as the ‘Tenant’s Savings and Construction Association’) with the aim 
of building affordable apartments for its members. HSB was founded as a vehicle for starting new 
associations in the country (Ruonavaara, 2005, p. 218) and is today Sweden’s largest cooperative 
housing association. One man, the architect Sven Wallander (who we return to in Chapter III), 
was instrumental in this process76. The aim of HSB was to build affordable apartments for its 
members and, during the interwar years, they were successful in this endeavour. Rents in HSB 
built apartments were significantly cheaper than market rents during the 1920s and a series of 
advertising campaigns did not fail to point this out. Table 2.5 (below) highlights the differences 
in rents per m2 between market prices and HSB. 
 
Table 2.5. Rental prices per m2 during the 1920s 
 
 
 Rental Market price per m2 HSB 
25 m2  47 kr 28 kr 
28 m2 48 kr 28 kr 
33 m2 42 kr 25 kr 
 
Source: Lundevall, 1992, pp. 26–27 
 
 The development of SKB, Hyresgästföreningen, and HSB provide illustrative examples 
of how actors with limited agency were able to collectively negotiate and overcome structural 
impediments in order to promote their interests. Knafo argues that, social relations between 
agents are mediated by structures (Knafo, 2010, p. 504). We can observe here that the agency of 
some (the working and middle classes) had been restricted by the actions of others (the pecuniary 
class), with the latter group in this instance able to exploit the former, mediated through the 
structures of housing finance, which, during this period were characterised by informal credit 
relations lacking proper legal intermediation. However, a coalition of working and middle-class 
actors were able to form institutions such as SKB, Hyresgästföreningen, and HSB in order to 
overcome the problems inherent both within the housing finance structures that existed at the time 
and the initial co-operative and rental models. These initiatives thus (ostensibly) protected 
prospective tenants against pecuniary financial interests. As this case illustrates, the relationship 
between structure and agency is not unilinear, as Knafo argues:  
                                               
 
76 Jardar Sørvoll (2013, p. 107) refers to Sven Wallander as the father of HSB. 
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When we focus on the restrictive nature of structures we limit ourselves to only one side of 
a social relation. What appears to be the product of structural constraints is always a product 
of agency when properly resituated within a social relation that takes into account the power 
of another actor exploiting these structural constraints (Knafo, 2010, p. 504). 
 
Those excluded from, or exploited by, the current housing system formation, then,  were able to 
increase their collective agency. These institutional conduits enabled actors to pursue and protect 
their interests whilst limiting the risk of financial exploitation, thereby circumventing the financial 
structures that would otherwise have impeded their agency. Such a position allows us to 
accommodate a more fluid interpretation of agency; agency is never static and relates to different 
actors in different ways and at different times. Furthermore, this case provides a microcosm of 
the housing and finance system macrocosm. It is through such interactions between actors and 
institutions that housing and finance systems evolve, albeit slowly. 
 Whilst it may be tempting to view these processes through a lens of working class 
emancipation, we should be mindful not to romanticise the cooperative movement in Sweden. 
According to Sven Wallander’s memoirs, published in 1968, his dream when HSB was 
established in 1923 was to make homeowners out of every Swedish household (Wallander 1968, 
translated in Sørvoll, 2013, p. 149).  Similarly, the policy commission that proposed the Swedish 
law of cooperative housing of 1930 – of which Wallander was a prominent member - regarded 
the cooperative alternative as a way to extend homeownership to the urban population (Sørvoll, 
2013, p. 149). From its inception, then, HSB sought to provide a form of tenant ownership which 
certain elements of the Social Democrats were deeply suspicious of (Sørvoll, 2013, p. 109). It 
would be some time before Wallander’s ambition was realised, however, as we will see in 
Chapters III & IV.  
 Against the backdrop of these developments, a movement, which remains strong in 
Sweden today, was born. Hyresgästföreningen represented the interests of a previously 
unrepresented class; those who could not afford market rents and who were too poor to buy. The 
founding of this union helped to forge a unique corporatist arrangement, whereby rents are 
negotiated between the state, landlords and the tenants’ union. And so, restraints imposed on 
agents were overcome as class cleavages formed around a salient issue. Thus, from a legislative 
Act that limited workers’ agency, emerged a powerful social constellation which could represent 
tenants’ interests. From 1923 onwards, the interests of tenants were mediated through the 
structures of a tenants’ union, which was institutionally embedded in rent negotiations in Sweden 
in 1933 with the first rent negotiation procedure. Two central pillars of the twentieth century 
Swedish housing system had emerged, and had done so, not only prior to the age of social 
democratic political hegemony, but also almost entirely independently of the state. 
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2.5. Concluding Comments 
 
Neither capitalist development nor associated state forms can be so thoroughly transformed 
as to lack any resemblance to former incarnations 
Rachel Weber, 2002 
 
In conclusion, this chapter sought to highlight the importance of a period in Swedish history which 
is both overlooked and (broadly) misunderstood in much contemporary housing scholarship. 
Returning to the historical record, I attempted to demonstrate that the period under investigation 
was not merely a historical footnote, of little relevance to twentieth- and twenty-first century 
housing and finance formations, but a formative epoch of central importance to subsequent 
housing and finance system development in Sweden. This was an era in which rapid 
industrialisation, demographic change, and augmentations in power and capacity, both at the level 
of the state and civil society, shaped the composition of housing and the built environment, and 
finance in Sweden. As an influential government report from 1945 noted, ‘Our cities and other 
urban agglomerations began, through industrialism to expand in earnest in the 1870s and 80s. It 
was during this time that their current appearance was largely determined (SOU, 1946, p. 638, 
author’s translation). For this reason, this chapter has given special attention to a period, which, 
as I have shown here and will continue to illustrate in the following pages, created the foundations 
for the housing initiatives of the post-War era. 
 Throughout this chapter, I challenged the notion that the state’s role in housing system 
development was nominal prior to the era of Social Democratic hegemony, arguing that such a 
position obfuscates key social and institutional transformations during the pre-WWI and interwar 
years. Furthermore, I endeavoured to illustrate that the analytical juxtaposition of the pre-War 
passive liberal state with that of the post-War active social democratic state creates a singularly 
unhelpful false dichotomy which is difficult to reconcile with the historical record, particularly in 
relation to housing finance. By adhering to the notion that the state was the main driver in the 
development of Sweden’s housing system after the War, yet played little role beforehand, scholars 
ignore the manifest build-up of state capacity and agency during the pre- and interwar years. In 
so doing, they present a portrait of almost unfettered political agency post-1945, whilst 
simultaneously diminishing the importance of state and non-state sectoral actors and interests 
prior to the 1940s.  
 By adopting an historicist framework, this chapter has offered a revisionist history of 
housing system development in Sweden, in an attempt to illustrate the importance of historical 
institutional lineages to future housing development, and also how these forms co-evolve in 
conjunction with housing finance systems. I showed how innovations in agrarian finance in the 
early nineteenth century were linked to sweeping land reforms and how these innovations, in turn, 
left indelible imprints on both the structure of urban housing finance and the role of the state in 
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extending urban mortgage credit. Further, I illustrated how these developments shaped the 
patterns and forms of urbanisation in Sweden’s major cities, creating imperatives for 
municipalities, city planners, developers, and financial intermediaries which produced surprising 
outcomes; one such outcome being the augmentation of state and municipal power in the late 
nineteenth century through speculative land trading strategies. These developments in state 
financial capacity were the preludes to the ambitious housing finance programmes of the early 
twentieth century, and the extensive municipal support programmes for municipal housing 
agencies and cooperative housing of the 1910s (Forsell, 2006, p. 251).  
 Finally, I examined the role of civil society organisations (namely the cooperative and 
tenants’ movement) and how the growth of working and middle-class agency began to palpably, 
and indelibly, affect housing system change from the 1910s onwards. While it might be tempting 
to view developments during Sweden’s age of improvement teleologically, the evolution of 
Sweden’s housing and finance systems outlined here was anything but given. This evolution was 
the product of social struggle. The myriad twists and turns explored throughout this chapter, and 
the epochal scale of change, serve to remind us that critical junctures within housing and finance 
systems are not only contingent upon the ideology and policies promulgated by ruling elites or 
the lobbying efforts of advocacy groups at any given time, but also upon events beyond those 
systems and, importantly, actors’ collective engagements with, and interpretations of, said events. 
As Bengtsson notes: 
 
The Swedish model is not the result of some measured plan, but emerged through a series of 
successive decisions and events over the last one hundred years which gradually, but rather 
unsystematically, strengthened the "corporatist" position of the party organizations in the 
rental market - and in the rent policy (Bengtsson, 2016, p. 20, author's translation). 
 
Understanding developments in housing, the built environment and finance during Sweden’s 
Great Transformation has required us to interrogate how factors such as demography, underlying 
social conditions, the development of state capacities, geopolitics, and the evolution of finance 
assisted in structuring social struggles and ideas. Heckscher (1954) once noted pertinently that 
the hand of the past never completely loses its grip. My analysis has shown here that, although 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were characterised by institutional change, and 
punctuated by ruptures, there was also a degree of continuity, particularly in the realm of housing 
finance, and the state’s role therein. The key point here, however, is not just the means of 
mobilising housing finance, but also the qualitative issue of where (and to whom) housing credit 
was being extended. Demands for housing finance created the fulcrum whereby class and sectoral 
struggles expressed themselves, and these demands became essential dynamics in shaping 
housing system development throughout this period and beyond as the formal credit system 
continued to evolve. By the 1930s, the tenants’ unions and cooperative sectors had gained much 
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ground vis-à-vis the property-owning landlords and speculative developers, but housing system 
development is sticky and the struggle for decent, affordable and accessible housing in Sweden’s 
major towns and cities was still in its infancy. Elements of the working and middle classes had 
obtained better housing than their parents could have possibly imagined, but there was still a long 
way to go. They would make further, significant gains, as I explore now. 
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Chapter III. Golden Years: The Financial Foundations of the 
People’s Home, c. 1930-1970 
 
The basis of the home is community and togetherness. The good home does not recognise any 
privileged or neglected members, nor any favourite or stepchildren. In the good home there is 
equality, consideration, co-operation, and helpfulness. Applied to the great people’s and citizens’ 
home this would mean the breaking down of all the social and economic barriers that now separate 
citizens into the rich and the poor, the propertied and the impoverished, the plunderers and the 
plundered. Swedish society is not yet the people’s home. There is a formal equality, equality of 
political rights, but from a social perspective, the class society remains and from an economic 
perspective the dictatorship of the few prevails77 
 
Per Albin Hansson, 1928 
 
 
3.0. Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, I explored the emergence and development of institutional forms of 
housing and finance, which came to constitute core pillars of the twentieth-century Swedish 
housing system. I examined the state’s role in the extension or mortgage credit (first in relation 
to the rural mortgage associations in the nineteenth century, and later in relation to support for 
urban mortgage banks and owner-occupiers); the nascent growth of (semi)-municipal housing; 
the birth of cooperative housing associations (bostadsrätter), and the importance of general 
supply-side subsidies administered by the state and municipalities in concretising these housing 
forms. Significantly, I located these developments within the context of Sweden’s broader 
political economy and demography, arguing that the imperatives brought about by rapid industrial 
urbanisation and late financial development influenced, to a considerable degree, the specific 
forms of housing finance that emerged; and the role of the state therein78. Accordingly, I urged the 
need to rethink the state’s role (at both the national and local level) during this formative period 
of development; arguing that, by channelling circuits of capital into the housing system and 
subsidising production, the state and municipal authorities played a much greater function in the 
housing system than is commonly acknowledged during this era of so-called laissez-faire. 
 The impetus behind this investigation came from a desire to highlight what is assuredly 
a foundational, yet neglected, period in the development of the modern Swedish housing and 
finance systems. The seeds of the decommodified housing system of the mid- to late-twentieth 
century were very much sown during this time yet, intriguingly, the period leading up to, and 
                                               
 
77 P.A. Hansson, translated in Rudolf Meidner, (1993, p. 212).  
78 As the need for vast quantities of capital was pressing, due to the scale and pace of Sweden’s industrialisation during 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, equity markets and deposits alone were not sufficient to meet demand 
(as they had been in Britain). Instead a combination of savings bank credit and bond-based finance, supported by the 
state, was the recourse.  
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including, the inter-War years is so often neglected in contemporary housing scholarship79. The 
institutional forms of housing and finance which developed in Sweden during the pre- and inter-
War periods may have come about as a result of incremental and unsystematic steps, but these 
accreted processes and developments were no less important or historically significant because 
of this.  
 In the present chapter, I elaborate the case that the evolution of housing and finance 
examined in the previous chapter left powerful institutional heritages, which would very much 
shape the housing initiatives of the Social Democrats throughout the 1930s, the War years, and 
beyond. Indeed, that these institutional heritages are so little acknowledged or theorised in 
analyses of mid- to late-twentieth century housing in Sweden is puzzling. The task of this chapter, 
then, is to historically situate mid-twentieth century housing developments, and to explore how 
and why the policies, programmes, and sectoral interests explored in the previous chapter became 
institutionally crystallised and embedded within the Swedish housing and finance systems under 
Social Democratic governance.  This chapter, thereby continues the historical survey of the co-
evolution of housing and finance in Sweden, examining the period (circa) 1930-1970 in which 
Sweden developed its housing industrial complex.  
 Politically, this was an era of social democratic hegemony. Unprecedentedly for a 
Western democracy, the same political party governed uninterruptedly (albeit in coalition at 
times) for over forty years, with one Prime Minsiter, Tage Erlander, holding office from 1946 to 
1969. During this time, Sweden was transformed from a country with an acute housing shortage, 
to one with a housing surplus; transitioning from a country with some of the worst overcrowding 
rates in Western Europe, to having the highest housing standards in the world80. While 
improvements in the general conditions, affordability, and standards of (as well as access to) 
housing were nigh universal throughout Europe during this period (Sweden was part of a general 
continent-wide improvement trend in this regard), what distinguishes Sweden during this period 
is (quantitatively) the scale and pace of improvement and (qualitatively), the methods and means 
mobilised to facilitate housing improvements, and the role of the state, finance, and sectoral actors 
in producing a housing industrial complex underpinned by mass housing production at low 
marginal rates of profit. It would be some time, however, before such a system would materialise 
under the guises of what some scholars would refer to as a social market system. Indeed, whilst 
political rhetoric may have been transformed, the first two decades of social democratic 
hegemony (circa 1932-1950), were marked as much by continuity with the housing programmes 
                                               
 
79 This is not only specific to housing scholarship focusing on Sweden. Whilst there are notable exceptions, scholars 
seem intent to analyse the ways and means by which tenure forms such as cooperatives and public housing have been 
commodified, or marketised, yet show little interest in how these forms emerged in primis! 
80 As Thord Strömberg (1992, p. 260) notes, in terms of space and equipment, the standard of Swedish housing reigned 
supreme globally by the mid-1970s. 
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of the early-twentieth century, as rupture. The notion that there was a decisive break with the past 
prior to 1950, then, will be challenged.  
 A social democratic housing programme took some time to emerge and, when it 
eventually did, it was very much forged onto the housing system inherited in 1932. Whilst there 
was more targeted action in relation to families during the 1930s, the general structure of 
subsidies; the promotion of homeownership in (predominantly) rural and suburban areas; and the 
direction of subsidies to cooperatives and municipal housing concerns, was not, on the whole, 
unlike those under non-social democratic administrations. To state otherwise, is to accept the 
notion that state intervention was almost non-existent prior to 1932. Yet, as Chapter II showed, 
such a view does not sit comfortably with the historical record if we observe the state’s role in 
the provision of housing finance81. Indeed, as Silk (1948, p. 38) notes, around 15 per cent of all 
dwellings constructed in urban areas from 1924 to 1933 were financed, to varying degrees, by 
state loans; and this figure was even higher in rural areas.  
 The most conspicuous differences during the first couple of decades of the Social 
Democrat’s hegemony were the scale of financial resources channelled into the housing system, 
and the fact that the extraordinary housing measures adopted during the Second World War were 
(unlike many of the measures enacted during the First World War) mostly retained. The former 
had much to do with Sweden’s increasingly favourable BoP position and an emboldened tenant 
and cooperative housing movement. In relation to the former, strong foreign demand for Swedish 
raw materials and technical apparatuses, led to export surpluses throughout the 1930s, which, in 
turn, helped to facilitate lower interest rates and the domestication of the Swedish national debt 
(Schön, 2008), including housing bonds.  
 When the Social Democrats decided, in rather piecemeal fashion, to increase the flows 
of state-sponsored credit to the housing sector, then, they aimed their subsidies squarely at pre-
existing institutional structures. As Bo Bengtsson and Hannu Ruonavaara note: ‘A housing stock 
produced during several decades … creates a powerful historical heritage that any government 
has to deal with when making housing policy decisions’ (Bengtsson and Ruonavaara, 2010, p. 
193, emphasis added). By the mid-1950s, the pace of housing completions was breaking records 
year-on-year, and the state and municipalities had taken centre stage in underpinning these 
developments. As was the case in the belligerent countries, the Second World War created 
imperatives for state intervention, and these did not subside after Nazi Germany’s unconditional 
surrender. Indeed, this was a prelude to the most conspicuous changes; those, which (for better or 
worse) would define the Social Democrat’s housing legacy.  
                                               
 
81 Indeed, as Myron T. Herrick and R. Ingalls Herrick & Ingalls note ‘The objectionable feature of the Swedish 
[mortgage] system is that the bank is too closely connected with the Government and enjoys a monopoly’ (Herrick and 
Ingalls, 1914, p. 218) 
 
 
 
89 
 The achievements in the realm of housing and the built environment in Sweden during 
the mid- to late-twentieth century have been written about extensively. Of all the programmes 
implemented during this time, however, one stands out above all others:  The Million Homes 
Programme (Miljonprogrammet). Between 1965 and 1974, over a million dwellings were 
constructed, alleviating the chronic housing shortages that had dogged Sweden since the nascent 
years of her industrialisation. By the end of this programme, around one third of Sweden’s entire 
housing stock had been constructed in less than two decades! This programme left an indelible 
imprint on the Swedish housing system and was made possible, I argue, by a financial revolution. 
The virtues of centralised planning, rationalisation, municipal land monopolies and the active 
involvement of the Social Democrats in Sweden’s semi-market economy have been considered 
core explanatory variables in this truly remarkable period and, whilst I am not inclined to disagree 
with these assessments in toto, this chapter does not seek to reiterate such analyses.  
 Using novel datasets, what this chapter seeks to do is quantitatively situate this 
astonishing epoch within an historical context, where the spheres of housing and finance are 
studied, not as discrete entities, but as inextricably linked, path-dependent phenomena. I explore 
how the Social Democrats managed to channel truly extraordinary financial resources into the 
housing system and how Sweden’s political economy became predicated upon the development 
of a housing industrial complex. In so doing I examine policy programmes as being situated 
within an existing nexus of institutions and social relations, which political elites during the mid-
twentieth century had little (or no) part in forming. As in Chapter II, the importance of the 
international sphere is emphasised. Sweden’s political elites have never existed within an 
international void, but within a fulcrum where factors beyond their immediate control and 
influence (such as global finance and world politics) helped to shape the determination of ideas 
and policy formation.  
 This chapter continues to look both at and beyond the sphere of politics and housing 
policy. I do not attempt to reduce the importance of political decision-making on housing system 
change but attempt instead to provide a complimentary level of analysis; an additional layer of 
explanation as to why certain ideas and policies succeeded, at certain times, in the context of the 
pre-existing edifices of housing and finance. Ideas are, of course, important, but falling back on 
the social construction of reality as the causal explanation driving housing and finance system 
change has been rehearsed quite thoroughly enough, and I feel no need to repeat this body of 
work. 
 The chapter is organised as follows. I begin by contextualising the Swedish political 
economy of the 1930s and assessing the impacts of the Great Depression and the Kreuger Crash 
on domestic politics. Here I explore the early housing initiatives of the Social Democrats, the 
burgeoning cooperative movement and the institutional development of a unique system of rental 
market corporatism. Following this, I examine the impacts of the Second World War on Sweden’s 
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housing and finance systems, and how the state responded at both the level of housing policy and 
monetary and fiscal stimuli. Then, I explore the post-War years up to (circa) 1970, and the 
centrality of state-sponsored finance in underpinning the housing industrial complex and how, 
following radical pension fund reforms, the state was able to generate the financial capacity to 
eradicate the national housing shortage. This section ends with a discussion about legal changes 
affecting cooperatives and rental housing which occurred during this period.  
 
 
3.1. From laissez-faire to planned economy? 
 
That housing habits change so sluggishly depends not only upon their intimate relation to the 
shaping of family life and household organisation: conservatism in housing habits is 
conditioned also and primarily by their confinement to an existing housing supply which can 
be transformed but slowly. 
 
Alf Johansson, 1938 (Economist and Chief Secretary to the Social Housing Commission) 
 
 
As in most other advanced economies, the early 1930s in Sweden was a precarious time. In the 
midst of an agricultural crisis (jordbrukskrisen), tumbling exports, and spiralling unemployment 
resulting from The Great Depression, Sweden followed Britain’s lead and abandoned the Gold 
Standard in September 1931, becoming one of the first countries to establish a monetary regime, 
aimed at stabilizing the domestic price level (Carlson, 2011, p. 29). Sweden’s newfound capacity 
to expand the money supply, however, was no panacea in an era of great uncertainty. Having 
weathered the Depression years better than most, the death of the enigmatic Swedish business 
magnate and industrialist, Ivar Kreuger, in Paris in March 1932, would shatter confidence in 
Sweden’s economy, and cast a long, indelible shadow over a fragile global financial system. The 
impact of Kreuger’s death was so resonant, and the social and political ramifications so vast, that 
it is worth reflecting on this episode briefly. 
 Kreuger had built an elaborate international business empire that was too big to fail82. 
Using his family’s match business as collateral, The Match King purchased bonds from cash-
strapped continental European governments throughout the 1920s, in exchange for monopoly 
rights in match production. At its peak, Kreuger’s company, Svenska Tändsticks Aktiebolaget 
(now Swedish Match), controlled over 60 per cent of global production, and his appeal both 
                                               
 
82 Some commentators speculate that his businesses owed more than Sweden’ entire national debt! (The Economist, 
2007). 
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domestically, and on Wall Street, was great83. However, despite the promise of eye-watering rates 
of return and tax-exempt foreign earnings, not all was well with Kreuger’s business model.  
 From the outside, Kreuger’s empire seemed as solid as the global demand for his matches, 
but the operational structures of his conglomerates were opaque, and his business relied heavily 
upon an ever-expanding pool of investors in order meet his contracts and obligations. In 1931, 
the Riksbank was compelled to guarantee half the credit at Kreuger’s house bank, Skandinaviska 
kreditaktiebolaget84, but when again, in 1932, he was unable to honour his obligations, Kreuger’s 
empire collapsed, leading to one of the most spectacular commercial defaults in Swedish history. 
The shares and debentures Kreuger had issued (Kreugerpapper) became worthless, and losses 
were great, both at home and abroad. Daniel Waldenström (2014, p. 7) notes that, after the 
Kreuger Crash, the Swedish stock market was stagnant, with trading activity and new listings 
greatly diminished. Further, following this crash, the total national wealth share of the top income 
percentile reduced dramatically (Roine and Waldenström, 2009b, p. 182), marking the prelude to 
what some have termed the financial ice age in Sweden. This had significant implications for 
banking and finance in Sweden, as elsewhere85. 
 As in other industrialised countries during this time, the mood was ripe for substantive 
political and socio-economic change, and the timing of the Kreuger Crash had huge political 
ramifications domestically. It was revealed shortly after Kreuger’s death that the Prime Minister, 
Carl Gustaf Ekman, had personally taken substantial donations from Kreuger on behalf of his 
party (Frisinnade folkpartiet). Ekman (initially) fervently denied these claims, but the tides of 
fact and public opinion were against him, and he was forced to resign in August shortly before 
the general election, later that year. Exploiting this controversy, the Social Democrats won their 
first workable minority government under the premiership of Per Albin Hansson, who made the 
phrase, ‘The People’s Home’ (Folkhemmet), a synonym for social democracy in Sweden86. 
Without a majority, they were reliant on a confidence and supply arrangement with the Farmer’s 
League, which was forged out of the mutual desire to regulate market forces (Schön, 2012, p. 
219). However, in the face of rising nationalism throughout Europe, and charges from 
establishment parties that the Social Democrats posed a dangerous threat to the national interest 
(Kielos, 2012), Hansson knew that his party had only a very short window in which to 
demonstrate their economic competence. Reducing unemployment, raising productivity, and 
                                               
 
83 In Sweden, Kreuger was prolifically issuing debentures and shares, which proved extremely popular with investors. 
Kreuger’s company, Kreuger & Toll, in turn, owned large blocks of shares in Sweden’s main industries (Waldenström, 
2014, p. 7). 
84 At that time, the largest commercial bank in Sweden. It was later agglomerated into SEB. 
85 As Maryam Hussein notes, the most significant effect of the Kreuger Crash in the USA was the creation of the US 
Securities and Exchange Commission (Hussain, 2014, p. 11). 
86 Previously, this term had been used as a go-to for the right-wing nationalist, Rudolf Kjellén. For further analysis of 
the framing of this phrase, see (Kielos, 2012).  
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improving living conditions were, thus, key objectives, and investment in housing would play a 
central role in realising them.  
 
State Finance Programmes, Mortgage Banks and Household Borrowing 
 
 By most metrics, and in spite of the global economic dislocation following the Great 
Depression and the Kreuger Crash, Sweden was affected later, recovered earlier, and had a 
balance of payments more favourable than any other major Western economy (Chang, 1951, p. 
166). As far as housing was concerned, residential building activity was surprisingly resilient 
during this period (Silk, 1948, p. 37), but it would be disingenuous to apportion too much credit 
to the Social Democrats here. Housing supply is, after all, inherently sticky, and production and 
financial expenditure relating to housing had been rising steadily for nearly a decade, stimulating 
a trend that would continue throughout the 1930s.  
 Governments of varying political colours had been channelling resources into the housing 
sector to ever-greater degrees throughout the 1920s and this would continue from the early-1930s 
onwards. The State Home Ownership Fund (egnahemslånefond) had, by the late-1920s, directed 
vast quantities of state-sponsored capital into the housing system for building and repair work87, 
and while this Fund continued its original remit of lending to rural and suburban inhabitants, the 
Urban Mortgage Bank (Stadshypotekskassan) and the State Housing Loan Bank (Statens 
bostadskreditkassan), focused their lending activities with increasing vigour in Sweden’s towns 
and cities throughout the 1920s and 1930s. Table 3.1 summarises the lending activity of the latter 
two. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
 
87 Between 1924 and 1933, this Fund had granted a total of 18,947 loans totalling 95,045,735 kronor in value (Silk, 
1948, p. 38). 
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Table 3.1. Swedish Mortgage Institutions: Lending and Obligations, 1910-194088 
 
 
Mortgage Institutions 
 
Bonds in Circulation    
Year Number  
of Loans  
Loans Outstanding  
(Amount, kr.) 
Stads- 
hypotekskassan 
Bostads- 
kreditkassan 
1910 72,300 288,188,288    100,795,600   
1915 69,302 289,311,831     215,305,567   
1920 61,682 303,528,396    243,479,000   
1925 55,252 337,369,764    399,337,400   
1930 57,259 386,685,331    654,764,333   20,000,000 
1935 61,290 433,508,679 1,069,098,000   98,697,000 
1940 59,052 490,816,112 1,192,691,000 159,290,500 
 
Source: SCB, 1945,author’s translation 
 
Between 1924 and 1933, these mortgage institutions granted loans totalling over 100,000,000 
kronor (SCB, 1935, p. 198), and this activity expanded greatly from 1930 onwards, with lending 
focusing increasingly on multi-dwelling unit production. The State Housing Loan Bank, which 
replaced the State Building Bureau (Statens bostadslånefond) in 1930, focused its lending 
activities on would-be homeowners and cooperatives, and allowed for greater loan-to-value ratios 
than the Urban Mortgage Bank and an amortisation period of up to 40 years (Wendt, 1962, p. 65).  
 As the formation of Sveriges Allmänna hypoteksbanken in 1861 illustrated, the 
government had, for a long time, been keen to stimulate foreign demand for Swedish mortgage 
bonds, as domestic appetite had been underwhelming initially. After 1909, however, domestic 
demand proved sufficient and by the 1910s the Mortgage Banks no longer relied on raising capital 
on foreign exchanges (Lindström, 1986, p. 48). The reason for this was that, by this stage, Sweden 
was no longer the financially ‘backward’ country that it had been some three decades earlier and, 
by the 1930s, the national stock of debt was becoming increasingly domicile. Further, not having 
to rely on a mortgage system underpinned by bonds denominate in foreign currencies had great 
advantages. These specialised mortgage institutions were supported by capital from the state, and 
ground funds (grundfonder) continued to underpin the urban mortgage market (SCB, 1945, p. 
202), serving as security for the liabilities of the funds (Regeringen, 1920, p. 30). The division of 
labour was thus: The Urban Mortgage Bank funded primary mortgages (up to 70 per cent LTV); 
the State Housing Loan Bank provided secondary mortgage loans (principally to single-family 
dwellings) at between 50 and 60 per cent LTV; and the established state support for owner-
                                               
 
88 The data in the third column includes all urban mortgage lending in the Kingdom of Sweden. Unfortunately, it is not 
possible to disaggregate these data in accordance to the individual lending institutions. Also, the rest of the urban 
mortgage loans had the support of capital from the government (Andersen, 2011, p. 155). These grundfonder underlay 
the entire urban mortgage market (SCB, 1945, p. 202). 
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occupiers (Statens egnahemslånefond) continued lending to rural and (increasingly) suburban 
households.  
 The rates of interest paid by borrowers from these institutions was equal to the net interest 
of the bonds plus a fee for administration (Wendt, 1962, p. 77). This, like the bond-based rural 
mortgage banks before them, made housing finance relatively cheap when compared to other 
industrialised countries (Landshypotek Bank, 2016). Loans from the State Housing Loan Bank 
were redeemable over periods of between 20 and 40 years (Silk, 1948, p. 37) and, unlike the US 
housing finance system at the time, (which predominantly relied on deposit-based Savings and 
Loans Associations), the bond-based structure of housing finance in Sweden allowed for 
significantly longer periods of amortisation. By way of comparison, in the USA during the 1930s, 
average LTVs to single-family households were not unlike those in Sweden (between 50 and 60 
per cent), but the periods of amortisation averaged between ten and fifteen years (US 
Congressional Budget Office, 1981, p. 177). These differences had significant, and enduring, 
implications for building form and tenure composition in urban areas (Blackwell and Kohl, 
2018b). 
 As noted in the previous chapter, it would be injudicious to describe the Swedish 
mortgage institutions at this time as strictly private business concerns. They were, as Andersen 
(2011, p. 156) notes, hybrid institutions and, as such, the state had significant sway over the flow 
and direction of credit to housing. Such a capacity was nothing new but, when faced with a 
faltering global economy in the 1930s, the Social Democrats were able to focus their sights on 
housing investment, using the existing nexus of institutional frameworks. By taking early 
measures to extend the housing subsidy programmes of the previous two decades and controlling 
the domestic price level in the economy more generally, the worst ills of this economically 
tumultuous time (chiefly mass unemployment) could, it was hoped, be mitigated.  As the head of 
the State Housing Loan Bureau, Alf Johansson, noted, ‘[f]ew works are more suited to counteract 
a depression than are construction projects’ (Johansson, 1938, p. 164). 
 The Social Democrats made special provisions for increasing residential building activity 
in the emergency public works programme of 1932/33 (Silk, 1948, p. 41). Gustav Möller, the 
Minister of Social Affairs affirmed Johansson’s assessment (above) claiming that: To stimulate 
the buildings industry is to stimulate all economic activity (Möller, cited in, Silk, 1948, p. 41). In 
the next year’s budget (1933/34), the parliament ‘appropriated’ 23,000,000 kronor for housing 
(ibid. p. 43)89, and introduced the Subsistence Homesteads Loans for Rural Workers, which was 
a new measure intended to improve housing in rural areas. This measure was in addition to the 
                                               
 
89 18,000,000 for rural and 5,000,000 for urban housing (Silk, 1948, p. 43). Adjusting for inflation, this amounts to 
around a quarter of the entire lending activities of the State Home Ownership Fund (egnahemslånefond) in the previous 
decade!  
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egnahemslånefond, and sought to give rural workers the opportunity of acquiring small 
homesteads (Johansson, 1938, p. 166) by offering loans of up to 6,000 kronor90. It is worth noting 
here that such support to owner-occupation from a Social Democratic party was not common in 
Europe at this time (Kohl, 2018a). 
 The impetuses behind these housing initiatives were both practical and social. From a 
social perspective, the need for greater volumes of decent quality, affordable housing was evident 
and pressing in both urban and rural areas. As Silk (1948, p. 40) notes, in many respects, the 
housing situation appeared to be little better than it had been in 1913. Whilst a general decline 
in the birth rate had eased overcrowding, the housing question was an enduring problem that the 
Social Democrats were determined to solve. From a practical perspective, as already noted, 
increased housing construction would stimulate economic growth. These actions represented not 
so much a decisive break with previous housing programmes, more a turbo-boost to them. Indeed, 
as Thord Strömberg notes, the still prevalent view (although not universally held within the Social 
Democrats) was that government support to housing should not jeopardise market solutions 
(Strömberg, 1992b, p. 249). 
 The state was, by the mid-1930s, in a position to increase its support to the housing 
industry in a way that it had never managed to before. This was, to a large extent, due to the 
improving financial outlook of both the state and Swedish households. Net receipts from 
Sweden’s positive BoP, and the consequent rise in the foreign exchange reserves, led to a rise of 
liquidity on the money markets (Chang, 1951, p. 163) and this, in turn, further capitalized the 
Swedish financial market, lowering interest rates (Schön, 2008). Low interest rates, combined 
with the political will to stimulate the economy and improve living conditions, thus allowed for 
a Keynesian-style fiscal stimulus centred on housing. The State was now actively using housing 
policy to regulate the business cycle; much as the Addison Act of 1919 in Britain, and the New 
Deal era housing programmes in the USA. The effects on housing production, in combination 
with steadily lowering mortgage interest rates, can be observed in Figure 3.1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
 
90 These loans bore no interest or amortisation requirement within the first five-years and were to be repaid over thirty 
annual instalments. Quite remarkably, as Johansson notes, the applicant was ‘assisted in obtaining suitable land, with 
the building of the homestead, and in its cultivation’ (Johansson, 1938, p. 166). 
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Figure 3.1. Housing Production and Mortgage Interest Rates, 1933-1939 
 
 
Sources: Ekdahl and Gustavsson, 1945; Silk, 1948, p. 119; and author’s own calculations. 
 
In addition to Government spending, households also played a key role. Following a period of 
deleveraging during the First World War, Swedish households began to borrow again. Lending 
from the mortgage associations and the commercial and savings banks helped to fuel this, and 
much of this spending was on housing. Indeed, as Jesper Roine and Daniel Waldenström (2009a, 
p. 165) note, this is the period when we begin to see the rise of ‘popular wealth’, in the form of 
owner-occupied housing. Mortgage interest rates were below four per cent throughout much of 
the 1930s and borrowing, by the mid-1930s, was at record highs. Household debt, as a share 
national income, astonishingly, reached a level that would not be eclipsed until the 2000s!  
 To add a comparative dimension to the mortgage interest rates featured in Figure 3.1, 
(above) the corresponding mortgage interest rate in 1939 in Britain was 4.79 per cent (BSA 
Yearbook, 2014), and in the USA, it was higher still at 5.55 per cent (Snowden, 2013, p. 54). 
Swedish households were borrowing more, and on more favourable terms of interest and maturity, 
than their Anglo-American counterparts. The availability of credit and rising incomes, in 
combination with the government’s push to increase the housing supply, were the core 
determinants influencing these borrowing trends. The aggregate level, and composition, of 
household borrowing are presented in Figures 3.2 and 3.3 respectively. 
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Figure 3.2. Swedish household debt as a share of national income, 1915-1950 
 
 
Source: Waldenström, 2015  
 
Figure 3.3. Composition of Financial Sector Credits to Households, 1915-1950. 
 
 
Source: Waldenström, 2015 and author’s calculations 
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Figure 3.3 provides a breakdown of lending to households on both the formal and informal credit 
markets. We can see that, throughout the late-1920s and 1930s, the mortgage associations 
increased their market shares. However, the most important actors in town, by far, were the 
savings banks. Ever since the rise of the organised, institutional credit markets from the mid 
nineteenth century onwards, these institutions played a pivotal role in lending to households (see 
Chapter II). What is most striking about this Figure is the continuity of their market share. As 
Blackwell and Kohl, (2017) note, these institutions, in combination with state-sponsored 
programmes, played a central role in expanding the homeownership franchise (see Chapter II). 
Indeed, by the end of the 1930s, homeownership rates were higher than those in Britain, and 
similar to those in the USA. 
 There is little doubt that the growing supply of credit to households and the construction 
industry, as well as government housing measures, produced a short-term economic stimulus, but 
the Social Democrats had longer-term visions for housing beyond manufacturing debt. One of 
their most historic actions was to appoint the Social Housing Commission (Bostadssociala 
utredningen). This enquiry, set up by Gustav Möller, and coordinated by statistician, Bertil 
Nyström, and economist, Alf Johansson, was tasked with mapping national housing conditions 
and providing guidelines for housing policy; specifically, in relation to the structure of loans, 
grants and subsidies (SOU, 1946). The Commission also included renowned economist, Gunnar 
Myrdal, and HSB’s Sven Wallander91. Whilst the Commission did not report until 1946, its 
influence (and the influence of its members) should not be understated in the period leading up 
to its publication. The Commission’s programme, according to Richard P. Appelbaum (1985, p. 
223), would become the guidepost for three decades of Swedish housing policy. I return to the 
influence of this report shortly. 
 For the budget years, 1933 to 1940, the Swedish parliament ‘appropriated’ 125,800,000 
kronor for housing, of which roughly half went to rural housing improvement (Silk, 1948, p. 121). 
This sum was directed towards subsidies and loans for the construction, improvement, and repair 
of substandard dwellings (Silk, 1948, p. 42.)92. According to some, (Castell, 2010; Hedin et al., 
2012; Andersson and Magnusson Turner, 2014), this was the period in which the principles of 
interventionist housing policy first emerged. However, as noted above, this mix of loans and 
subsidies was very much a continuation of the housing policies enacted prior to 1932. Thus, whilst 
there was a significant lag between ideas and their implementation during the Social Democrat’s 
                                               
 
91 Whilst Gunnar Myrdal was a Social Democrat stalwart, the same cannot be said of Sven Wallander, who was key in 
the establishment of HSB. Wallander was a progressive, but not ideologically welded to the tenets of social democracy. 
92 Grants were limited to 1,000 kronor per dwellings. In general, grants could not exceed 50 per cent of the estimated 
costs. In special cases, however, they could amount to 80 per cent of the costs. Loans could amount to as much as 3,000 
kronor, or a maximum of 70 per cent (Silk, 1948:42). 
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first two decades in office, as both this, and the previous chapter, has shown, interventionist 
housing policy with social ambitions was not, strictly speaking, a 1930s phenomenon.  
 The 1930s was also a key time beyond the sphere of state housing policy. The Swedish 
Union of Tenants’ national association, (Hyresgästföreningen) adopted its first rent negotiations 
with the landlords’ association (Fastighetsägarna) in 1933 (a model which, despite an interlude, 
would influence the structure of the unique corporatist rental negotiations, which still exist in 
Sweden today) and HSB’s, member associations were expanding throughout the country at 
pace93. Further, Gunnar and Alva Myrdal (1934) published their influential monograph, Crisis in 
the Population Question (Kris i befolkningsfrågan). Gunnar Myrdal, as a key member on the 
Bostadssociala utredningen, had much influence within the Social Democrats, and the publication 
would have wide-reaching implications. 
 
State Fund for Low-Income Families with Many Children, (Barnrikehussatsningen), 
HSB, and nascent rental corporatism 
 
 In their third year at the helm of government, the Social Democrats introduced a housing 
policy based on the findings of the Population Commission (befolkningskommissionen), which, 
according to Per Borg, can be said to represent the first housing policy that placed social goals 
above all other ambitions (Borg, 2004). The Commission closely followed the approach adopted 
by Alva and Gunnar Myrdal in their monograph in its report (Silk, 1948, p. 44), and put forward 
proposals, which, it was hoped, would help to stem the decline in the birth rate. Improving housing 
conditions and reducing housing costs for low-income families (as identified by the Myrdals) 
were seen as key objectives to achieving these ends. Thus, a programme to provide adequate 
housing for families (Barnrikehussatsningen) and to alleviate overcrowding was put forward 
(ibid., p. 44). What made this policy significant was not just that it was progressive per se 
(arguably financial support to cooperatives and municipalities from the 1910s onwards was 
socially progressive), but that the financial support was targeted at specific families, and not the 
housing system as a whole94.  
 The loans supplemented both rents and the production of rental units, and also stipulated 
building standards and form95. The size of the allowance was dependent upon income and the 
number of children. Rents were determined by subtracting 30, 40, or 50 per cent from the costs 
of the apartment, according to whether the family had respectively three, four, or five children to 
support (Johansson 1938, p. 168), as follows: 
 
                                               
 
93 Between 1930 and 1940, HSB’s membership doubled. 
94 This was novel, and partly as a result of better data and information about households. Before this time, there was 
simply insufficient data to target specific families at a national level.  
95 The apartments had to be of at least three rooms (Ramberg, 2000, p. 295). 
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    3 children = -30% 
    4 children = -40% 
             ≥5 children = -50%96 
 
The need for these grants was obvious. When the Population Commission reported, it was 
revealed that, in the fourteen cities and towns covered, two thirds of all lodgings consisting of (at 
most) two rooms and a kitchen, and were lacking basic sanitation (Silk, 1948, p. 24). The picture 
in rural locations was, as ever, worse, with 32 per cent of all rural dwellings classified as either 
dilapidated or having ‘basic defects’ (ibid.).  
 A popular radio show at the time, Lort-Sverige (Dirty Sweden), hosted by the Anglo-
Swedish author and journalist, Ludvig ‘Lubbe’ Nordström, sought to highlight the poor housing 
conditions at the time. This ran until the late-1930s and was a reminder to the Social Democrats 
that their housing programmes were failing to deliver in the way many low- and middle-income 
families had hoped. To add to the woes of the Social Democrats, rental strikes and boycotts were 
taking place with ever-greater frequency. In 1933 and 1936 there were big organised rent strikes 
in Gothenburg (Anderman, Neal and Victorin, 1983; Mayer, 2016). This forced the government 
to act, and led to a stopgap compromise between the Swedish Union of Tenants, 
(Hyresgästförening) and the landlords’ association (Fastighetsägarna), which would prove to be 
of enduring significance, as Bo Bengtsson notes: 
 
A government commission, including representatives of the organisations on both sides, was 
initiated in order to settle the disturbances and normalize the relations … [the] decision 
making process was seen as a political recognition of the organisation, and one seat on the 
new mediation boards for rental conflicts was reserved for a local representative of the tenants 
(Bengtsson, 2007, p. 12). 
 
Such a compromise had been attempted during the First World War with rent tribunals at the 
municipal level but had had little enduring impact (see Chapter II). This political recognition of 
the tenants’ movement, though, would eventually pave the way for a more substantive and 
enduring, corporatist rental programme, not unlike the historic wage negotiations agreement 
between the Swedish Employer Association (SAF) and the Swedish Trade Union Confederation 
(LO) in Saltsjöbaden in 1938 (Victorin, 1979; Bengtsson, 2004). However, at this time, political 
recognition alone was not enough. The new Rental Act was slow to emerge (it was not passed 
until 1942) and, until then, tenants were still not granted security of tenure (Bengtsson, 2007, p. 
12). 
 Diphtheria, scarlet fever, infantile paralysis, rickets, whooping cough, and a whole host 
of other serious infectious diseases were still prevalent in families occupying overcrowded 
                                               
 
96 Johansson, 1938, p. 168. 
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dwellings (Silk, 1948, p. 25). In order to remedy these social ills, the Social Democrats would 
need to increase their housing budgets further. Following the recommendations of the Housing 
Commission, they did just that. Subsidies and loans were granted to local authorities and non-
profit corporations for the construction or conversion of dwellings for families with at least 
three children under sixteen years of age (Silk, 1948, p. 45). These loans were to be amortized 
over thirty- to forty-year periods in the case of new houses (ibid.), which a truly astonishing 
amortisation period at this time in Europe, and only possibly thanks to the state’s willingness 
to absorb risk. Further, interest rates corresponded to the credit costs to the state. 
 At the local level, municipalities were playing an increasingly important role in the 
implementation of housing policy. Thanks, in part, to Barnrikehussatsningen, this was the time 
in which the first truly public housing companies (allmännyttiga bostadsföretagen) emerged. The 
legislation stipulated that building contractors (not the builders themselves) had to be from the 
public sector (Ramberg, 2000, p. 295), and municipalities were required to provide the balance 
of capital needed above the state loan, and to rent the apartments at a scale of rents 
corresponding to the cost price (Silk, 1948, p. 45). Municipalities, thus, used their own housing 
companies (many of which still exist today), but they also worked closely with HSB (HSB, 1975). 
 HSB were an organisation at the forefront of rationalisation, standardisation, and 
technical innovation. Indeed, arguably, HSB spearheaded the high technical and building 
standards which would later come to characterise Swedish public housing. By the mid-1930s, 
nearly 15 per cent of Stockholmers were living in cooperative apartment houses (Childs, 1938, p. 
84) and HSB’s housing experience was, to a considerable degree, utilised by municipalities across 
Sweden during this period (HSB, 1975). This was no coincidence. As a member of the 
Government’s housing commission, Sven Wallander knew that this new housing programme had 
huge implications for the cooperative association he was so central in establishing. Wallander and 
his HSB representatives wasted no time in exploiting this new programme. As soon as the 
decision to provide state support for large families was finalized, HSB representatives were 
visiting local politicians, with standard floor plans in hand (Gustafson, 1977 in Strömberg, 1992, 
p. 250). As Figure 3.4 attests, a relationship was formed between HSB and the municipalities, 
which would last well into the 1970s. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
102 
Figure 3.4. Aggregate Number of Apartment Completions by HSB, 1930-1970  
 
  
Source: HSB, 1975 
 
Kenneth Snowden (2000, p. 54) argues that, to be complete, ‘…explanations of institutional 
change should not only explain why a new mechanism worked, but also the timing and location 
of its appearance’. Why was it now that Public Housing and the cooperative movement really 
gained traction? One obvious answer is: generous state support, which HSB and municipalities 
were able to benefit from. Whilst the cooperative movement predates the mid-1930s, this was the 
period in which it gained momentum. Indeed, both municipalities and the Riksdag were utilising 
HSB’s expertise to extend affordable housing to low income groups and families with large 
children, with the latter making available ‘a generous appropriation for construction of low cost 
apartments’ (Childs, 1938, p. 89). It is important to pose counterfactuals when analysing these 
processes, however. Had state housing support not materialised at this specific time in HSB’s 
lifecycle, there is reason to suspect that the cooperative sector may have, at best, remained residual 
or, at worst, languished. Instead, HSB became institutionally embedded within Government 
housing policy (Ganapati, 2010, p. 377). This was no coincidence.  
 The question of how the state and municipalities chose to coordinate housing policy and, 
in particular, production is important here. Wallander was a gifted and charismatic lobbyist, 
whose influence on housing policy (through his role on the Housing Commission) should not be 
underestimated (Strömberg, 1992b). Known even to international commentators for his talents, 
which combined ‘remarkable skill and inventiveness as an architect with a keen business sense 
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and a capacity for organisation’(Childs, 1938, p. 85), he was a formidable component of Sweden’s 
cooperative housing movement. However, were we to transplant a similarly flamboyant and 
passionate cooperative housing advocate into, say, Britain, at this time, the result would almost 
certainly have been quite different. Labour-led councils in Britain remained deeply suspicious of 
cooperatives (Vall, 2015, p. 529). Labour councils in Britain, then, adopted a different path, 
socialising the housing stock and, to a great extent, enacting a more radical housing programme 
than Sweden. The path adopted by the Social Democrats was more of a middle way, combining 
municipal, council-style housing, with cooperative housing provision and private building. This 
was not so much a break with the housing regime of the past, but more an institutional 
crystallisation of the housing system that had developed in the previous decades.  
 It is, of course, possible to imagine other outcomes during this period; there was nothing 
inevitable about increased state support to municipalities and cooperatives for the production of 
housing for low- and middle-income groups. However, in the context of growing social 
discontent, and recognition of the existence of a national housing problem (as highlighted by the 
Myrdals), it is, perhaps, not surprising that the support to the housing system provided by the 
Social Democrats before the Second World War was aimed at existing institutional financial and 
tenure structures. Politicians, generally speaking, show little propensity to reinvent the wheel. 
Further, the development of Sweden’s formal credit market, not to mention the improving 
financial outlook of both the state and Swedish households, meant that support could be increased 
as never before. Little did these actors know that these subsidies and loans were merely the 
prelude to greater state involvement. 
3.2. The Second World War  
 
To this generation of Swedes, housing is becoming the panacea for all social evils. What the 
cathedral was to their ancestors, the bible to their grandfather, and Kreuger debentures to 
their fathers, the modern spacious home (filled of course with stainless steel and labour 
savings gadgets) has become to them 
E.G.  Sandström, 194597 
 
By the outbreak of the Second World War, housing represented between one-third and one-half 
of all real investment in Sweden (SOU, 1968, p. 387). Private building concerns, cooperatives, 
and municipalities were all building at record levels, thanks to a combination of abundant credit 
and state-subsidies and, whilst the state’s role was key, Silk notes that the main factors stimulating 
residential building were the great increase in real income and the drop in interest rates (Silk, 
1948, p. 48). Indeed, some orthodox economists hold the year 1939 up as an example of the 
efficacy of the private building sector. A record number of dwellings were constructed throughout 
                                               
 
97 Sandström, 1945, cited in Dickens et al., (1985, p. 55) 
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the country in this year; a textbook case, according to some, of how private, market actors, can 
efficiently calibrate the laws of housing supply and demand, without the need for State 
interference (Söderlind, cited in Ramberg, 2000, p. 102)98. Clearly, as this and the previous 
chapter has shown, such an interpretation is erroneous. However, as celebrated as this decade may 
be by orthodox economists, this intermezzo of high productivity would not last.  
 No sooner had Hitler’s panzers rolled into Poland during the September Campaign, than 
were the effects on housing construction in Sweden felt. In a repeat of the impacts of the First 
World War, the construction industry was paralyzed following the outbreak of the Second World 
War and, yet again, the state was called upon by private building concerns, municipal housing 
companies, and cooperatives to act. In response, as Rudolf Meidner (1993) notes, Sweden 
introduced regulations, rationing, and price and investment controls; in short, a planned war 
economy. This would have ramifications for Swedish housing, and the financing thereof, which 
would resonate throughout the twentieth-century99. As elsewhere, the Second World War was a 
critical juncture, which would irrevocably alter the relationships between the state and the 
systems of housing and finance in Sweden. 
 Figure 3.5 (below) shows the extent of the housing production collapsed after 1939. As 
was the case during the First World War, the Government used loans, capital subsidies, and 
guarantees for mortgage interest payments as a means to support the housing system (Boverket, 
1960, p. 120). Loans for new rental housing production were provided on the condition of 
controlled rents (and adherence to strict building standards), and rents on existing buildings were 
frozen in 1942. These extraordinary measures worked to combat the precipitous housing 
production decline, and halt the inflationary tendencies in rent costs, which would have inevitably 
been brought about by a protracted housing shortage (ibid.). Significantly, also during this year, 
the barnrikeshus policy was replaced with a system of universal subsidies aimed at the entire 
housing system.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
 
98 Two comments are necessary in relation to this point. First, irrespective of whether housing supply and demand were 
balanced during the late-1930s, the housing stock was still sub-standard by Western European comparison. Vacancies 
in Stockholm there may have been, but overcrowding was still high, as large groups of the population were forced, “for 
economic reasons” to live in small, overcrowded flats (Boverket, 1960, p. 121). Second, how this exceptional year can 
constitute the basis of an economic rule remains to be seen. 
99 For instance, “In 1942 new State loans were introduced to support construction of owner-occupied houses”, a policy 
which would last until 1991 (Fälting, 2000, p. 39). 
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Figure 3.5. Housing construction in urban areas, 1937-1946 
 
 
 
         
Source: SABO, 2015  
 
 By bearing the brunt of housing investment risk, the Swedish Government was able to 
both stimulate production and control rents. The former, it should be noted, expedited the latter. 
By ensuring that housing investment was both profitable, and that risk was mitigated, the state 
was in a position to be able to dictate terms on a quid pro quo basis. Bengtsson (2007, p. 12) notes 
that the decision to control rents in 1942 was politically uncontroversial and regarded as a 
practical and provisional response to the crisis. The reason for the lack of controversy (unlike 
the furore surrounding rent controls during the First World War) was that any objections that the 
building industry, or private landlords, may have had were assuaged by the presence of generous 
subsidies. Thus, by shoring up the profit margins of private capital, and by enacting all of the 
above measures, the economic risks of new construction came to rest with the state (Ramberg, 
2000, p. 295). Overall, the Social Democrats subsidised, in one form or another, over 90 per cent 
of wartime construction during the period 1942-1945 (Franzén and Sandstedt, 1981, p. 199). This 
phenomenal assistance can be seen as an extension of the subsidy programmes enacted during the 
previous decades, but on a much greater scale; and the impact of these programmes on the 
construction sector had the desired effect, as Figure 3.6 illustrates. 
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Figure 3.6. Annual growth rates (%) of the volume gross value added of the building and 
construction sector100 
 
 
Source: Edvinsson, 2005  
 
From this point onwards, the production of Public Housing (allännyttan) became central to the 
state’s housing programmes. As Figure 3.7, below, attests, the Public Housing share of total 
housing production increased sizably, helping to buoy overall production, and beginning a trend 
that would not be reversed until the 1970s. This, as well as the Rent Control Act of 1942 
(Hyresregleringslagen, SFS 1942:429), would irrevocably alter the terms and conditions of rental 
housing in Sweden. State expenditure on housing was now breaking records year-on-year, with 
housing ‘appropriations’ for the budget years, 1940 to 1945, totalling 728,100,000 kronor, and 
investment in 1944/45 alone totalling 277,900,000 kronor (Silk, 1948, p. 122). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
 
100 Basic prices and corrected for changes in the value-added share in gross output. 
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Figure 3.7. Public housing share of all housing construction  
 
 
 
 
 Source: SABO, 2015 
 
 Price controls during this period were not only confined to the rental sector. Also, in 1942, 
a law was enacted to control the assignment and transfer of cooperative apartments (SFS 1942: 
430).  The Cooperative Housing Control Act (Lagen om kontroll av upplåtelse och överlåtelse av 
bostadsrätt) did nothing to stifle the development of HSB or the cooperative movement in general 
(on the contrary) but was intended as a bulwark against speculation. There is little to suggest that 
this was strictly necessary from the point of view of the existing housing cooperatives as, hitherto, 
HSB’s raison d'être had been to provide good quality affordable and accessible housing101. 
However, there was a fear that the rent gap between the newly controlled rental sector and the 
cooperatives would open up space for private landlords to convert rented housing into 
cooperatives, and sell cooperative shares at usurious rates (Sørvoll, 2013, p. 138). As Jardar 
Sørvoll notes, the purpose of the legislation was to, ‘…make it harder to circumvent the rent 
control act for landlords and prevent the cooperative sector from becoming a safe haven for […] 
speculative activity and profiteering’ (ibid.). Thus, the Cooperative Housing Act provided 
legislative protection of the cooperative ethos.  
                                               
 
101 At this time, HSB could still boast much cheaper dwelling costs than the private rental sector (Lundevall, 1993), 
and continued to do so well into the 1960s (Sørvoll, 2013, p. 140). Further, they had their own, well-established, 
controls on prices. Even from the 1920s, HSB associations had stipulated that prices on second-hand contracts could 
not exceed the original down payment, plus the value of amortization payments on the association’s loans (Sørvoll, 
2013, p. 140). 
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 By now, another major player in the cooperative movement had entered the fray. In 1940, 
Svenska Riksbyggen was founded in Gothenburg. This cooperative was born out of the 
construction union movement (affiliated with the Labour Organisation) in response to the 
employment crisis in the building trade brought about by the War (Ganapati, 2010, p. 369). Today, 
this cooperative is Sweden’s second largest, after HSB. Again, as was the case with HSB in 1923, 
a bottom up organisation, born out of civil society, was formed which sought to improve the living 
standards of tenants and construction workers in the face of trying socio-economic conditions. 
With the help of state subsidies, this cooperative became a bona fide success. 
 Despite robust growth102, by the end of the War, the cooperative sector was still relatively 
small, accounting for just over four per cent of the national housing stock. Nevertheless, by 
international comparisons, Sweden had the largest cooperative housing sector in the world. As 
far as other tenures were concerned, owner-occupation had been increasing steadily since the 
1920s, and now accounted for nearly 40 per cent of the housing stock. This was significantly 
higher than in Britain, but private rentals (which constituted around 50 per cent of Sweden’s 
housing stock) were roughly equivalent in the two countries. This difference can be explained by 
the fact that Public Housing was more marginal than council housing in Britain (accounting for 
just six per cent of the housing stock)103. This would change but, as I show, not as quickly as 
some scholars assume. 
 
3.3. The Post-War Years: A Brave New World? 
 
As was the case during the First World War, the Second World War implied an immense financial 
bonus to both Swedish industry and the state (Schön, 2008). By the end of the War, Sweden had 
developed a highly efficient and profitable industrial sector and, by the mid-1940s, had joined the 
ranks of the world’s wealthiest countries, as measured by GDP per capita. 
 The Swedish state had already used methods of managing fiscal and monetary aggregates 
during the 1930s, and especially during the War years, but these techniques of macroeconomic 
management would develop further. Housing policies, even prior to the Second World War, were 
part of developing programme, which attempted to stimulate the rise in effective demand, 
improve living conditions, and regulate the business cycle, but housing would take an even more 
central role in the economy henceforth. The post-War period marked what many scholars have 
referred to as the Golden Age of housing in Sweden (Christophers, 2013, p. 7). This was not 
unique in Europe or the USA at this time. What marked Sweden out as exceptional in the post-
                                               
 
102 Cooperative housing construction accounted for around 10 per cent of all housing units produced in urban areas 
from 1924 to 1933 (Silk, 1948, p. 39). 
103 In Britain at around this time, council housing made up around 18 per cent of the total housing stock. 
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War years, however, was the constellation of actors and institutions involved, and the scale and 
pace of development.  
 Following the death of Per Albin Hansson in 1946, Tage Erlander became Prime 
Minister104. A staunch supporter of the People’s Home ideology, he was acutely aware of the 
political importance of the Housing Question and retained Möller in his post as Minister for Social 
Affairs. Building on the experiences and financial capabilities that the state had agglomerated 
during the War, the Parliamentary decision of 1946 upped the support for the housing industry, 
following the recommendations of the Social Housing Commission. This would place the 
extraordinary programmes of the War-years on a more permanent footing. Mortgage institutions 
and other loan providers would provide primary and secondary loans of up to 70 per cent for the 
construction of houses, as had been the case previously. However, in the case of multi-dwellings 
buildings, the state deepened their financial involvement by providing tertiary loans at different 
levels of support (Niva, 1989, p. 211). Municipalities and Cooperatives were the principle 
beneficiaries of these loans, with the state providing 100 per cent and 95 per cent of the tertiary 
loan capital respectively, but private building concerns also benefitted, as Table 3.2 shows. 
 
Table 3.2. Structure of Tertiary Loans after 1946 
 
Tenure     Tertiary Loan  Max. loan share  Interest  
     (%)   (%)   Rate (%) 
           
Public Housing    100   30   3 
Cooperatives    95   25   3 
Private building enterprises 85   15   3 
 
 Source: Lundevall, 1994, p. 24 
 
What this financial support implied was that the Public Housing associations (allmännyttiga 
bostadsföretag) were, essentially, no longer required to raise their own capital in order to 
commence building projects. Cooperatives (kooperativa företag) needed only 5 per cent, and 
private building companies (enskilda företag) were only required to put forward between 10 and 
15 per cent of their own capital (Niva, 1989, p. 211). The amortisation period for the largest 
tranche of the loan (primary and secondary loans provided by mortgage associations, savings 
banks and commercial banks) varied slightly, but the tertiary loan amortisation period was up to 
40 years and the rate of interest was set at 3 per cent (Lundevall, 1994). Such a period of 
amortisation, and under such terms, was extraordinary in Western Europe at this time.  
 Swedish Public Housing companies, cooperatives, private building concerns, and 
households, were now borrowing cheaper, and for longer, than their counterparts in Western 
                                               
 
104 Erlander would hold office for 23 years, making him the longest serving Prime Minister in Swedish history. 
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Europe and the USA, thanks to the structure of tertiary loans and the ability of the state to absorb 
risk in the primary and secondary mortgage markets. In 1945/46 the total nominal value of tertiary 
loans was around 190,000,000 kronor (Riksbanken, 1950). However, by 1975/76, that figure was 
727,076,000 kronor for multi-dwelling units alone, and 1,809,728,000 kronor for small houses 
(Riksbanken, 1980)!  
 The immediate post-War years saw ever-greater injections of state-sponsored capital into 
the housing system and, by 1949, state finance accounted for nearly 10 per cent of the entire 
Swedish housing finance system (SOU, 1968). However, other measures beyond the sphere of 
finance were introduced too. Shortly after the War, the 1947 Housing Provision and Building 
Acts, inspired by the investigations into planning and land policy in Great Britain (Pahl-Weber et 
al., 2009), were introduced. These, as Appelbaum (1985, p. 226) notes, ‘…allocated to the 
municipalities responsibility for solving the housing shortage, along with the right to decide how 
all land with the municipal boundaries was to be used’  and also required municipalities to draw 
up five-year plans (Ödmann and Dahlberg, 1970, p. 183). This can be seen as the 
institutionalisation of what many municipalities had, since the late-nineteenth century, sought to 
do. This Act institutionalised municipal local planning and building power in a way Albert 
Lindhagen had envisioned, augmenting the power of municipalities to utilise their planning 
monopolies. During this same year, housing exchanges (Bostadsförmedlingen) were established, 
whereby, as Christophers (2013, p. 15) notes housing allocation occurred on the basis of a 
queuing system to channel apartment vacancies.  
 The following year (1948) the National Housing Board (Kungliga Bostadsstyrelsen) was 
created, replacing the State Building Loan Office. This Board worked closely with municipalities 
and oversaw their plans, as Ella Ödmann, and, Gun-Britt Dahlberg note: 
 
[T]he [municipal] programmes [were] submitted to the county housing boards, where they 
[were] reviewed in light of the regional allocation of resources and then referred to the 
National Board. They thus constitute[d] an important source of information concerning local 
requirements and resources’ (Ödmann and Dahlberg, 1970, p. 184). 
 
As well as overseeing town plans, the National Housing board was, from 1949 onwards, to play 
a greater role in technical standardisation, when the National Board of Building Research was 
established by the Government (Boverket, 1960, p. 145). This organisation helped pave the way 
for rationalisation in the building trade and assisted in ushering in a new era of concrete 
prefabrication.  
 Such rationalisation, technological improvement and functional efficiency was seen as 
necessity in the post-War years. In 1945 only 21 per cent of all dwellings in Sweden had a bath 
or shower; 64 per cent of inhabitants had to make do with an outside toilet; and less than half had 
central heating (Appelbaum, 1985, p. 227). 50 per cent of housing with central heating may have 
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been tolerable in warmer climes, but in Sweden during the mid-twentieth century, the reality of 
such figures was dire, and, as Appelbaum (ibid.) notes, these figures had only improved 
marginally by 1955. However, with a highly efficient industrial sector and technological 
advancement, as well as expanding state-support and stipulations on building standards, things 
were changing, and it was during this period that we witness a confluence of Sweden’s 
functionalist tradition with the planned war economy; and the product of this confluence was a 
housing industrial complex. 
 In 1949, the State Owner-occupied Housing Credit fund (Statens egnahemslånefond), 
which had been key in helping to improve dwellings throughout Sweden hitherto, was, after 45 
years, wound up. In its final year, it granted 5,341 loans (of which 5,252 were interest free), and 
issued loans totalling 62,387,000 kronor (SCB, 1950 p. 207). This was by no means a capitulation 
to the ideals of improving housing conditions in the countryside and suburbia, or an ideological 
shunning of owner-occupation per se. Indeed, throughout the 1930s and 1940s, the Social 
Democrats had steadily increased the activities of this Fund. Per Albin Hansson had, in 1933, 
introduced a new loan system with the primary aim of aiding the construction of owner-occupied 
dwellings for rural workers (Johansson, 1938) and the Own-Home rhetoric (egnahemsrörelsen) 
was even incorporated into the People’s Home discourse of the Social Democrats during much of 
this time (Cramér, 1943; Harrison, 2014). However, after two decades of actively supporting the 
building and improvement of single-dwelling, owner-occupied units, there is little doubt that, by 
the 1950s, the pendulum had tipped in favour of financial support for multi-dwelling buildings in 
the form of Public Housing and Cooperatives. Nevertheless, much support was still being given 
to owner-occupiers via the universal, state-sponsored financial mechanisms. With the changing 
demographic realities brought about by industrialisation, the Fund was deemed to have run its 
course and this spending was to be subsumed within the general structure of grants, loans and 
interest subsidies.  
 In 1950, The Swedish Association of Public Housing Companies (SABO) was formed at 
a meeting of the municipally owned Gothenburg Housing Company. This would create an 
advocacy group which still plays a central role in the functioning of the Swedish rental market 
today and which, by 1958, would play a key role in collectively negotiating municipal rents and 
resolving disputes with the Swedish Union of Tenants (Hyresgästföreningen). The Security of 
Tenure Act (besittningsskyddslagen), passed in 1956, meant that, for the first time, the principle 
of rent control proper, was abandoned in favour of a comparative trial with similar apartments 
(Bååth, 2015, p. 4). It is important to note that, since this time, Public Housing rents (and from 
the 1970s onwards, private rents too) have been determined by market parties without state 
intervention (SABO, 2013, p. 1), in contrast to the deluge of misinformation in the Swedish media 
about the existence of rent controls (Bengtsson, 2016). This arrangement, which had existed in 
various guises since the 1930s, was thus institutionally crystallised and mirrored, somewhat, the 
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corporatist wage negotiations between the Labour Organisation (LO) and the Employers 
Federation (SAF) established at Saltsjöbaden in 1938105. 
 By the mid-1950s, nearly all of the components, which can (in hindsight) be said to 
constitute the Swedish housing model, (specifically rent negotiations and the system of general 
grants, loans and interest subsidies) were in place. Cooperatives were expanding their market-
share year-on-year; Public Housing companies had formed a powerful interest group and were 
building at record rates (Ödmann and Dahlberg, 1970, p. 186); and tertiary state loans 
underpinned the entire housing finance system (with preferential treatment given to municipal 
housing and cooperatives). Indeed, by 1959, the state’s financial support to housing comprised 
over twenty per cent of Sweden’s entire housing finance system (SOU, 1968). Further, the rental 
market had developed a distinctly unitary character, whereby access to Public Housing was 
universal and this tenure-form competed directly with the private rental sector (see Kemeny, 
1995). In their 1956 election manifesto, the Social Democrats even declared that: The housing 
market must not be allowed to become a playground for private speculative interests 
(Socialdemokraterna, 1956 author’s translation), implying that, under their stewardship, the 
interests of private speculators had been muted. Still, this had less the feeling of a Brave New 
World, and more one of piecemeal development, best summed up by Erlander in one of his diary 
entries from the early 1950s: 
 
The housing question is becoming more and more precarious. The difference between rental 
rates, and the current violent price increases on building materials are perhaps not the worst. 
The tensions derive from the difficulty of conducting an active housing policy while 
maintaining tight monetary policy. Probably, we must conduct an nonsensical housing 
policy. There are permanent conflicts between the finance and social departments (Erlander 
cited in Eriksson, 2004, p. 114, author’s translation, emphasis added). 
 
It is these tensions between housing supply, housing finance, and the monetary policy effect on 
various other branches of the Swedish economy, that dogged the Social Democrats throughout 
the 1950s. Indeed, housing shortages were still felt and the seemingly perpetual Housing Question 
was still a politically charged issue, with parties in the Riksdag trying to out-do each other vis-à-
vis their commitment to get to grips with the problem (Ramberg, 2000, p. 296). Hitherto, it is 
difficult to discern a rapid transition, but this would change. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
 
105 This, as Meidner notes, ‘was the tacit understanding of the agreement that state intervention in labour market matters 
should be avoided’ (Meidner, 1993, pp. 222–223) and, arguably, the same can be argued vis-à-vis rent negotiations 
from this period onwards. 
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3.4. Financing a Million Homes  
 
This section explores the most (in)famous and ambitious housing project in Sweden’s history: 
The Million Homes Programme (Miljonprogrammet). So-called because over a million dwellings 
were constructed within the space of a decade (1965-1974), it is difficult to describe the scale and 
scope of this programme without resorting to hyperbole. Per capita, Sweden produced more 
residential housing units within this timeframe than any other industrialised country (see Table 
3.3). The purview of this section (and the chapter more generally) does not extend to an extensive 
analysis of the completion of this programme. This is quite simply because the tensions and 
contradictions which brought this programme to bear were vastly different from those which arose 
as it neared its dénouement in the mid-1970s; the latter, then, will be the focus of the following 
chapter.  
Table 3.3. Number of Completed Housing Units per 1,000 inhabitants  
 
    1965   1971   1980 
 
Sweden    12.5   13.6   6.2 
Switzerland   10.1   10.7   6.7 
West Germany   10.0   7.8   5.9 
Soviet Union   9.5   9.4   7.5 
The Netherlands   9.4   10.4   8.0 
Denmark   8.5   10.1   5.8 
Finland    8.0   10.8   10.2 
Norway    7.5   9.4   9.0 
Source: Lundevall, 1996, p. 42 
 
 Table 3.3 places this building programme in international perspective. Even today, the 
dwellings of these Record Years make up roughly 30 per cent of the total housing stock in Sweden 
(Vidén, 2012, p. 22). Multi-dwelling units dominated production, as the earlier phase of intimate 
Swedish modern, gave way to the Fordist mode of planning and construction, production (Vall, 
2015, p. 530). This, as Owen Hatherley notes, was an attempt by the Social Democrats to solve 
the housing question at one prefabricated stroke (Hatherley, 2013), but there would be social 
consequences to this, which would reached far beyond the 1960s and 1970s. Astonishing as these 
achievements were, and as successful as they were at alleviating the chronic housing shortages 
that had afflicted Sweden since the great urban spurt, what can seem to be the solution for one 
generation, can often become the problem for the next (Lisinski, 2016)106.  
 During the 1940s and 1950s, much housing production had still been a manual affair, but, 
during the late-1950s and early-1960s, construction was becoming industrial in scope (Ramberg, 
2000, p. 296), as the ideals of functionalism coalesced with the technical and financial capacity 
                                               
 
106 ‘The areas with the greatest incidence of crime, often combined with other social problems, were built between 1965 
and 1975 in the so-called million program’(Lisinski, 2016 author's translation) 
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to rapidly expand the housing supply. The Public Housing and cooperative sectors played a key 
role in driving this, but there was a general consensus throughout the housing industry that 
rational, large-scale methods of production should become the norm (ibid.). Housing shortages 
were still being felt and, despite a slight decline in the rate of population growth, urban areas were 
still expanding at between 15 and 20 per cent, decade-on-decade. Modern industrial building-
techniques, then, were seen as both necessary and desirable. Building on the capabilities and 
experiences accrued during the War, this was the period in which Sweden truly developed a 
housing industrial complex. 
 
Figure 3.8. Dwelling Type and Age Profile 
 
 
 
Source: SCB 
 
 As a consequence of the sheer volume of dwellings constructed during this period, 
Sweden still has a relatively young housing stock by European comparisons. As of 2017, just over 
45 per cent of one- or two-dwelling building housing stock in Sweden was built in the period 
1961-1990, and nearly 62 per cent of multi-dwelling buildings in Sweden today were built 
between 1951 and 1980. The mode of planning and construction that facilitated this phenomenal 
effort had been in the offing since the Bostads sociella utredning reported its findings, and HSB 
had, arguably, led the way in some of these techniques prior to the War. Processes of 
rationalisation, and scientific and technical advances in prefabrication and reinforced concrete, 
proliferated throughout the building trade (supported by the National Board of Building 
Research), would combine with the state’s newly found capacity to direct extraordinarily large 
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flows of credit to the housing system (see below), and the products of these concatenations, in 
terms of building output can be observed in Figure 3.9. 
Figure 3.9. Housing Construction and Population Change in Sweden, 1958-2014 
 
 
Source: Emanuelsson, 2015 
 
How was it that the State was able to finance this? I have written already about Sweden’s 
improving fiscal position and, to be sure, part of the story can be told through an examination of 
direct government assistance to households and the housing sector, depicted in Figure 3.10.  
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Figure 3.10. Government Housing Assistance as a Share of Total State Expenditure (%) 
 
  
 
Source: Ekbrant, 1986, p. 29 
 
 Figure 3.10 provides a breakdown of government assistance to the housing sector (as a 
share of total government expenditure) covering a period of 40 years. As well as expanding 
assistance in the form of housing allowances to low income households and families 
(bostadsbidrag); interest subsidies for construction (räntebidrag) and mortgage interest tax 
deductions for owner-occupiers (skattesubventioner), households’ wages too were increasing 
unabated throughout the 1950s and 1960s, and thus households were doing their part to stimulate 
the demand for production. These metrics are relative easy to monitor, but there is more to this 
story than the improving position of state and household finances. The keen reader will note that 
the period in which the Million Homes Programme was active (1965-1974) sees only a modest 
rise in total government expenditure on housing, and even a slight decline in two years. Whilst 
direct government support, then, had been central to the development of the housing system 
hitherto (on both the supply and demand side), this alone cannot account for this monumental 
building programme. In order to establish what can, we must look more closely at the sources and 
means by which credit was directed towards the housing system as, clearly, the räntebidrag and 
bostadsbidrag (subsidies to builders and households respectively) do not come close to 
accounting for this. This requires us to take a brief step back in time. 
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Overcoming Maturity Mismatch 
 
 As noted in Section 3.3, credit controls were put in place as an emergency measure during 
the Second World War. These were not lifted. When Sweden joined the IMF in 1951, the rate of 
the kroner was fixed and kept constant by the Riksbank for 20 years (Jonung, Kiander and Vartia, 
2009, pp. 27–28). Exchange controls were also in place, facilitated by the Bretton Woods system 
(Ryner, 2002) and, in addition to these, liquidity ratios and lending ceilings were established, as 
elsewhere in the developed world at this time. This, as Lars Jonung (1993, p. 347) notes, allowed 
monetary authorities to ‘…establish a structure of interest rates and a distribution of credit 
according to political preferences’. The state and the Riksbank, thus, had developed a system of 
controls, which, to a considerable extent, had a bearing over who could borrow, and on what 
terms. This had implications for one of the Social Democrat’s most pressing priorities: housing. 
But, how should these capabilities be orchestrated to produce and improve housing on such a 
scale, and by which mechanisms? 
 One of the main drivers of financial innovation in the realm of housing and infrastructure 
is the desire (by a range of actors within a housing system) to overcome maturity mismatch; that 
is, the discrepancy between the maturity of assets and liabilities on a financial institution’s balance 
sheet. Herman Schwartz notes: ‘Maturity mismatches occur when an organization borrows in 
credit markets on a short term basis and then reinvests the proceeds into less liquid, longer 
duration assets’ (Schwartz, 2012a). The large upfront costs required to invest in housing (a liquid, 
longer duration asset), then, are mismatched to the short-term borrowing which most commercial 
banks rely on (i.e. customers’ deposits and capital markets).   
 The larger the project, the greater the sum (or frontloading) required. Herman Schwartz 
notes that, ‘…maturity mismatch arises from the fact that short term depositors can withdraw their 
money at any time. But it is much more difficult for the bank to extract the whole loan from a 
borrower’ (Schwartz, 2012b, pp. 135–136). This is why banks (prior to the early-twentieth 
century) were often reluctant to provide mortgages to individuals that were not already part of the 
propertied classes. The era of universal suffrage, however, created demands on states throughout 
the industrialised world to intervene to ease credit lending, and/or the supply and access to 
affordable housing. How should government’s resolve this capital mobilisation problem, without 
other branches of the economy and welfare state suffering?  
 There is no simple answer to this question. One way, however, is to attempt to calibrate 
the maturity of assets and liabilities in a way that will increase the credit flow on both the demand 
and supply side. States are in an obvious position to be able to do this, as certain industrialised 
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countries had been since the 1920s and 1930s107. Another is to innovate. The function of Mortgage 
Backed Securities (MBSs) and covered bonds today is (in theory) to help banks, investors and 
households smooth out their assets and liabilities over the life cycle, whilst mitigating the risk of 
default and increasing the supply of credit. When the demand for credit was as great as it was in 
Sweden at this time then innovation was certainly required in order to accommodate this 
phenomenal frontloading. Figure 3.11 depicts the development of the Swedish capital market 
between 1958 and 1986. The scale of the investment in housing is quite remarkable.  
 
Figure 3.11. Borrowing on the Swedish credit market, 1958-1986 (% share) 
 
 
 
Source: Sveriges Riksbank Statistical Yearbooks 
 
 Whilst the state’s role in subsidising housing production and consumption was important, 
state spending alone cannot, demonstrably, account for the level of borrowing and investment 
geared towards housing during the 1960s. What is striking about Figure 3.11 is the volume of 
credit directed towards the housing sector in relation to the entire Swedish credit market. Between 
1958 and 1970, well over 40 per cent of the Swedish credit market was geared towards housing 
production and consumption and, at times, this figure exceeded 50 per cent! This investment made 
                                               
 
107 In Britain, council housing was seen as the solution to overcome tight mortgage conditions and extend the 
opportunity to live in good quality homes to lower- and middle-income groups. In the USA, better access to mortgage 
credit was seen as the solution. In the former case, finance was provided through general capital expenditure. In the 
latter, this was initially the case but, later on, securities markets were established. 
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up between five and seven per cent of Sweden’s GNP during this period (Ekbrant, 1986, p. 24) 
and, interestingly, the majority of financing for housing was not derived from general capital 
expenditure. Whilst there was direct state support, both on the demand and supply side (and whilst 
this was high in terms of total state outlays) it was, curiously, after this phenomenal building 
programme that direct State-financing ballooned, as I explore further in Chapter IV. Where did 
the money come from? 
 
The ATP Funds and Organised Interest Groups 
 
 The key to explaining this ‘puzzle’ is to be found by looking at pensions funds. Pension 
and insurance funds (typically) look to long-term assets, with reliable income streams, in order to 
balance their long-term liabilities. Housing is illiquid and costly, requiring long-term financing, 
and the financing of housing though either bonds or securities creates, as Schwartz (2012a, p. 43) 
notes, a natural asset for private pension plans or funded public pensions. As we have seen, 
Sweden has a long-established tradition of financing the production of housing by emitting bonds 
(a tradition which remains today), with the support of top-up loans from the state. Unlike the 
USA, and a host of other Western European countries (Britain, Belgium, Ireland, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Spain), who relied principally on deposits for issuing mortgages, Sweden had, since the 
mid-nineteenth century (not unlike Germany and Denmark) nurtured a bond-based mortgage 
system which had increasingly, in combination with the savings and commercial banks, been able 
to meet the demand for financing housing production and consumption, albeit with considerable 
state support. This system, as illustrated above, had allowed for greater LTVs, lower interest rates, 
and longer maturities than in the USA and the aforementioned Western European countries, who 
adopted varying provisions (state-backed and non-state-backed) of providing more affordable 
dwellings (whether to buy or rent) to lower- and middle-income groups. Thus, whilst the deposit-
based savings banks were important market actors in Sweden (considerably more so than 
Germany and Denmark) it had been built into the Swedish housing system for some time, via this 
distinctive bond-based system of housing finance, to establish long-term debt contracts via the 
issuance of housing bonds (bostadsobligationer). 
 In 1959, the Government introduced a new pension system (Allmänna 
Tilläggspensionen), and the possibilities this created for the financing of housing were, quite 
simply, revolutionary. The National Pension Fund’s First, Second and Third Fund Boards were 
established in 1960 in connection with the ATP reform (Första AP-Fonden, 2012). The idea 
behind this reform, very much driven by the Social Democrats and the Labour Organisation (LO), 
was to serve as buffers in a future pay as you go (PAYG) and defined benefit (DB) system 
(Belfrage, 2011, p. 118). This would provide earnings-related pensions, to supplement the flat-
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rate pension (folkpension), which was introduced earlier in the century (Palmer, 2000, p. 1), and, 
as Jonung notes, implied the socialisation of the nation’s savings (Jonung, 1993, p. 356). 
 At the time of their inception, the rules governing the AP fund boards permitted 
investment only in fixed-income securities (Första AP-Fonden, 2012), thus bonds were their 
primary investments. These Funds gave the state enormous control over national savings and 
quickly grew to become the largest investors in mortgage bonds (af Jochnick, 2014, p. 3). Figure 
3.12 illustrates the effects of this vis-à-vis investment in housing construction. 
 
Figure 3.12. Real Net Flows to Housing Construction on the Organised Credit Market, 1958-
1986 (1958 prices) 
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Figure 3.13. Distribution of Credit to Housing Construction on the Organised Credit Market, 
1958-1986 (% share) 
 
 
Source: Sveriges Riksbank (various years); and author's calculations  
 
 The data presented in Figure 3.12 illustrate the volume of credit flows to housing 
construction in real terms108. This is supply-side data. The solid black line indicates lending from 
public insurance and pension institutions (the AP Funds), and the volume (and market 
capitalisation) is astonishing. The ATP Funds became the major market players when it came to 
the purchasing of bonds related to housing, as can be seen from the phenomenal market 
capitalisation growth in Figure 3.13. Financing housing construction through the AP bond-based 
mechanism, as Claes Belfrage (2011, p. 112) argues, was, ‘…at the heart of the construction of 
the “Swedish model”’. The establishment of the AP Funds in the 1960s, then, meant that the state 
was now able to channel large circuits of capital into the housing system in order to subsidise 
housing production as never before, without accruing huge budget deficits. 
 The capacity of the state to do this was enhanced by a system of financial controls, which 
had been established during, and in the immediate aftermath of, the Second World War, and which 
had been institutionalised internationally under the Bretton Woods System. This programme was 
possible for several reasons. First, the general, nation-wide, housing conditions were still quite 
                                               
 
108 The lending is calculated on a net basis, whereby the amounts borrowed are reduced by the amounts repaid 
(Riksbank, 1986, p. 118). When a metric is negative, then, this indicates that there has been a net transfer away from 
the housing sector (i.e. capital has been repaid, as is the case for the Commercial banks after 1985). All positive metrics 
indicate borrowing accruing to the housing sector (i.e. investment in the housing sector). 
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poor in Sweden in the 1950s. Although standards had improved markedly since the 1930s, the 
housing issue was still politically troublesome (Ramberg, 2000, p. 296). Standards across the 
board were too low, and overcrowding was still high, even compared to war-torn Britain at this 
time. Thus, the material need for high-volume, high-quality housing production, as in the 
belligerent countries, was pressing. Second, technological advancements and standardisation, as 
noted above, allowed for a system of production which would have been unimaginable, in scale 
and scope, only two decades earlier109. The universal adoption of rationalisation and 
standardisation in the construction industry from the mid-1950s onwards (encouraged by the 
state) led to uniformity in housing, which, as any observant visitor to Sweden will tell you, is 
quite striking in apartments built between the 1950s and 1980s (kitchens, floor plans, materials et 
cetera).  
 Finally: the financial component. The long-established tradition of bond-based housing 
finance was amplified with the introduction of the ATP reform and AP funds. Although the 
Swedish housing finance system relied on deposits more than Denmark and Germany, Sweden 
did not confront the same obstacles as Britain with her deposit-based model, or the USA with her 
Savings & Loans institutions. Whereas the USA turned to Public Housing and quasi-state 
institutions such as Gennie Mae and Freddie Mac (the pioneers of mortgage back securities) in 
order to provide dwellings for lower- and middle-income groups, and Britain turned to their 
councils and the Building Societies, Sweden turned to a Public Pensions System in order to 
finance housing production.  
 In terms of the constellation of actors involved in the systems of housing and finance 
during this time, Sweden, again, stands out. Not only were rents negotiated (independently of the 
state) in a uniquely corporatist manner between market actors (SABO and Hyresgästföreningen), 
but the cooperative share of the housing stock was, by the 1960s, standing at around 10 per cent. 
This, as noted earlier, was no coincidence. As Jonung (1993, p. 358) argues, one of the most 
influential organised interest group during this era was the cooperative, non-profit construction 
firms, such as HSB and Riksbyggen. With them, the construction unions and the tenants’ 
associations had, since the early 1930s, curried favour with the Social Democrats, and vice versa. 
However, especially during the Second World War, private construction groups leant on the State 
to provide support (as they had done in the USA during the 1930s). It should be noted that while 
the state participated in the housing system by financing and subsidising investment (and 
regulating the way in which subsidies were distributed), it did not physically construct housing 
independently. The whole programme of building a housing industrial complex, then, was not, as 
                                               
 
109 HSB had been leading the way here for some time, but even by 1960, the cooperative share of the national housing 
stock accounted for only nine per cent and Public housing 13 per cent. 
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some have suggested (Clark and Johnson, 2009), socialistic110. As long as the profit margins of 
private building concerns were solid, and the state was prepared to absorb risk via subsidies and 
loans (see Section 3.4), the Social Democrats would have the support of these actors.  
 Another influential group, as Jonung (1993) notes, were the farmers and their politico-
institutional interest groups. Whilst the Social Democrats had made do (for the most part) with 
forming minority governments since the 1930s, they still required the support of other parties, as 
is generally the case under proportional electoral systems. As the bourgeois parties (as they are 
known in Sweden) were, clearly, not ideal bedfellows, the Social Democrats turned to other 
parties, including the Democratic Farmer’s League (Sverges demokratiska jordbrukareförbund), 
to push through policies. Their influence can be explained by the fact that the rural share of the 
Swedish population was, even by the 1960s, still much higher than elsewhere in Western Europe. 
This, too, can perhaps explain why the Social Democrats went to such lengths to support 
homeownership during the 1930s and 1940s; a support that ran contrary to most Social 
Democratic party ethos in Europe during this period (Kohl, 2018a).  However, between 1952 and 
1958, the Social Democrats went into coalition with the Democratic Farmer’s League, who were 
firmly in favour of low interest rates. While the reasons for this were that that their electoral base 
(rural dwellers) was keen to have access to cheap credit for agricultural purposes, this had an 
impact on housing and the built environment in Sweden’s towns and cities too.  
 It is important to consider these constellations of interests, as well as the overall nature 
of Sweden’s political economy and financial system, during the Record Years. As Appelbaum 
(1985, p. 224) notes, ‘[t]he Social Democrats by no means had free rein to promote a thorough-
going socialist housing program’. These may have been The Golden Years for Swedish housing, 
but, as Headly (1978, p. 59) notes, class-and sectoral-based compromises are delicate, and can 
break down easily: 
 
[R]etention of [SAP] power hinges on 5% of voters and seats so that public opinion and the 
parties and interest groups which represent centrist opinion have to be carefully cultivated. 
Compromise is a political necessity not just a national characteristic’ (Headly 1978 in 
Appelbaum, 1985, p. 224). 
 
Thus, we should not be lured into thinking, as some scholars and commentators do, that such an 
epoch could be recreated without a fundamental shift in the present alignment of interests, 
resources and sectoral power dynamics (Blackwell and Holgersen, 2016). Nor should we believe 
the notion that political will and good intentions (Al-Dewany, 2015) allowed for this phenomenal 
building effort. These attributes were necessary, but not sufficient; for without means or capacity 
(both in parliament and within broader civil society) it is doubtful many of the programmes 
                                               
 
110 Indeed, Britain’s council housing programmes of this era were arguably more so (Donnison and Ungerson, 1982) 
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outlined above would have been possible. The constellation of political, sectoral, and class 
interests which had enabled these housing programmes would soon shift, and it was during the 
height of the Million Homes Programme that legislative changes, which would have the potential 
to undermine the Swedish model of housing, occurred. 
 
Cooperative and rental politics in transition 
 
 In 1968 the Permanent Rent Act passed by the Riksdag. This was the introduction of the 
so-called ‘utility value system’ (bruksvärdes-systemet) which constitutes what some scholars 
have referred to as soft rent control (Turner, 1997, p. 485). The aim of this legislation was to 
assess the reasonableness of the rent (Boverket, 2008, p. 9), by comparing rents for apartments 
that are equivalent in terms of ‘utility value’ (ibid.). A report by the National Board of Housing, 
Building and Planning (Boverket) notes of this Act that, ‘Its aim was to allow for a transition to 
a market like development of rents’ (Hedman, 2008, p. 9 emphasis added). 
 The legislation was piecemeal, but, by the mid- to late-1970s, the rent control system of 
1942 had been abolished and the corporatist system of rent negotiations, whereby voluntary 
collective agreement between the landlord associations and the tenants’ unions (mediated by rent 
tribunals where agreement could not be achieved as a last resort) were institutionally crystallised 
in law in the form of the Rent Negotiation Act of 1978 (Bengtsson, 2007)111. This, according to a 
Bengt Turner, achieved ‘market-like rents, subject to certain restrictions’ (Turner, 1997, p. 485). 
Turner summarises the core components thus:  
 
(i) basing the rent on a user value concept; 
(ii) giving the municipal housing companies a price determining role; and 
(iii) establishing rents through negotiations between the local landlords and the 
local tenants' association (ibid.) 
 
This represented a transition from a rigid system of public control of over rents to a less rigid 
system (Victorin, 1979, p. 239). Despite opposition from factions within the Social Democrats 
and the Communist Party in the Riksdag (Bengtsson et al., 2006) this legislative programme met 
little parliamentary resistance. Indeed, the Tenant’s Union were broadly supportive and, in 1971, 
the Swedish Property Federation signed up to the negotiations.  
                                               
 
111 According to Bo Bengtsson, ‘Use-value comparisons are made primarily with the rents of public rental dwellings 
as bench-mark, which gives the non-profit municipal housing companies the role as price-leaders in the local rental 
markets. If a private landlord demands a considerably higher rent than the rent-level in the public sector, the tenant can 
take the case to the rent tribunal. This makes the Swedish rental sector an unusually clear-cut case of a ‘unitary social 
rental market’ (cf. Kemeny 1995: 4)’ (Bengtsson, 2007, p. 11).  
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 The significance of this law to the Swedish rental market system would not be realised 
immediately. Indeed, in terms of organisational practices, the law on negotiations was generally 
seen as merely a formal legal acknowledgement that stipulated, ‘what was already established on 
the market’ (Bååth, 2015, p. 32). However, as Victorin notes:  
 
[t]he success of the organisations on the housing market depends to a great extent on the fact 
that they act as effective parties to bargaining. They administer the rules in a way that is 
advantageous to both sides, and they act as representatives of the parties in disputes’ (Victorin, 
1979, pp. 242–243 emphasis added).  
 
During the late 1960s and early 1970s, it could be argued that the system which was being 
institutionally embedded was able to deliver mutual advantages to both tenants and landlords 
(both public and private); but sectoral interests and power dynamics (both within and between 
organisations) are never static and, as Joe Doherty (2000, p. 175) notes, ‘…patterns of need, 
demand and supply alter over time responding to changing social, economic and political 
contexts’. While, formally, institutional arrangements and social constellations may appear 
similar, prima facie, the way actors interact and relate to each other within and between these 
systems changes over time. These interactions are ultimately what drive changes in what social 
scientists often refer to as structure. Agents exercise power through these structures (Knafo, 
2009) and, as I explore in the following two chapters, the negotiations delivering effective 
mutually advantageous outcomes would not last. 
 In the same year that the Permanent Rent Act was introduced, another law was passed 
which would have wide-reaching consequences for housing cooperatives, and which would 
ultimately (in combination with subsequent measures and financial developments explored in 
Chapters IV & V) transform the Swedish housing system. The Cooperative Housing Control Act 
(Bostadsrättskontrollagen) of 1942 was abolished in 1968 and, as of January 1969, cooperative 
tenants were able to ‘sell their occupancy rights for the highest price that the market would 
deliver’ (Christophers, 2013, pp. 5–6). Cooperatives became less social and more commodified 
(Ganapati, 2010, p. 374) and, as Christophers notes, since this time, the tenant-owned apartment 
sector ‘…constitutes a subset of owner-occupancy in all but name’ (Christophers, 2013, p. 6)112.  
 Cooperative housing in Sweden, thus is (and has always been) a somewhat confusing, 
and contested, legal entity. Indeed, the legislation in 1968-69 can be seen as a particular 
expression of a longstanding tension inherent within the Swedish cooperative model of housing, 
encapsulated by the dichotomy between the Swedish law of 1930’s description of cooperative 
dwellings as a form of private property (enskild äganderätt), and HSB’s own official conception 
of the ‘housing right’ (bostadsrätten), noted by Sørvoll, (Sørvoll, 2013, p. 151). As noted in the 
                                               
 
112 Indeed, as far as the European Commission’s official statistics agency (Eurostat) is concerned, there is no difference 
between tenant-owned apartments in Sweden and owner-occupation elsewhere in Europe. 
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previous chapter, the HSB pioneer, Sven Wallander (who died in 1968), was not so equivocal. 
He summarised HSB’s movement thus:  
 
The HSB movement was founded on the principle that peoples’ housing should not be the 
object of speculation, but to put it somewhat cynically, it was never in our minds that they 
were to be prevented from making a profit from their own apartments. They were meant to 
be homeowners (Wallader, cited in, Sørvoll, 2013, p. 151). 
 
A government commission ultimately came down on the side of Wallander, stating in their report 
that, ‘[c]ooperative housing is not wholly comparable to rented housing. (…) In some ways it is 
more meaningful to compare it to individual homeownership’ (Memorandum, 1967, 12:105, cited 
in Sørvoll, 2013, p. 162). This was a significant piece of legislation, which would have far-
reaching implications. Christophers argues that this was this was ‘…the first component of the 
Swedish housing system to be deregulated and marketised and, thus neoliberalised’ (Christophers, 
2013, p. 5); a claim which challenges many of the scholarly accounts of Swedish housing and 
neoliberalism I analysed in the Introductory chapter and Chapter I. Whether neoliberal, or not, 
this legislation would change the housing landscape in Sweden irrevocably, creating new 
opportunities for construction firms, developers, and financiers, as I explore in the next chapter. 
 
3.5. Conclusion  
 
This chapter sought to unpack some of the political-economic facets of Swedish housing and 
finance system development throughout the mid-twentieth century, combining an analysis of 
broad macroeconomic trends (both domestic and international) with specific sectoral dynamics, 
particularly in relation to housing finance, construction, and the state’s role therein. In so doing, 
I attempted to connect the co-evolution of Sweden’s housing and finance systems during this 
forty-year period to developments which occurred during the pre- and interwar years. I argued 
that the first two decades of Social Democratic hegemony (c. 1930-1950) were marked as much 
by continuity with the previous housing and finance system configurations as they were by 
change, and that a comprehensive, social democratic housing programme took some time to 
emerge. Further, I highlighted the path dependent trajectories of housing and finance system 
development in Sweden and stressed the role and importance of institutional legacies and sectoral 
interests, which pre-dated the 1930s, in Social Democratic housing programmes of the inter- and 
post-War periods. 
 The aim of the first two sections of this chapter was to challenge scholarly preconceptions 
about the nature of pre-1930s housing and finance initiatives of both state and non-state actors. I 
argued that, by coarsely juxtaposing the so-called passive, laissez-faire governance of the early-
twentieth century, with that of the ostensive planned (active) social market economy assembled 
under the stewardship of the Social Democrats, scholars reinforce a dichotomy which, ultimately, 
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promotes a misleading account of housing system development. In so doing, such analyses tend 
to analytically privilege a narrow tranche of top-down political governance over all else. That is 
to say, scholars take little heed of the conditioning historical, sectoral and financial dynamics on 
the constitution of housing systems and tend to judge housing outcomes primarily through the 
behaviour of individual units113. Such approaches, I argued, relegate the importance of historical 
institutional and sectoral constellations in housing and housing finance; and their effects on 
housing demand and supply. 
 By analysing the development of state capacities during the 1930s and 1940s, I 
demonstrated how Sweden’s planned war economy became so central to the development of a 
housing industrial complex during the post-War era and how this, in turn, was fused onto the 
existing institutional nexuses of housing programmes and provisions, which had developed 
during the previous decades. While frustration that the housing question had still not been 
‘resolved’ was still palpable within the Social Democrats during the 1950s, by the end of this 
decade, new financial conduits would revolutionise the Swedish housing and finance systems. 
The establishment of the AP funds would be key to the state’s efforts to tackle the housing 
question, and these funds would become central pillars of the Swedish model of housing which 
contemporary scholars so laud. Indeed, their establishment, ‘represented a massive socialization 
of the nation’s savings’ (Jonung, 1993, p. 356), and, with it, the socialisation of housing 
investment risk. 
 The construction of a million homes within the space of a decade was nothing short of 
sensational, but it cannot be fully comprehended without first understanding the importance of 
state financial capacity generated by the ATP system, and how the acquiescence of key sectoral 
actors in determining where financial resources were to be directed was linked to this capacity. 
As I explore in Chapter IV, the quid pro quo arrangement between the state, finance, and 
construction capital was central to the success of the Golden Years and, as such, one cannot view 
housing policy in isolation of the broader housing industrial complex which developed during 
this period. 
 I showed in the last subsection that institutional changes were afoot, which would have 
the potential to undermine the Swedish model of housing, even before the completion of the 
Million Homes Programme. In the next chapter I explore how the constellation of actors and 
interests which made the Million Homes Programme viable to begin with, would also be the ones 
who would usher in its demise. As phenomenal as this era of mass housing programmes built at 
low marginal rates of profit was, then, it would not last.  
 Sweden’s Golden Years were more fleeting than many imagine, lasting little more than 
                                               
 
113 I adapt this formulation from Kenneth Waltz’s Theory of International Politics (Waltz, 1979, p. 110). 
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two decades. As I explore, below, the cooperative sector would continue its radical departure 
from its original ethos; the concentrated building industry (fostered by the Social Democrats, 
construction firms and the unions) would prove that construction industry monopolies can 
aggravate for housing supply; the municipal planning monopolies would see the outbreak of 
municipal war in the context local budgetary restraints; and the regime of financing which made 
the Million Homes Programme possible would reach breaking point. When the Million Homes 
Programme concluded in 1975, vacancies were high and there was widespread belief among the 
Social Democrats, the trade unions, the cooperatives, and the tenants’ movement that the urban 
housing shortages, which had plagued Sweden for over a century, were a thing of the past 
(Sørvoll, 2013, p. 165) and that the Swedish housing market was now balanced. However, far 
from being a case of mission accomplished, the end of the Golden Years would herald a new era 
of uncertainty and economic dislocation, with housing at its core. 
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Chapter IV. From housing system ‘balance’ to dysfunction: the 
decline of the housing industrial complex, c. 1970s 
 
 
The essence of the Swedish Model … was the notion that full employment and economic 
stability could be made compatible. We argued that anti-inflationary full employment policy 
had to be based on two pillars: a restrictive general economic policy which does not 
guarantee full employment, and selective labour market policy measures which absorb 
redundant labour. Swedish governments have frequently neglected the first part of the 
recommendation and tolerated periods of excess demand in the product and labour markets. 
The destabilizing effects of this inflation-prone policy were obvious already in the 1970s but 
became fatal in the 1980s: profits skyrocketed, speculation pushed property values to 
unsustainable heights, growth came to a stand-still and Swedish competitiveness faltered.  
 
Rudolf Meidner, 1993 
 
4.0. Introduction 
 
The previous chapter sought to challenge many commonly held scholarly assumptions about the 
composition and development of the Swedish housing and finance systems, and the role of the 
state therein, during the mid-twentieth century. By situating developments in housing and the 
built environment during the inter- and post-War periods in relation to the historical composition 
of housing finance and advances in state capacity, Chapter III sought to demonstrate that the 
inextricable nexuses linking housing, finance, and the state, during the so-called Golden Years 
were not merely products of a specific post-War political ideology or agenda promoted by a 
particular political party, but also of long-run, accreted dynamics, which would perdure over the 
course of the twentieth century, and beyond.  
 These dynamics, I argued, were promoted and sustained by sectoral and class cleavages 
(cooperatives, municipal housing associations, construction capital, unions, and financial 
institutions), and mediated by the state; whose long-established role in underpinning core pillars 
of the Swedish housing finance system and mobilising capital on both the demand- and supply-
side was significantly augmented following the Second World War.  The thrust of my argument 
was not to deny the importance of political actors or political ideology per se, but to advance a 
holistic analytical approach to the study of housing system development; one which looks beyond 
politics and ideology and which takes into account the multifarious range of actors, interests, and 
institutions involved in the production, distribution, consumption, and financing of housing 
through time.  
 The state’s role in guaranteeing the profit-margins of private firms within the housing 
supply nexus through subsidy programmes had been paramount to the ‘success’ and creation of 
the housing industrial complex, whose most obvious manifestation was the (in)famous Million 
Homes Programme (Miljonprogrammet). Throughout the twentieth century, the state buttressed 
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the creation of this unique complex, initially by bolstering the supply of mortgage credit, 
mitigating risk, and resorting to general capital expenditure (as during the pre- and inter-War 
years). It was during the post-War years, however, that this system was complemented and 
significantly augmented; with profound implications for housing and the built environment. The 
AP system, served to channel Swedish households’ savings into housing construction on an 
unprecedented scale, and was an innovative instrument of capital mobilisation and state financial 
control. The synchronisation of credit and monetary policy enabled the Million Homes 
Programme (Ryner, 2002, p. 90) and there is little doubt that, without such synchronicity, this 
programme would not have been fiscally practicable, or indeed (arguably) possible. Indeed, no 
country had, hitherto, built so much housing per capita within such a short timeframe; this was a 
phenomenal feat of capital and resource mobilisation. 
 The present chapter is driven by a desire to interrogate an alluringly modest question 
raised by the analysis in the previous chapter: Once a housing industrial complex has been formed, 
and exceeds demand capacity, what happens next? Once a state, and almost an entire financial 
system (as well as a domestically-oriented industrial supply chain) has been geared towards the 
mass production of housing, on the basis of low marginal rates of profit - with all the ancillary 
social, political, financial, and economic nexuses which have been mobilised to realise this - what 
happens when said system becomes saturated?  
 To address these questions, this chapter, builds upon the analysis conducted in the 
previous chapter by focusing on the changing relationships and power dynamics between the state 
(both local and national), construction capital and households towards the end of the Million 
Homes Programme, and beyond. The aim of this multi-sectoral approach is both to situate housing 
system developments in relation to their broader macroeconomic context, and to understand how, 
in an era of high inflation, faltering productivity and economic uncertainty, the distribution of 
preferences and incentives, which had been so central to the development of Sweden’s housing 
industrial complex hitherto, would ultimately reconfigure to undermine the basis of its very 
existence.  
 Whereas Chapters II and III examined the formation of what scholars commonly assume 
typifies the Swedish housing system, and the establishment of a housing industrial complex, this 
chapter is concerned principally with the mounting contradictions created by this peculiar Swedish 
model of housing and finance, and the role that the state and municipalities, households, and 
construction capital played therein. By contradiction here, I refer to the tensions created by a 
series of substantive qualitative and quantitative changes in the way housing was produced, 
consumed, distributed and financed. During the 1970s and 1980s a change, or Aufhebung, 
occurred whereby Sweden’s housing system moved from one which was predominantly geared 
towards the mass production of affordable housing, at low marginal rates of profit, to one 
characterised by lower volumes of high-end production (particularly single-family dwellings and 
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cooperative dwellings), at higher marginal rates of profit. In this era of high inflation, housing 
consumption played a much more central role in this emergent housing model, and it is during 
this period that Swedish households increasingly came to view housing, not as a social good, but 
as an economic good.  
 This was a sublation that was facilitated on the supply-side by actors in the sphere of 
construction, and fostered by the municipalities, and the structure of the state housing loan system 
and, while it was by no means instantaneous (the accreted, path-dependent, logics and interests 
built up throughout the twentieth century hitherto would not be transformed in toto), it is no 
exaggeration to say that the period under investigation represents another critical juncture in the 
history of Sweden’s housing system. I argue that, by the 1980s, the decommodified, egalitarian 
system of housing, which has been said to have characterised Sweden’s housing system for much 
of the post-War period, had, to paraphrase Rudolf Meidner (1993), been fatally undermined. Some 
scholars would vehemently dispute this timeframe; for, as I remarked in Chapter I, the 
‘breakdown’ of the Swedish model of housing and the ‘birth’ of neoliberal housing policy (read: 
housing outcomes critical housing scholars neither like nor agree with) is supposed to have been 
the product of a decisive break with past policy by Karl Bildt’s Conservative-led government in 
the early 1990s (see Chapter V). For the many scholars who advocate such a position, the 
transition to what they loosely term neoliberalism was ‘rapid’ (Clark and Johnson, 2009; Hedin 
et al., 2012; Andersson and Magnusson Turner, 2014). This chapter tells a different story, 
however. Where my account differs from most is in identifying the insuperable contradictions in 
the Swedish model of housing as beginning in the 1970s.  
 My point of departure from other scholarly accounts, as noted in Chapter I, is to stress 
that even though institutional elements of a housing or finance system may, on the surface, appear 
similar throughout time, the distribution of preferences, and manner in which actors interact 
within said systems, changes. I claim that, by the 1980s, the housing industrial complex can no 
longer be said to exist, and that the ideal-type characteristics which are so often said to typify the 
post-War model Swedish housing (accessibility, universality, tenure neutrality, and a 
decommodified cooperative model) are almost impossible to reconcile with reality. Following the 
cooperative price control reforms of the late 1960s (see Chapter III), cooperative associations 
were becoming increasingly conservative, building less and voting for restrictions that were more 
in favour of maintaining property values than extending affordable, good quality accommodation 
to the masses (Sørvoll, 2013, p. 292)114. By the 1980s, real rents in Public Housing units were 
pulling away from their long-term relationship to consumer prices; the value of residential and 
commercial real estate began to soar; the state subsidy system, which had originally been designed 
                                               
 
114 As Sørvoll (2013, p. 292) notes, HSB ‘opposed […] the expansion of price controls, substantial capital gains taxes, 
municipal distribution, rental-cooperative housing and restrictions on conversions’. 
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to promote tenure neutrality, quickly came to substantially benefit middle- and high-income 
owner-occupiers; and socioeconomic and ethnic segregation was on the rise.  
 The chapter is organised accordingly. I begin by couching the end of the Million Homes 
Programme within the macroeconomic context of the early-1970s. Here, I explore the aggregate 
shift in household demand and tenure preferences; the overcapacity of multi-dwellings buildings 
generated in areas of low aggregate demand; and how construction firms and developers 
responded to the post-Million Homes era. Following this, I explore households’ interactions with 
the structures of state housing subsidies in an era of high inflation, and how middle- and high-
income groups were able to mobilise this system to their advantage, simultaneously undermining 
the basis of the housing industrial complex. The final section seeks to explain the shift in power 
dynamics between municipalities and construction capital. Here, I investigate how the general 
system of housing subsidies, fiscal constraints, and demographic change created imperatives on 
municipalities to pursue housing and commercial development as a means of raising revenue, and 
how private construction companies were, in turn, able to use their burgeoning land banks and 
capital reserves to influence the structure and form of urban residential development to ever 
greater degrees, inflicting a systematic blow to the system of housing provision which had 
characterised the post-War decades hitherto.  
 
4.1. From housing deficit to housing surplus? 
 
The economic backdrop to the 1970s was not nearly as rubicund as it had been in the previous 
post-War decades in Sweden. In 1976, the Social Democrats ceded control of the Riksdag, ending 
over forty years of parliamentary dominance, and for the next few years until 1982 a loose 
coalition of so-called ‘bourgeois parties’ was at the helm of government. Despite six currency 
devaluations between 1976 and 1982, all designed to promote industrial competitiveness in the 
era of oil price shocks and floating exchange rates, real GDP rose less than Great Britain, 
Denmark, Finland and Germany (Caprio, 1982, p. 25), the Current Account Balance (CAB) 
reverted to deficit, and consumer prices rose more rapidly than the OECD average in seven of the 
ten years of the 1970s (ibid. p. 26), reaching 13.6 per cent in 1980 (SCB, 2016). Commentators 
may have awarded the dubious accolade of sick man of Europe to Britain during the 1970s, but 
Sweden was little better. In combination with the deterioration in macroeconomic aggregates, and 
ballooning government deficits (>10% in 1978 and 1979), there was also a shift towards a more 
militant approach from the unions in Sweden, with growing demand for higher wages 
exacerbating inflation, and an increase in strike activity hitherto unprecedented in the post-War 
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era115. Having created the world’s most advanced social democracy, fissures were beginning to 
appear, and the housing industrial complex, which had become so central to Sweden’s post-War 
model of political economy, would provide no immunity.  
 
The end of an era 
 
 The mid-1970s marked the terminus of the Million Homes Programme, with many 
scholars, commentators, and institutions arguing that housing supply had been brought into 
balance with demand (Appelbaum, 1985, p. 221; Jaffee, 1994, p. 11). Whether misguided or not, 
this view was influencing the outlooks of key sectoral actors in Sweden’s housing supply nexus. 
HSB, for instance, argued that price regulation would be ‘…less needed in the balanced housing 
market of the future’ (cited in Sørvoll, 2013, p. 198 emphasis added), and the influential Housing 
Committee (Bostadsrättskommittén) established to investigate price controls during the 1960s, 
was also of the view that, in a balanced housing market, price and rent controls were unwarranted. 
As Sørvoll notes of the Committee’s report findings in the late-1969s: 
 
The underlying message was that price regulation was a form of legislation suited for war 
and post-war circumstances: necessary in times of grave shortages on the housing market but 
superfluous to requirements in an era when consumers had a wide choice of rented, 
cooperative and individually-owned housing (Sørvoll, 2013, p. 161). 
 
 
The housing crisis that had plagued Sweden since the nascent years of her industrialisation had 
literally, or so it seemed, been built away (SABO, 2015b). The homes that had been built were 
generally of a higher quality than the contemporaneous mass housing programmes elsewhere in 
Europe and the OECD countries (Hall and Vidén, 2005), and there was no shortage of government 
agencies and personnel within the housing industrial complex willing to take credit for this 
accomplishment. Considering that Sweden had had some of the lowest housing standards in 
Europe prior to the Second World War this was irrefutably quite an astonishing accomplishment. 
So much so, in fact, that the American sociologist Richard P. Appelbaum (1985, p. 221) called it 
the Swedish Miracle.  
 Others, however, were not quite so attuned to these hyperbolic assessments. For some, 
particularly on the Left, the housing crisis was persisting, even in 1974 when the Million Home 
Programme was drawing to a close:  
 
Everyone can see that there is chaos in the housing market. Total housing production has 
sunk by around 30 per cent between 1970 and 1973. The production of new apartments has 
                                               
 
115 The number of working days lost annually through strikes increased by a factor of ten during the 1970s and 1980s 
compared to the previous two decades (Bergström, 1991, p. 18), and whilst not as numerous as those in the USA, this 
was still a marked deterioration in labour relations. In 1980 alone, due to a breakdown in negotiations between SAF 
and LO, over 4,000,000 working days were lost due to industrial action (ibid.). 
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fallen to around half the level of 1970 and, meanwhile, the production of single-family houses 
has increased sizeably” (Boberg et al., 1974, p. 7 author’s translation). 
 
Such sentiments may appear to boarder on hubris, but concern was felt, particularly in Leftist 
circles, during the 1970s, where there was apprehension that the rise in single-family dwellings 
(which typically, although not necessarily, correspond to owner-occupation in Sweden) would 
undermine the decommodified nature of the Swedish housing model. Indeed, the concerns 
expressed by Kenneth Boberg et al. were, in many ways, fortuitous.  
 After a concerted push by the state, municipalities and construction firms to house the 
nation in (predominantly) multi-dwelling units for rent and cooperative ownership, Swedish 
households, by the early-1970s, had other ideas and the demand for rented, Million Homes-era 
apartments in suburbia collapsed, with predictable consequences for housing construction. 
 
Figure 4.1. Total number of completed units by building type, 1938-1994 
 
  
Source: SCB 
 
 The extent of the collapse of multi-dwelling building production following the 
completion of the Million Homes Programme can be observed in Figure 4.1. However, overall 
housing production was buoyed somewhat by the increase in single-family dwelling housing 
completions. The following from Thomas Hall and Sonja Vidén, outlining the terminus of the 
Million Homes Programme, is worth citing at length: 
 
In the mid-1960s most people were convinced that high housing production would still be 
necessary after the end of the Million Homes Programme. The drastically reduced demand 
for rented flats around 1970 came as a total surprise for almost all those involved, ironically 
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just after an administrative apparatus for large-scale housing production was finally 
established. After 1975 the production of housing, especially apartment blocks, was at a low 
level for a long time. This meant a distinct terminus for the ‘record years’. Without this mark 
of the end of an era … the programme might not have come to be regarded as a single project 
(Hall and Vidén, 2005, p. 321 emphasis added). 
What is noteworthy about the evident shift in demand and housing production is that it was not 
the result of intentioned policy per se; it had been some decades since Social Democrat ministers 
or government agencies had actively tried to promote single-family dwellings or owner-
occupation (see Chapters II & III). Swedish households were driving a change towards a different 
sort of building form (single-family dwellings) and tenure (owner occupation), and they were 
using mortgage tax deduction incentives (which had been in place for over two decades), and 
higher real wages to their advantage to realise this. On the housing supply-side, these trends 
ushered in a new era of lower housing production, whereby construction firms and developers 
sought to operative at higher marginal rates of profit, on a speculative basis.  
Speculation in the city 
 
 Michael Ball (Ball, 1982, p. 61) notes of housing production that, ‘[i]n periods when 
housebuilding is expanding, housing conditions for most people will tend to be getting better; 
when it slumps the problems begin to mount up’. While there are context and conjuncture specific 
causal dimensions to this observation, both assertions contained in this sentence can be applied to 
the Swedish case both prior to, and following the completion of the Million Homes Programme, 
respectively. Indeed, according to Irene Molina and Karin Grundström (2016, p. 320), by the 
early-1970s, ‘…the entire Swedish population had obtained decent housing conditions’. 
However, following the collapse in residential building output during the mid-1970s, problems in 
the Swedish housing system were beginning to mount.  
 The shift in household demand and the corresponding shift in supply during the early- to 
mid-1970s took the state (and others) by surprise. While the abrupt change in production was 
admonished by the more ideologically committed elements within Leftist circles, what it indicated 
was that a growing number of Swedes were reverting to a building form which had been somewhat 
marginalised (for practical and political reasons) since the 1950s in urban areas. No longer content 
to inhabit what were increasingly being seen as vast, monotonous concrete buildings in the 
suburbs, middle class household’s tenure and locational preferences were changing. Henceforth 
the gap between multi-dwelling unit production and single-family dwelling production would 
return to levels last witnessed during the interwar years before the era of mass housing 
programmes.  
 Contemporaneously, as the demand for single-family housing soared, demand for 
cooperative apartments in ‘attractive’ inner-city areas was also on the rise, as ‘…the middle 
classes began to flee from municipal rental housing’ (Sejersted, 2011, p. 264). It was around this 
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time that we witness the emergence of a new breed of institutional property investor. These 
investors began purchasing private rental buildings (hyresrätter) en masse in inner city areas. 
However, while rents were starting to pull away from consumer prices by the early-1970s, 
following rental market reforms in the late-1960s (see Chapter III) and higher building costs, it 
was not merely steady rental income which these investors sought.  
 The business model which these new urban investors adopted involved buying up entire 
multi-dwelling rental buildings and running them down, by systematically reducing maintenance 
and running costs. The poster boy of this new strategy of highly leveraged real estate purchases 
was Adam ‘Lex’ Backström - an architect with a Ph.D. in real estate economics from the Royal 
Institute of Technology (KTH) in Stockholm - who, throughout the early- to mid-1970s, built one 
of the largest real estate companies listed in the Stockholm Stock Exchange, Credo. Having run 
the rental stock down, Backström would then convert rental buildings into either office blocks, 
co-operatives, or timeshare apartments (Andelslägenheter). The latter represented a peculiar form 
of tenure which functionally created a form of owner-occupation in lieu of proper legal 
frameworks to accommodate freehold ownership of individual rental units within multi-dwelling 
buildings.  
 These conversions of attractive inner-city rental housing were highly profitable. Banks 
and finance companies were key investors in Backström’s highly leveraged real estate empire. 
However, Backström’s questionable methods were disadvantages to tenants, whose homes were 
increasingly becoming objects of speculation. The Tenants’ Union were none too pleased by the 
actions of Lex and his cohort of speculators and, while the scale and pace of these conversions 
continued unabated until the mid-1970s, the Riksdag eventually introduced a new acquisition law 
for rental buildings (Lag 1975:1132) in an attempt to stem the tide of rapacious real estate 
speculation. Such was the extent of Backström’s inner-city real estate purchases, that this new 
law was even colloquially named after him: Lex Backström’s Law (Malmström, 2011). Following 
huge public criticism and investigations by the Swedish tax authorities, Backström emigrated to 
the USA. However, while Backström may have left the Swedish real estate market, his modus 
operandi would endure. Commercial real estate investment was becoming increasingly popular 
throughout the late-1970s and, in 1982, a new law was passed allowing private rental tenants to 
form cooperative associations and to convert their multi-dwelling rental buildings into 
cooperatives. These conversions represented an institutionalisation of Backström’s speculative 
tactics and would later be extended to Public Housing (see Chapter V). 
 Why, the reader may enquire, were these speculative practices and behaviours flourishing 
now? The changes in rent regulations of the late 1960s and early 1970s (see previous chapter) 
were certainly conditioning factors. When first introduced, they had the effect of temporarily 
depressing rents, which made the private rental stock unattractive to current and prospective 
contractors and landlords. The law change which allowed cooperative owners to transfer their 
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occupancy rights without price controls, however, was more significant. This new breed of 
speculators was attempting to use this law to their benefit, and it was having a direct impact on 
the composition of the Swedish housing system. There were even examples, in the early 1970s, 
of developers changing the tenure form of apartment units from rental to cooperatives before the 
buildings had even been completed (Jörnmark, 2016). 
 While the new acquisition law of 1975 had attempted to stifle these trends, the tenure 
composition in Sweden’s major towns and cities was changing rapidly. The share of households 
living in private rental accommodation plummeted throughout the 1970s, at the same time as 
cooperative-ownership, and owner-occupation burgeoned. This was a fundamental shift in tenure 
composition, and it would have implications for future housing supply, as well as the flow of 
subsidised finance to the Swedish housing system. I now explore how household behaviours 
began to undermine the basis of the housing industrial complex.  
 
4.2. The role of household demand in shaping housing and finance system 
outcomes 
 
The shift in households’ tenure preferences from the mid-1970s onwards would have radical 
implications for the development of the Swedish housing and finance systems henceforth. 
Households are, to a great extent, participants in helping to create the housing and finance 
landscapes which they inhabit by virtue of their actions and preferences; not only by electing 
governments with oversight of regulatory processes every four years or so, but also by the 
consumer choices they make in their everyday lives (Seabrooke, 2006). These choices would, 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s, help to reshape the Swedish housing and finance systems, and 
households’ consumption patterns would become one of the most important drivers of GDP 
growth (Englund, 2015). The extent of financial transformations (most of which took place during 
the 1980s) will be explored in the next chapter. For now, though, this section focuses on 
households’ tenure preferences and how state subsides, in an era of high inflation helped to foster 
this fundamental shift in demand. 
 During much of the 1970s, Swedish households had the lowest savings ratio of any of the 
Nordic countries. Equity withdrawal became more common, and house prices began to increase 
at levels not witnessed during the post-War period hitherto. Indeed, Jan Bohlin notes that, ‘[f]rom 
1972 to 1979, house prices in Göteborg rose at an average annual rate of almost 13 per cent’ 
(Bohlin, 2014, p. 45). These exceptional changes in house price trajectory can be witness in Figure 
4.2, below. 
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Figure 4.2. Indices of residential property prices in Stockholm, Göteborg and Sweden, 1957–
1985 (1957 = 100). 
 
 
Source: Söderberg, Blöndal and Edvinsson, (2014) 
 
The data presented in Figure 4.2 disaggregate the prices of houses and apartments. The reader 
will note that there is a tangible shift in the trajectory of these indices during the 1970s, and that 
the ‘spread’ between house and apartment prices increases throughout the 1970s and early-1980s 
up until the mid-1980s, where prices then begin to converge.  
 What were the determinants driving these price rises? Higher wages were certainly a 
factor; as were income tax reforms during the early 1980s (Brownstone, Englund and Persson, 
1985). However, the growth of the credit stock was also key and, during the 1970s, households 
were taking on ever-greater quantities of debt. What is surprising is that the levels of household 
debt were high even before the dramatic financial reforms (or deregulation) of the 1980s (see 
Chapter V), as lenders and borrowers were increasingly meeting outside of formal banking 
channels, in the so-called ‘grey market’ (Jonung, 1994, p. 364). It was during this time that 
households, assisted by the banks, developed new ‘creative financing’ techniques, akin to those 
in the USA, whereby, as Mark Boleat (1985, p. 263) notes, ‘…seller[s] agreed not to receive the 
full sum demanded, but rather held a certificate with a mortgage on [their] old house as collateral’, 
with banks acting as brokers (Englund, 1999, p. 83).  
 According to Jappelli and Pagano (1989, p. 1092) the average ratio of household debt to 
consumption 1965-83 was 117 per cent in Sweden. This compared to 84 percent in the USA and 
56 percent in UK (cited in Englund, 2015, p. 7) and, as Peter Englund (1999, p. 83) notes, 
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‘Swedish households on aggregate were among the least credit-constrained within the OECD 
group of countries’. The incentives for households to take on debt had been encouraged through 
the tax and subsidy system for some time (see Chapter III) and, during this era of high inflation, 
potentially unlimited mortgage tax deductibility made borrowing highly attractive for middle- and 
high-income groups. The combined effects of this were that real mortgage rates had been 
negative for some time, as Figure 4.3 reveals. 
 
Figure 4.3. Nominal and Real Mortgage Rates, 1980-1993 
 
 % 
 
 
Source: Jaffee (1994, p. 77) 
 
 While Figure 4.3 only depicts nominal and real mortgage rates during the 1980s and the 
beginning of the 1990s, real interest rates had been strongly negative through the 1970s (Englund, 
1999, p. 83). Credit was, for want of a better word, unquestionably cheap through this period 
which, as former Riksbank deputy governor, Kristiana Persson, noted in an address to a 
conference of Social Democrats in 2002, ‘…pushed up the demand for credit substantially’ 
(Persson, 2002, p. 2), further fuelling inflation. In some cases, households were actually being 
paid to inhabit their credit-financed houses (Bergh, 2014, p. 38); as a famous study by two 
Swedish economists, Bo Sandelin and Bo Södersten (1978) entitled Betalt för att bo (Paid for 
being housed), famously claimed. Englund explains the dynamic thus: 
 
The marginal tax rate was varying between 50 and 60 per cent for the medium income earner 
until 1991 ... The interest rate was strongly negative all through the 1970s, came close to zero 
after 1980 but became negative again after 1985. It was only in connection with the crisis of 
the early 1990s that Swedish households met positive costs of borrowed funds for the first 
time in three decades (Englund, 2015, p. 9). 
 
Mortgage tax deductibility, in its original guise, was not intended to skew tenure incentives 
 
 
 
140 
towards homeownership. Indeed, the official policy of the Swedish government had been to 
uphold the principals of tenure neutrality (see Chapter III). However, whilst the policies had 
remained the same, the underlying macroeconomic conditions had changed; and some households 
(principally middle- and high-income groups) were able to turn this situation to their advantage. 
High inflation, in combination with high marginal taxes which households could deduct mortgage 
interest payments against, meant that debt financing became an incredibly attractive proposition 
for households of means during much of the 1970s.  
 Bo Sandelin and Bo Södersten (1978) use the following example: If a high-income 
household was to take on mortgage loan with a nominal interest rate of 10 per cent when inflation 
was roughly 8 per cent, then the real interest rate before tax becomes 2 per cent. The real rate, 
when deducting interest payments from a marginal tax rate of 60 per cent, then produces an after 
tax interest rate of  minus 4 per cent (Sandelin and Södersten, 1978, p. 48). If (as was the case) 
house prices increased at the same pace as consumer prices (which they did), then this was not 
merely a generous subsidy, but an actual net transfer of wealth from the state to households 
purchasing their homes on credit (Bergh, 2014, p. 38). Indeed, as Andreas Bergh (ibid.) notes, the 
actual progressiveness of this system (which remains in place today) is much lower than the 
marginal tax rate (or most analyses of income inequality in Sweden for that matter) would imply. 
 This was not how the subsidy system had been designed to work. Indeed, the system, as 
implemented after the War, had not been designed to accommodate inflationary tendencies and 
speculation. But this subsidy was, unsurprisingly, popular with a large tranche of middle-class 
Swedes. As Bengtsson, Ruonavaara and Sørvoll (2017), note, while the Social Democrats were 
well aware that the mortgage tax relief system was unfeasible, it was seen as, ‘…politically too 
risky to undermine economic conditions for this large group of ‘our people’ – as the influential 
Minister of Finance labelled home owners’ (Bengtsson, Ruonavaara and Sørvoll, 2017). Figures 
4.4 and 4.5, below, provide a quantitative summary of the evolution of state housing expenditure 
on housing from 1950 to 1980, which complement my analysis in the previous chapter. The reader 
will note the development of mortgage tax credits from the late-1960s onwards. By 1980, credits 
to households amounted to nearly 50 per cent of all government assistance to housing (including 
housing loans). The shift, in the early-1970s, from the supply-side to the demand-side subsidies 
is more than evident. Swedish households were now being institutionally encouraged to encumber 
themselves with debt.  
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Figure 4.4. State Housing Expenditure at Constant Prices (in million SKr) 
 
Figure 4.5. State Housing Expenditure (% share) 
 
 
Source: Olsson (1986) 
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 Despite the relative declining importance of state subsidies to housing construction, the 
state’s financial exposure was still increasing at an unprecedented rate. This was due to the 
macroeconomic conditions (inflation), and a lack of political willingness to alienate homeowners 
and cooperative owners. When the policy had been formulated it was intended to put all tenures 
on an equal footing, but the economic fundamentals had changed. Table 4.1 charts developments 
in tenure composition in Sweden between 1945 and 1990. 
 
Table 4.1. Forms of Tenure in Sweden, 1945-90 (%) 
 
 
 
  
Homeownership Tenant-
owner 
(co-op) 
Private 
Rental 
Public 
Rental 
Total 
1945 38 4 52 6 100 
1960 34 9 43 14 100 
1970 34 13 30 23 100 
1980 41 14 21 24 100 
1990 40 15 20 25 100 
 
Source: Turner (1997, p. 478) 
 
 It is evident from Table 4.1 that the biggest tenure shifts occurred during the 1970s. 
Households, supported by the savings banks, were using tax incentives and higher wages to their 
advantage, and conversions of private rental accommodation to cooperatives (following the 
reform in 1982) continued apace. Further, as I explore in Section 4.3, construction consortia and 
developers were having a greater say over urban development, helping to facilitate, and augment, 
these trends.  Why, the reader may enquire, do we witness no dramatic change in tenure 
composition during the 1980s? Quite simply, the credit that did flow into the housing system from 
the banks and finance companies during this decade served not to increase the homeownership 
and tenant-owner (co-op) franchises, but simply to inflating prices. I discuss these dynamics more 
in the following chapter.  
 
Imbalances between supply and demand  
 
 One effect of this shift in aggregate household demand and housing supply away from 
rental apartments during the 1970s and early-1980s was that the number of vacant dwellings in 
multi-dwelling rental units soared, reaching a peak of nearly 40,000 in 1982. This may have only 
represented just over one per cent of the entire housing stock in Sweden at the time (SCB, 1990), 
but having been transformed from a country with a housing shortage to one with a housing surplus 
(Hall and Vidén, 2005, p. 324), Sweden had now built so much housing that accommodation, 
particularly multi-dwelling municipal rental units, were lying empty. Sweden was in the 
historically novel position of having too much housing; or, at least, too much of the ‘wrong’ type 
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of housing and, critically, in the ‘wrong’ place.  
 Pål Castell (2010) comments that, ‘…landlords began to have difficulty filling all the new 
apartments with tenants’, and it was the oversupply of rental units that made them attractive for 
conversions. There were now more multi-dwelling buildings than household demand could 
accommodate and, municipal housing companies, in particular, had developed far too much 
capacity (SCB, 2012). While this was considered a problem by the state and local authorities, this 
situation, as we have seen, proved ripe for investors, who were keen to exploit the shift in 
household demand. 
 Vacant housing, per se, may not be worthy of note beyond general sentiments of 
indignation about poor resource allocation. What is worthy of note, however, is that, even in those 
areas with vacant housing visible for all to see, new construction of both private and municipal 
rental units continued unabashed and unabated (Wiklund, 2016) throughout the 1970s and 1980s; 
albeit not to the same extent as the Record Years. Thus, whilst housing construction volumes fell 
in absolute terms from their early-1970s record highs nationally, the construction that did take 
place during much of the late-1970s and 1980s was in what might be termed peripheral industrial 
towns and cities, with little aggregate demand. Indeed, as the Ministry of Finance’s Expert Group 
on Public Economics (ESO) report commented, the biggest increases in construction occurred in 
municipalities with fewer than 30,000 residents (ESO, 2002, p. 80). 
 These levels of construction appear to have been driven neither by need nor demand and, 
in the context of the inner-city rental conversions taking place during the early-1970s, such an 
increase in rental housing supply is intriguing. This requires explanation, some of which can be 
understood through an analysis of construction output data. Figure 4.6, below, provides a more 
fine-grained regional picture of housing supply. Using a metric employed by Dwight Jaffee 
(1994), it depicts the ratio of housing completions to population growth in the 1980s in various 
counties in Sweden. For the purpose of this particular analysis, I restrict the analysis to regions 
where the population grew throughout the decade.  
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Figure 4.6. Housing Completions/Population Growth in the 1980s 
 
 
 
Source: SCB and author’s own calculations 
 
 The ratio employed in Figure 4.6 (housing completion/population change) is by no means 
a perfect gauge of housing supply and demand, as it uses aggregate measures, which provide 
merely a snapshot of one decade (1980s).  It tells us little of the housing situation prior to 1980 
and one could wonder, for instance, whether the areas with higher ratios in the 1980s were also 
those with significant housing deficits in the 1970s; perhaps Dalarna and Jämtland were playing 
catch-up. Testimonies from this period and analyses conducted subsequently, however, suggest 
that there were no such deficits (Boverket, 2013). Indeed, as Castell (2010) surmises, the housing 
deficits of the past had been eradicated during the Million Homes Programme. When one 
considers that the headship rate (ratio of households to population) hovered around 0.45 during 
the 1980s in Sweden as a whole (Jaffee, 1994, p. 57), it becomes evident that, in all cases, the 
ratio of housing completions to population growth exceeded this rate and, in some cases, markedly 
so.  
 What is most interesting is that the ratio is highest in areas of least probable demand, as 
illustrated in Figure 4.7, below. Indeed, by running an exponential regression model, we can see 
that there is a strong negative relationship between housing construction and housing need, as 
measured by the population change over the course of the decade (r2 = 0.4997). 
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Figure 4.7. Population growth and the ratio of housing completions to population growth in 
Swedish counties in the 1980s 
 
 
Source: SCB and author’s own calculations 
 
 
 What such an analysis cannot accommodate is the even more extreme cases where the 
population declined over the decade. Jaffee (1994, p. 57) notes that, in the city of Sundsvall in 
Västernorrland, 8,234 housing units were constructed throughout the 1980s, despite the fact that 
the population actually fell by 500 people. Sundsvall was not alone. My analysis shows that, in 
Västernorrland County, despite a 2.5 per cent population decline throughout the 1980s, 11,176 
housing units were built, and in Norrbotten County, 13,930 units were built, despite a population 
decline of 3,319. A very similar (but less extreme) pattern played out in the counties of Kalmar, 
Blekinge, Örebro Värmland, Västmanland, and Gävleborg. This predicament led Ola Nylander, 
of the National Association of Swedish Architects to declare in an interview to SVT that: 
Surprisingly they had caught up enough to resolve the housing crises of the past too! (Wiklund, 
2016). What explains this oversupply of residential housing? And why were the state, 
municipalities and construction companies so keen to support the steady supply of rental housing 
in areas with a palpable lack of demand?  
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4.3. The housing supply nexus and the balance of power 
 
There are, of course, no simple answers to the above questions. As noted previously, a housing 
industrial complex involves a range of state and non-state actors whose actions and expressions 
of interest are multifarious and multifaceted. The interactions of different spheres of interest 
within a housing complex may, prima facie, appear, to be mutually reinforcing (balanced) or 
antagonistic (imbalanced) to the preservation of the status quo but, at all times, as Joseph 
Schumpeter observes so pertinently of economic activity in general, the process of industrial 
mutation incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure from within, incessantly destroying 
the old one, incessantly creating a new one. These mutations may take many forms (some more 
manifest than others), but in order to understand these inexorable processes of mutation, we need 
to interrogate both how and why the housing industrial complex in Sweden following the Million 
Homes Programme could continue to produce so many housing units well after a housing surplus 
had been identified, and at a time when vacancy rates were at all-time highs.  
 In this section, I conduct a sectoral analysis, examining the various intersecting spheres 
of Sweden’s housing supply nexus. I avoid the use of the term supply chain here as this implies a 
linear developmental logic with fixed processes and preferences, whereas, in reality, the social 
and material inputs and relations required to plan, produce and finance housing are both fluid and 
dynamic. While I explored the evolution in households’ tenure and locational preferences in the 
previous section, this section looks at the changing power relations and dynamics vis-à-vis local 
government, national government, and construction capital. 
 
Municipal War? 
 
 One answer to the above problem of over-supply could lie at the municipal level. In order 
to appreciate how, a brief explanatory digression is required. Swedish municipalities have an 
extraordinary degree of autonomy and tax raising powers, both in absolute and relative terms. 
Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, local government taxation as a share of overall taxation 
was on average just under 30 per cent (OECD, 2017b)116, and today, Sweden has a municipal tax 
share of over 36 per cent, compared to a European Union average of 10 per cent117. There are 
historical reasons for this118 and, as I explored in Chapter II, city regions and municipalities had 
been keenly vying for more autonomy (particularly regarding control and discretion over 
                                               
 
116 This local taxation equated to roughly 12 per cent of GDP (on average) throughout the decade  
(Gustafsson, 1983, p. 55). 
117 This compares to a municipal tax share of roughly 10 per cent in the United Kingdom during the same period, less 
than 5 per cent in Belgium and Spain, and less than 2 per cent in the Netherlands and Italy (OECD, 2017). 
118 Agne Gustafsson (1983, p. 52) points out that the tradition of local autonomy in Sweden dates back at least to the 
Middle Ages, and possibly even earlier. 
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planning, infrastructure and housing) as early as the 1860s119, when the urban population in 
Sweden was growing more rapidly than anywhere else in western Europe.  
 A central pillar of Swedish municipalities’ autonomy is the ability to generate tax revenue 
from residents’ incomes. In 1981, 42 per cent of all municipal revenues were generated through 
income tax (Gustafsson, 1983, p. 109) but, whilst there may be numerous merits to such a local-
orientated system of taxation, it does mean that Swedish municipalities are more reliant upon 
income tax receipts from residents within their administrative boundaries than almost anywhere 
else in Europe. And here we come to the crux of the matter. In rich areas of growth, with low 
unemployment and high wages, such as the Greater Stockholm region120, municipalities have the 
potential to generate high tax revenues, but there is, of course, a flipside to this. In areas where 
unemployment is higher than the national average, and/or where the population is declining, 
municipalities face budgetary imperatives. In a system where municipalities are so reliant on 
income tax to generate revenue, then, the incentive structure is clear. The more jobs that are 
created, the more tax revenue that is available to pay for services, amenities and personnel costs. 
The latter costs were not insubstantial in a country where 25 per cent of the population were 
employed by local government. Indeed, direct personnel costs made up roughly 60 per cent of 
municipal and county council running costs in 1981 (Gustafsson, 1983, p. 105).  
 Ronny Svensson notes that, ‘…in the case of places to work, all authorities in principle 
are at war with each other, trying to obtain as many job opportunities as possible’ (Svensson, 
1975, p. 66 emphasis added). The notion of municipalities being at war with each other may seem 
overstated, but the level of intra-regional competition was clearly felt in Malmö where, in the 
mid-1970s, the municipality there became the first in Sweden to appoint an economic advisor to 
promote a municipal growth strategy (Billing, Olsson and Stigendal, 1992, p. 298). Indeed, from 
the commencement of the Million Homes Programme, and even more so throughout much of the 
1970s and 1980s, commercial urban development and the building of new homes was increasingly 
viewed as a means of encouraging inward investment, jobs and growth by municipal authorities. 
This was especially the case in areas and regions whose industrial base had been exposed as 
obsolete by stiffening international competition emanating from Germany and Japan (ibid.). 
 The longstanding principle of local autonomy vis-à-vis municipal planning and land use, 
enshrined in the Town Planning Act of 1947, meant that it was principally for municipalities to 
decide how land was to be used and developed within their administrative boundaries (see Chapter 
III). While their five-year plans had to be approved by the National Housing Board who could, in 
theory, supersede planning decisions, in practice this seldom happened (Svensson, 1975, p. 53). 
                                               
 
119 The principle of municipal autonomy was first formalised by a Local Government Act of 1862  
(Andersson, Carlson and Larsson, 2012, p. 9). 
120 Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Stockholm consistently accounted for around one-fifth of all employment in 
Sweden (Fournier and Axelsson, 1993, p. 292). 
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Given practically free rein, then, and operating under the assumption that any investment in 
housing and infrastructure would be good investment in housing and infrastructure, municipalities 
used their planning powers to drive residential and commercial real estate development.  
 While the view that urban development could be used as an instrument to spur regional 
growth might have appeared logically sound, prima facie, such an approach to revenue generation 
failed to pay the expected dividends in the over one third of Swedish counties which experienced 
declines in their populations throughout the 1970s and 1980s. However, as housing construction 
was so heavily subsidised by the state during this period (see Chapter III), the short- to medium-
term financial outlays and risks, particularly for Municipal Housing Companies, were borne 
principally by the central administrative apparatuses of the state, and not the municipalities. 
 
Housing subsidies & perverse incentives  
 
 This leads us to the question of how it was that risk was distributed in such a way. I 
outlined the anatomy of the subsidy system in the previous chapter and briefly again in section 
4.2, and there is no need to rehearse this again fully here. Suffice to say that the entire impetus 
behind the subsidy and state loan system (which, in essence, allowed municipal housing 
companies and cooperatives to meet the entirety of their initial capital outlay (30 per cent LTV) 
at a heavily subsidised rate) was to promote non-speculative housing construction in a time of 
housing shortages, and to improve housing standards at a time when Swedish housing conditions 
were among the worst in western Europe (see Chapters II & III). This programme came at great 
expense121 but, without doubt, succeeded on its own terms122.  
 By the late-1970s, the national housing situation that the subsidy system had been 
designed to ameliorate had changed almost beyond recognition, and many scholars (chiefly 
economists) have pointed to the nature of the subsidy system in stimulating the oversupply of 
housing, especially outside major urban centres throughout the 1970s and 1980s (Jaffee, 1994; 
Warsame, Wilhelmsson and Borg, 2010). In a system with general building subsidies provided 
centrally, it was the state, as noted above, that bore a significant proportion of the financial risk. 
This system of socialising risk, there is little doubt, provided perverse incentives for both 
municipalities and construction companies, applying, as it did, wholesale throughout Sweden and 
irrespective of housing demand and need.  
 This arrangement constituted a tacit quid pro quo between developers, cooperatives, 
municipalities and the state, which had underpinned the subsidy system since the Second World 
                                               
 
121 The state’s share in the provision of housing finance nationally reached over 20 per cent in the late 1950s and early-
1960s (SOU, 1968). 
122 As noted in the previous chapter, whilst not a belligerent nation, Sweden’s housing conditions were amongst the 
worse in Western Europe in 1945. As Sune Jussil (1975, p. 178) notes: ‘…the proportion of all flats that have central 
heating has risen from 46% in 1945 to 91% in 1970’. 
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War. In return for a degree of control over what was built and where, (as well as general standards) 
housing providers, whether municipalities, cooperatives or private developers, would be provided 
with stable access to loans at heavily subsidised rates, as well as developable land and a 
guaranteed market (Newman and Thornley, 2002, p. 209). As the majority of housing projects 
(>90%) were carried out by private contractors (irrespective of whether they initiated these 
projects or not) this acted essentially as a profit guarantee (Grundström and Molina, 2016) for 
private construction firms and other actors within the housing supply nexus.  
 Until the early-1990s (see Chapter V), developers were able to receive subsidies 
regardless of whether they were building in areas of high demand. Suffice to say that, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, municipalities and developers used these subsidies to their advantage, 
demonstrably choosing to build in areas where land and overheads were cheaper (i.e. usually not 
in inner city areas), and where profits were buffered to a large extent by the structure of state 
subsidies and the willingness of municipalities, (particularly those in more peripheral areas with 
a declining industrial base) to promote economic growth and employment. Warsame et al. note: 
 
[I]t is quite apparent that subsidized interest rate [was] more important in regions where 
demand [was] weak, such as in population contracting regions, than in growing regions. The 
production cost sensitivity [was] higher in growing regions than in contracting (Warsame, 
Wilhelmsson and Borg, 2010, p. 242) 
 
This assessment supports my quantitative findings, above. Both municipalities and private 
construction firms seemed willing to bend the subsidy system to their mutual advantages, in an 
era of inflation and burgeoning building costs. As I show in Chapter V, when the subsidy system 
was phased out from the early-1990s onwards, private construction firms clambered to initiate 
projects with absolutely no intention of seeing them through to completion in order to receive a 
tranche of the subsidised state loans (Dagens Nyheter, 2015a). This proved, if there was ever any 
doubt, that construction firms had much to gain from these loans and that the system, to all intents 
and purposes, was no longer able to serve its intended purpose. 
 One should be cautious before decrying the nature of subsidy systems per se on the basis 
of a single case study. The role of subsidies and municipalities undoubtedly helped to eradicate 
the housing shortages of yesteryear in Sweden, and Swedes today enjoy some of the highest 
housing standards in the world. Further, even in a housing system without comprehensive 
subsidies, overbuilding in areas where demand is weak is not uncommon, as the cases of Spain 
and Ireland in the 2000s attest. The fact remains, however, that during much of the 1970s and 
1980s, the urban development decisions of certain municipal authorities were poor (Jaffee, 1994, 
pp. 10–11; Baeten and Listerborn, 2015, p. 251), and the decisions of some to promote 
commercial and residential property at all costs, and in the face of depopulation, was based more 
on blind faith in a new model or urban regeneration than on any realistic assessment of need or 
demand. This model, then, was not sustainable, and by the late-1970s, several Municipal Housing 
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Companies in areas of population decline were facing heavy losses, as the numbers of vacant 
dwellings soared123. 
 In part due to the oversupply of housing in central and northern regions, Sweden, by the 
early 1980s, had the lowest ratio of persons per dwelling in Europe124. Sweden also had the highest 
state spending on housing by the midpoint of the decade, with spending at around 10 per cent of 
overall government expenditure. Whether this was a price worth paying is a normative issue, and 
one I look into more closely in the following chapter. For now, though, the primary concern is to 
explain the overcapacity generated in the aftermath of the Million Homes Programme and, in 
order to do so, we must consider the issue (or problem) of concentration in the building industry.  
 
The ascendency of construction capital 
 
 By the late-1970s and throughout the 1980s, the relationship between municipalities and 
developers was undergoing profound change. Municipalities in Sweden were not immune from 
the macroeconomic difficulties facing Sweden throughout this period and, increasingly, many 
were facing financial difficulties. Declining tax revenues (particularly in regions of population 
decline) and a cap on state aid grants created a pincer movement on fiscal flexibility and 
municipalities were, by the late-1970s and early-1980s, facing a level of financial stringency 
(Wise and Amnå, 1993, p. 343) not witnessed for several decades. Indeed, driven by the Swedish 
Federation of Local Authorities’ (Sveriges Kommuner och Landsting, SKL) desire to balance 
municipal budgets, Sweden was one of the first countries to adopt accrual accounting and 
consolidating accounting techniques at the level of municipal administration (Grossi and 
Tagesson, 2008, p. 339) in order to promote productivity gains and efficiency. These New Public 
Management measures were enacted to instil budgetary discipline on local authorities and would 
help to reshape the way municipalities made planning decisions. 
 The level of fiscal restraint and the adoption of new accounting practices which acted as 
fiscal straightjackets had implications for the way municipalities approached building projects. 
Municipal land banks had been much depleted throughout the Record Years (Barlow and King, 
1991; Davidson, 1994, p. 151) and, increasingly, it was not simply the case that private developers 
and construction companies were awarded contracts by local authorities to build on municipal-
owned land in line with local authorities’ five-year plans. Indeed, following the completion of the 
Million Homes Programme, developers and construction firms had developed sizable land banks 
which, as Dickens et al. note, would threaten the whole strategy of providing masses of cheap 
housing (Dickens et al., 1985, p. 56). Construction firms, by the late-1970s and early-1980s, were 
                                               
 
123 See Baeten & Listerborn (2015) for a case study overview of housing policies in the ‘ordinary city’ of Landskrona, 
from the deindustrialisation of the 1970s to the present day. 
124 Measured aggregately by the average number of persons per occupied dwelling. 
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no longer simply acting as building contractors as they had previously (Barlow and King, 1991, 
p. 13). Instead, they were having a greater say in what was being built (which increasingly 
included a far greater degree of commercial buildings) and, importantly, where.  
 It is important to note that this was all in spite of the fact that there had been no de facto 
major change in planning law or policy. James Barlow and Adrian King describe this as a move 
towards 'semispeculative' operations, arguing that firms were now ‘initiating large schemes, often 
on their own land, for the profitable commercial sector but with a social housing component as 
'bait' for the communes’ (Barlow and King, 1992, p. 392). Ignoring the somewhat semantically 
problematic use of the term semispeculative for now, in a related paper Barlow and King highlight 
the process and means by which this baiting was achieved: 
 
The firm approaches the commune, which negotiates the size of the housing component. This 
form of development must be seen partly as the result of oligopolistic pressure from large 
builders but also the increasing financial pressures on local authorities to maintain their 
housing programmes in the face of tightened finances and declining land banks (Barlow and 
King, 1991, p. 13 emphasis added). 
  
What was changing was the balance of power between major construction firms and the 
municipalities. Duncan and Barlow note that, ‘[l]arge private sector construction firms are 
becoming more economically dominant and, in that they can overshadow local and regional state 
authorities, are becoming more important in setting the housing agenda’ (Duncan and Barlow, 
1991, p. 216 emphasis added). This was a fundamental shift in dynamics and would have enduring 
implications for the very nature of Swedish housing system development henceforth. 
 What these developments illustrate is that practices at the level of planning, development 
and procurement can change without a change in policy per se. Construction firms were now 
gaining more control over the types of projects municipalities engaged with and financed, and 
they were also providing more of their own capital to realise these projects Indeed, as Newman 
and Thornley (2002, p. 213) note, ‘…the negotiations over commercial development in the 1980s 
occurred in the context of the weak financial position of municipalities’. Thomas Hall outlines 
out the new modus operandi: 
 
A consortium, consisting of building contractors and insurance companies, negotiates with 
the municipality. The consortium provides something which the municipality wants, while 
the municipality exploits its planning monopoly in granting generous building permits, and 
the insurance company takes care of the financing (Hall, 2003a, p. 272). 
 
Whereas, previously, construction firms had relied on municipalities to initiate and award 
contracts - predominantly on municipally owned land - construction firms, from the late-1970s 
onwards, were now increasingly able to attract new sources of finance – from insurance 
companies, finance companies and banks - and this was changing the rules of the game vis-à-vis 
the residential housing provision. Another game changer throughout this period was the cost of 
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building housing which, from the mid-1970s onwards, began to soar, as evidenced in Figures 4.8 
and 4.9. This created a pincer movement, with rising costs compounded by falling productivity 
and, goes some way to accounting for rising rents throughout this period.  
 
Figure 4.8. Building Price Index (BPI) for dwellings under construction, including VAT, by type 
of building, (1968=100) 
 
 
Source: SCB  
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Figure 4.9. Construction costs and inflation 1968-1994, annual change (%) 
 
 
Source: SCB  
 
 
 The Swedish construction industry, customarily one of the most concentrated in the 
developed world, was becoming even more so throughout the 1970s and 1980s, and this process 
of concentration was intensified by ballooning construction costs. One might suppose that high 
levels of sectoral concentration (through mergers and acquisitions and vertical integration), low 
productivity and spiralling prices would be cause for government concern, but that would be to 
assume that the state’s role in Sweden’s political economy was one of neutral arbitration of 
‘market forces’. Such a view would be misguided; for it was, in part, government intervention 
which had helped to create this system.  
 The process of industrial concentration was very much a function of the Swedish model, 
and central to the creation of a housing industrial complex. The LO economists, Gösta Rehn and 
Rudolf Meidner had, decades earlier, as Belfrage notes, ‘…argued for a strictly solidaristic wage 
policy through central wage-bargaining in combination with taxes on corporate profits in order to 
mitigate wage drift’ (Belfrage, 2011, p. 115). The idea behind this was that wages should remain 
as uniform as possible across industries and sectors (construction being no exception here). This 
was an arrangement which had initially been negotiated by LO and the Employers Association, 
dating back to the Saltsjöbaden agreement in 1938, but was further developed by Rehn and 
Meidner and adopted as an official stance by LO in 1951, and the Social Democrats in 1955 
(Ryner, 2002, p. 86). In terms of industrial composition, however, what this meant in practice was 
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that weaker actors were squeezed out; a central component to the design of the so-called Rehn-
Meidner model.  
 The Swedish model of housing construction had been characterised by high capital-to-
labour ratios to minimise production costs (Dickens et al., 1985), which also systematically 
disadvantaged smaller firms. With increasing sectoral concentration, spiralling building costs, and 
new financial channels undermining the tacit quid pro quo between developers and the state, this 
model (which the state had helped to orchestrate with its subsidy system), was under severe strain 
by the 1980s. Skanska, (Europe’s sixth largest construction company during much of the 1980s - 
now the fourth) built around one third of total output in Sweden during this decade, and this level 
of concentration would only increase in the construction sector, with mergers and acquisitions, 
vertical integration (OECD, 1992), and burgeoning residential and commercial property 
portfolios. The housing supply nexus, throughout the late-1970s and 1980s, was being dominated 
by an ever-decreasing pool of highly profitable and highly powerful actors, and this was having 
ramifications for residential housing.  
 Barlow and King (1992, p. 390) and Duncan and Barlow (1991, p. 213) have referred to 
the level of concentration within the Swedish construction industry during the 1980s as 
oligopolistic in nature, but it would be imprudent to think that this was solely the product of 
capital-labour relations. It bears noting here that sectoral concentration was also fostered at the 
municipal level. Indeed, there exists a very strong tradition in Sweden of municipal leaders 
becoming board members of housing companies and/or important local industries (Newman and 
Thornley, 2002, p. 241). In the case of Malmö, there were multiple scandals throughout the 1980s 
in relation to vast building projects (Billing & Stigendal 1994; Newman & Thornley 2002, p. 240) 
whose public value could be said to be highly doubtful. These projects were agreed by municipal 
leaders, many of whom also happened to sit on the boards of the construction firms who were 
awarded the contracts (Billing et al, 1994).  
 It was becoming clear that the oligopolistic nature of the construction industry, and its 
close relationship to the municipalities, was cause for concern. During the 1970s and 1980s, 
Sweden’s Competition Commission (Konkurrensverket) carried out over 50 investigations into 
price fixing (Konkurrensverket, 2004, p. 29). These investigations led to little in the way of 
meaningful change, however, as from 1993 onwards, the construction industry is reported to have 
had the highest number of revealed or suspected cartels of any industry or sector in Sweden (ibid. 
p. 40). Indeed, in 1991, an official government report noted that ‘open tendering collusion has 
increased in the construction industry’ (SOU 1991, p. 219). This, of course, implicates 
municipalities too. A report from the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention notes of 
this relationship that:  
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The construction and civil engineering industry is governed by political decisions and 
requires good contacts with the public sector. Such contacts may be necessary for 
entrepreneurs and contractors who want to carry out projects, grow and be successful. The 
public sector accounts for a large part of the construction and civil engineering investments 
and are therefore major clients with the private construction companies. In view of the 
problems existing in the construction industry, with all kinds of economic crime, not least 
corruption, there is much more to do by way of clean-up, both on the part of the government 
authorities and the industry (Brå, 2013, p. 73 emphasis added) 
 
Throughout the 1990s, the construction industry in Sweden became the focus of multiple cartel 
investigations by the Competition Commission (OECD, 2007), with the charge that the industry 
had been systematically rigging bids submitted in public procurements and sharing the market 
geographically between them for decades (Male, 2009, p. 178). It is difficult to assess precisely 
the degree to which these behaviours impacted on public procurement or building costs. However, 
with this industry accounting for the most revealed and suspected cases of cartels in Sweden, and 
with price fixing the most common misdemeanour (Konkurrensverket, 2004, pp. 30–40), it is 
difficult to imagine that the concentration in Swedish construction industry, in combination with 
its close relationships to the municipalities, would have had benign effects. 
 Concentration in the construction industry was one means by which construction 
companies and developers were able to augment their power and agency vis-à-vis the 
municipalities and, from the mid-1980s onwards, the level of concentration within the 
construction industry would intensify. With the oversupply of residential housing generated 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s - driven largely by a combination of untargeted state subsidies 
and municipalities’ planning monopoly - commercial property became the most lucrative form of 
investment for construction firms, and these firms were able to promote this type of development 
as never before, as I explore in the following chapter.  
 This section has explored how municipalities and construction firms were adjusting to 
the post-Million Homes Programme era, and how confluent factors on the housing supply-side 
steadily eroded of the quid pro quo which had sustained the housing industrial complex hitherto. 
I identified four main dimensions to this. First, municipalities during the 1970s and 1980s saw 
investments in commercial and residential property as a means of promoting regional growth and 
increasing the tax base. This mantra, however demonstrably ill-founded in retrospect, was only 
effective in growth regions, but this did not deter municipalities with declining populations from 
commissioning projects which were demonstrably ill founded in retrospect. Second, the structure 
of state housing loans and subsidies provided significant and compelling incentives for 
municipalities to draw on their remaining land banks in order to promote commercial and 
residential development, irrespective of demand.  
 Third, although, local authorities still retained their planning monopolies, their fiscal 
positions had weakened throughout the 1970s, and their land resources were much depleted. 
Negotiations concerning the provision of commercial property development (and the residential 
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housing mix therein) thus occurred in the context of the weakened financial position of 
municipalities. With dwindling finances and land banks, and new technologies to enforce 
budgetary discipline, the municipalities increasingly looked to construction consortia to finance 
urban development and the construction industry found itself increasingly able to set the planning 
and development agenda; including the scope and extent of residential housing construction. 
Finally, the level of concentration within the Swedish construction industry fuelled anti-
competitive behaviours which, in combination with the ‘revolving door’ between construction 
firms and municipalities, led to a lack of openness on the part of the municipalities (Bejrum et 
al., 1995, cited in Newman and Thornley, 2002, p. 213), and the delivery of building projects 
(both residential and commercial) whose public values could be considered doubtful. The era of 
mass housing programmes had come to an end and it was those who had gained the most from 
the housing industrial complex who sounded its death knell. The new era would look quite 
different.  
 
4.4. Concluding comments 
 
 
All Socialists must hate inflation 
Gösta Rehn, 1957 
 
  
The purpose of this chapter has been to interrogate a simple question: once a state, and almost an 
entire financial system - as well as a domestically-oriented industrial supply system - has been 
geared towards the mass production of housing and housing-related infrastructure - with all the 
ancillary social, political, economic nexuses which have been mobilised to realise such as system 
- what happens when said system reaches saturation point?  
 When one considers the discursive use of terms such as ‘balance’ by various institutions 
(state and non-state) to describe the Swedish housing system of the late-1960s, and early-1970s, 
the contrast with the situation we encounter by the early-1980s, is quite striking. Towards the end 
of the period under investigation, the difference between private and cooperative ownership had 
largely been erased (Strömberg, 1992b, p. 263; Boleat, 1985); rents were pulling away from 
consumer prices apace (more than doubling between the late-1970s and mid-1980s); house-prices 
were increasing unpretendingly (Edvinsson, Jacobson and Waldenström, 2014, p. 45); the subsidy 
system, which had been designed to promote tenure neutrality was subsidising owner-occupiers 
to ever-greater extents; housing supply was totally out of step with demand; speculative tycoons 
were buying up swathes of inner-city rental stock; and segregation and overcrowding were 
increasing. If a ‘healthy’ housing market is one that is stable, affordable, and inclusive, as Robert 
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Shiller contends (cited in Foroohar, 2016, p. 213), then by the 1980s, Sweden’s housing system 
was beginning to show signs of disease.  
 In this chapter, I attempted to illustrate, in relation to demand-side dynamics, that the 
preferences and behaviours of middle- and high-income households (who were, by the 1980s, 
adopting a forward-looking perspective to house purchases), assisted in rendering the pre-existing 
system of credit controls and subsidies unmanageable. Private firms and households were utilising 
rising asset values in this era of high inflation as collateral for further leveraged investment 
(Jonung, Kiander and Vartia, 2009, p. 18) to an extent that had not been witnessed since the 1930s, 
and this was impacting on the state’s ability to control the flow and direction of credit to housing. 
Meanwhile, on the supply-side, construction firms and developers were utilising their growing 
capital reserves and burgeoning land banks in order to exert ever-greater influence over local 
planning decisions. Central components to this growing influence were the increasing 
concentration and anti-competitive behaviours evident in this sector and rising building costs. 
New financial channels empowering construction capital and middle- and high-income 
households assisted in generating insuperable tensions and contradictions in the subsidy system 
which had hitherto developed throughout the post-War decades; and this, in turn, undermined the 
capacity of the state to buffer the pre-existing system of financial controls, which had been so 
central to the creation of the housing industrial complex.  
 That the above developments are not more commonly recognised in Swedish housing 
scholarship is intriguing. Indeed, housing scholars, so often, fail to make a distinction between 
policy and practice and, by focusing purely on policy, have a tendency to obscure core sectoral 
dimensions and interactions, ignoring the fact that policies do not have the same effects ad 
infinitum. This chapter has attempted to show that rapidly expanding housing supply to meet 
increases in demand (whether real or perceived) is not without consequence. As Michael Ball 
notes (Ball, 2003, p. 901), when a house building boom is over, all those resources have to be 
redirected elsewhere, which generates substantial re-adjustment costs. The quantifiable ‘costs’ 
during the 1970s and 1980s have been relatively easy to assess: the bulk of the state’s financial 
support to the housing system, by the 1980s, was being heavily directed to the demand-side 
(homeowners) in the form of mortgage tax relief; and multi-dwelling units were built in areas 
where there was no commensurate level of demand. However, understanding the process of re-
adjustment following the Million Homes Programme, required us to look a little deeper than the 
immediate consequences of temporary oversupply and fiscal overshoot.  
  It was predominantly the private construction sector that delivered the Million Homes 
Programme125, with the state providing subsidised loan tranches, and actively promoting 
                                               
 
125 One, Skanska, provided about 10 per cent of the entire programme (Skanska, 2017). 
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rationalisation in the building supply chain. The construction companies which benefitted 
principally from state support (Skanska, Peab, NCC), profited massively; as did those within 
housing-related supply-chains and industries, such as Ingvar Kamprad’s IKEA126. Thus, far from 
being the outgrowth of an ideologically virtuous social democratic programme, the system of 
housing production and finance which developed during the mid-twentieth century in Sweden 
was, in fact, built on the logic of private capital and profit (Grundström and Molina, 2016, p. 
321). What was produced was a highly concentrated and monopolistic system (Billing and 
Stigendal, 1994) which had been sponsored by the (predominantly) social democratic state, and 
which some scholars have described as oligopolistic (Barlow and King, 1991). As I argued, this 
construction oligopoly was no accident. More, its creation was a central component of the supply 
side of Swedish housing throughout the Golden Years, which the state was instrumental in 
fostering through targeted subsidies, and a system of wage bargaining - which developed broadly 
independently of the state - which favoured only the largest construction firms.  
 The period under investigation here was one of profound housing system flux, in which 
substantive qualitative and quantitative changes on both the demand- and supply-side altered 
Sweden’s housing and finance systems irrevocably. This was an era in which the mounting 
socioeconomic contradictions generated by Sweden’s housing industrial complex, led to the 
embryonic emergence of a palpably different system of housing production, distribution, and 
consumption. The housing industrial complex was not succeeded by a new system overnight, and 
the re-adjustment costs in the wake of the Million Homes Programme would take some time to 
filter through. To paraphrase Antonio Gramsci, the old was dying, but the new had not yet been 
born. However, as I explore in the following chapter, this period of interregnum, would evolve 
quickly. When the housing system changes explored in this chapter coalesced with changes in the 
constitution of finance during the 1980s, the results would be explosive.  
 The actors and institutions involved in the creation of the housing industrial complex of 
the mid-twentieth century would also be the authors of its demise, and these very same actors 
would hasten the emergence of another system: what I term the housing finance complex. As I 
explore now, changes in the constitution of housing finance during the 1980s and beyond would 
fuse onto the new demand- and supply-side dynamics explored in this chapter; and financial 
practices and modes of speculation which had been (somewhat) constrained and legislated against 
hitherto, would gradually been institutionalised. It would be the embrace of speculative practices 
by the state which would, ultimately, concretise Sweden’s housing finance complex and, as we 
shall see, from the 1980s onwards, the state would not be merely a neutral arbiter of speculative 
dynamics within the Swedish housing system, but rather an enabler. The piecemeal behavioural 
                                               
 
126 As Rudolf Meidner notes, ‘IKEA had its domestic basis in furnishing the million apartments’ (Meidner, 1994, p. 
226). 
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and institutional developments and logics leading to the creation of the housing finance complex, 
would be the preludes to something far more dramatic. By the mid-1980s, Sweden was in the 
midst of an economic boom. The stock market rose by over 1000 per cent throughout the decade; 
and construction companies, finance companies and financial institutions experienced rises in 
their equity prices not witnessed since the heyday of Ivar Kreuger. Unlike the boom of the 1920s 
in Sweden, commercial and residential property transactions would become the central objects of 
speculation. However, like Kreuger’s day, the boom would not end well. Neither before nor since 
has Sweden experienced a financial crisis of such magnitude; and housing, housing finance, and 
construction capital would be at the epicentre of this economic dislocation, as I now explore. 
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Chapter V. Financialisation and housing systems: the case of 
Sweden 
 
Until recently, when people asked me what kind of a society I wanted to see, I had a stock 
answer: "Sweden in the summer of 1980." Why Sweden? Because I am a soggy liberal, and 
Sweden has traditionally been the exemplar of what used to be called the "middle way," a 
market economy with the rough edges smoothed by generous government programs. Why 
summer? Because Stockholm, arguably the world's most beautiful city on a sunny day in June, 
has precious little daylight in winter. And why 1980? Because by the early '90s the Swedish 
model was falling apart. The one-time model society had contracted Euro-sclerosis, with 
sagging growth and an unemployment rate of more than 8%. And the Swedish welfare state 
seemed to be going broke: In 1993 the budget deficit reached an absurd 12% of GDP. 
Paul Krugman (1999)  
5.0. Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, I investigated some of the institutional modalities of Sweden’s housing 
complex during the 1970s and 1980s, and how the tensions and contradictions generated following 
the winding down of the state’s mass housing programmes of the previous decades exposed not 
just the fragility of the Swedish housing system, but the Swedish model of political economy 
itself. It sought to understand how the linkages and power dynamics between state, local 
authorities, and construction capital were altered inexorably during this tumultuous period of 
economic uncertainty, declining profitability, rampant inflation and spiralling government 
deficits; and, crucially, to assess how Swedish households responded to this new and uncertain 
economic milieu. 
 This final chapter focuses on what many scholars view as the neoliberal turn in Sweden, 
and the role of housing therein. Swedish housing scholars maintain that it was during the 1990s 
that Sweden’s housing system transitioned from one which was regulated and subsidised, to one 
which was deregulated and market-based (Andersson and Magnusson Turner, 2014, p. 4). 
However, while much contemporary Swedish housing scholarship interprets this as a distinctly 
post-1980s phenomenon127 (Turner and Whitehead, 2002; Clark and Johnson, 2009; Hedin et al., 
2012)128, championed by the Conservative-led coalition government in the early 1990s, this 
chapter challenges such accounts. I argue here that the contemporary scholarly focus on the early-
1990s as the source of an ostensive ideological or paradigmatic shift, obscures key processes and 
transformations that occurred within the Swedish housing and finance systems during the 1970s 
and 1980s on both the demand- and supply-side.  
                                               
 
127 Of course, there are exceptions to this, notably Christophers (2013) and Grundström & Molina (2016). 
128 In an influential article on the neoliberalisation of housing in Sweden by Karin Hedin et al., (2012), the 1980s are 
omitted from their tabular schematisation of key housing transformations (see: Table 1 in the Appendix). This omission 
is a tacit illustration of one of my central arguments here in this chapter: that, curiously, the 1980s have received little 
analytical attention in Swedish housing scholarship. 
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 In this chapter, I make the case that the perceived neoliberal shift in the early-1990s, 
which many of the aforementioned scholars attribute to the election of Carl Bildt´s bourgeois 
government in 1991, was more akin to what Rudolf Meidner (1993, p. 220) has referred to as a 
formal confirmation of an ongoing process rather than its cause. Indeed, the regulatory changes 
in capital and currency markets administered by the Social Democrats during the 1980s delivered 
a fatal blow to the social democratic systems of regulation (Ryner, 2002, p. 161); and this, in 
conjunction with the attendant insurgence of power, influence and concentration of the 
construction and finance sectors, would have profound impacts on housing and the built 
environment. 
 I argue that these transformations were not simply a capitulation to technocratic, 
neoliberal market dogma on behalf of certain factions within SAP; although there is a degree of 
truth to this assessment. More, they were the result of insuperable tensions and contradictions 
endogenous to a model of housing and political economy that had been crucial to the production 
of a housing industrial complex over the course of the previous decades. The regulatory 
apparatuses required to mobilise the phenomenal social, material and financial resources needed 
to create and sustain such a complex had, in essence, become nominally redundant and, by the 
1980s, the state authorities found that they no longer had the capacity to control the flow, volume 
and direction of credit that they had had hitherto. Whilst nothing was inevitable about the courses 
of action and programmes pursued in response to this predicament, the interaction between 
systematic regulatory arbitrage and the politico-institutional responses to said arbitrage would 
lead inexorably to the worst financial and economic crisis in Sweden since the 1930s. The 
economic boom foreshadowing this crisis would fundamentally transform the way households, 
finance, and construction capital, relate to housing; and the legacies of these transformations 
would prove enduring. 
 This chapter continues the story of how, within the space of less than three decades, 
Sweden went from housing abundance to housing shortage and crisis; transitioning from a 
position of building more homes per capita than any other Western country during the 1960s and 
1970s, to building the least in the new millennium. It seeks to explain also how and why 
households in one of the world’s most egalitarian societies came to rank among the most indebted 
in the world; and, crucially, to understand how a housing system ostensibly grounded on the belief 
of housing as a social right, and once feted for its efficiency, could become one of the most 
dysfunctional (Christophers, 2013), segregative (Orange, 2017) and expensive129 in the OECD 
(2017a). Significantly, this analysis is anchored in an exploration of the development, dénouement 
and aftermath of the Swedish Banking Crisis, and is driven by a central question: How could a 
                                               
 
129 As measured by the price-to-income ratio. 
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housing system predicated upon debt-fuelled consumption, speculation in commercial and 
residential property and growing wealth inequality, and which had shown itself to be so inherently 
unstable, survive and thrive following a crisis of its own making? 
 Understanding why speculative financial practices emanating from the ‘shadow banking’ 
sector were later operationalised within regulated banking circuits and how practices such as 
cooperative conversions of rental housing units, which were politically reproached prior to the 
crisis, were then championed by the state thereafter, will be a core concern of this chapter. I argue 
here that these operationalisations represent merely the institutional crystallisation of the modus 
operandi of speculators, which had flourished throughout the previous decade in the lead up to 
the banking crisis.  
 Whereas the previous chapter sought to investigate the sectoral interests and socio-
economic determinants influencing the demise of the housing industrial complex, and the 
embryonic emergence of what I have termed the housing finance complex, the present chapter 
seeks to understand how this precarious housing finance complex - which precipitated the most 
profound and protracted economic dislocation in Sweden since the Great Depression - could be 
promoted, embedded and sustained beyond the banking collapse of the early-1990s.  
 Having adopted a strategy of periodisation in order to guide the structure of the thesis 
hitherto, the periodic distinction between the present chapter and Chapter IV is somewhat more 
indeterminate. The reason for this is that this chapter gives significant analytical weight to the 
Banking Crisis that was forged during the 1980s and erupted in the early 1990s, but whose legacy 
is still palpably felt in the Swedish housing and finance systems today. Due to the significance of 
this crisis, the phases of development warrant special attention. The central concerns of this final 
chapter, then, are divided into three sections organised around the temporal dynamics of the 
banking crisis of the early 1990s: the boom of the mid-1980s, the bust of the early-1990s, and the 
‘recovery’. First, I explore the lead up to the Swedish banking and economic crisis, where 
particular focus is given to the growth and role of finance companies and the regulatory 
frameworks governing bank lending activity, taxation and housing policy during the mid-1980s 
and early 1990s. Second, the dénouement of the boom: the bust. And, third, the road to ‘recovery’ 
and the legacies of the crisis; how it was negotiated from a socio-economic and regulatory 
perspective in the immediate aftermath, and importantly, how enduring institutional and sectoral 
permutations developed as a result. This is then followed by a discussion section in which I 
explore the macroeconomic implications of Sweden’s housing finance complex, and a conclusion. 
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5.1. Regulatory arbitrage, deregulation and the boom 
 
The post-War period in Sweden leading up to the 1980s has frequently been referred to as, The 
Golden Age (Schön, 2008); the ‘care free’ years (Andersen, 2011, p. 225) of unbridled prosperity, 
equality and economic growth, in which Sweden’s Keynesian welfare state housing model 
(Grundström and Molina, 2016) was recognised as one of the most effective in the world (Dickens 
et al., 1985). As the previous chapter illustrated, however, Sweden was in no way immune from 
the global economic maelstrom brought about after the collapse of the Bretton Woods System 
and the oil crises of the 1970s. The strategy of controlling the distribution and flow of credit, 
subsidising stricken industries, and aggressively devaluing the kronor throughout the 1970s an 
early-1980s in order to promote productivity and paper over fundamental fissures in Sweden’s 
political economy (Bergh, 2014, pp. 37–39), progressively gave way, throughout the course of 
the mid-to-late-1980s, to an altogether different approach of macroeconomic management; or 
mismanagement as former Social Democrat minister and Riksbank Deputy Governor, Kristina 
Persson, would later claim (Persson, 2002)130.  
 Whether by accident, design, or a combination of both, it is fair to say that the 1980s (as 
elsewhere in the industrialised world) signalled a fundamental realignment of the post-War 
system of political economy and regulation in Sweden. This realignment can best be described at 
the macroeconomic-level as an incremental shift from an economy dependent on export-
orientated industries such as steel, pulp, automotive, and shipbuilding, to one where domestic 
consumption played a much more central role in generating aggregate demand. An insight into 
the dynamics underlying this shift can be observed from a cursory comparison of productivity 
metrics - growth, investment, and foreign trade - with earlier periods studied in this thesis. The 
post-1970s era stands out as one of anaemic and sclerotic productivity and investment, which was 
compounded by high inflation. Even by comparison with two-hundred-year trend-data (1800-
2000), per capita GDP and investment were weak during this period and inflation was 
uncharacteristically high, as evidenced in Table 5.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
 
130 In a discussion addressing fellow Social Democrats in 2002, Persson claimed that the problems generated during 
the 1980s boom years were ‘made worse by the fact that the deregulation and the major tax reform came in the wrong 
order. Real interest rates after tax were actually negative for households for a period and thereby pushed up the demand 
for credit substantially’ (Persson, 2002). 
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Table 5.1. Annual growth rates in per capita production, total investments, foreign trade, 
consumer prices and population in Sweden 
 
Period Per 
capita 
GDP 
Investments Foreign 
trade 
 Consumer 
 prices 
Population 
1870-1910 1.7 3.0 3.3 0.3 0.6 
1910-1950 2.2 4.2 2.0 3.0 0.5 
1950-1975 3.6 5.5 6.5 5.0 0.6 
1975-2000 1.4 2.1 4.3 6.0 0.4 
1800-2000 1.9 3.4 3.8 3.0 0.7 
Sources: Schön (2008); SCB; and author’s calculations 
 
 Declining industrial productivity and languid export growth, in combination with 
stubbornly high inflation, had created a pincer movement on the Swedish economy during the 
1970s and 1980s, which the growth of domestic consumption was only able to offset to some 
extent (Jonung, Kiander and Vartia, 2009, p. 19). Fuelling this rapid swell in consumption was 
the growth of the credit stock and a trend shift in the growth of wage income (Agell and Berg, 
1996, p. 584), which, as Chapter IV discussed, was undermining the very basis of the Rehn-
Meidner Model. This was a very different type of economic growth to that which Sweden had 
been accustomed to hitherto.  
 To appreciate the significance of this shift, we need to look at the practices of state and 
non-state actors and their interactions. At the regulatory level, the exchange and capital controls 
that had been in place since the Second World War (see Chapter III), and which had allowed the 
state to elaborately orchestrate liquidity ratio requirements, lending ceilings and the bonds 
emissions in a way which bolstered Sweden’s housing industrial complex, were rendered 
effectively redundant by financial actors’ and households’ abilities to circumvent them. This was 
a period of institutional lag, in which financial deregulation was playing catch-up; with the state 
attempting to reflect the new realities and culture that systematic regulatory arbitrage had created. 
The interface between these two processes (arbitrage and deregulation) is where the analysis in 
this section lies. This section explores how new behavioural logics, previously considered corrupt, 
or even criminal, only a decade or two earlier would become institutionalised throughout the 
course of the 1980s, ushering in the age the of the housing finance complex. 
 
The boom begins… 
 
 Despite Sweden’s robust economic growth throughout much of the post-War period, the 
Stockholm bourse had essentially been stagnant since the Kreuger Crash precipitated what some 
scholars have termed the financial ice age (Waldenström, 2014, p. 230). This changed 
dramatically from the late-1970s onwards, however, instigating an upward trend which only the 
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banking crisis of the early-1990s, the dotcom bubble of the early 2000s and the Global Financial 
Crisis would interpose. Swathes of Swedish firms, which had hitherto engaged solely in 
manufacturing, now began to engage with financial activities, creating supplier-owned finance 
companies specializing in financing purchases of said supplier’s products (Jennergren, 2001, p. 
4), and yielding an increasing share of their profits through the buying and selling of firms and 
stock market speculation (Ryner, 2002, p. 147). It was the age in which, as Lars Engwall (1994, 
p. 229) notes, ‘the borderlines between banks and other industries were becoming increasingly 
less clear-cut’, and in which banks were, ‘forced to reconsider their role’. Figure 5.1 illustrates 
one outcome of these changing dynamics and their impacts on the stock market turnover rate. 
 
Figure 5.1. Turnover rate at the Stockholm Stock Exchange, 1870-2012 
 
 
 
Note: Turnover rate is defined as the value of the total volume traded divided by market capitalisation (value of listed 
shares)   
Source: Waldenström (2014, p. 225) 
  
 There is an alluringly simple explanation, which is frequently deployed to account for 
these changes: financial deregulation. This process in Sweden, as Jonas Agell and Lennart Berg  
note, ‘…started at a modest pace towards the end of the 1970s, and … was completed in 1989’ 
(Agell and Berg, 1996, pp. 582–583). However, using financial deregulation as an explicans for 
these changes can only tell us half the story. Indeed, as Leo Panitch and Martijn Konings (2009) 
observe, there is more to this process than simply ideologically charged regulators tearing up the 
statute books in an attempt to unleash dynamic market forces: 
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‘Deregulation’ was determined not so much by ideological commitment to neoliberalism as 
by a series of pragmatic decisions, usually driven by the exigencies of the moment, to remove 
legal barriers to financial dynamics that had already gathered decisive momentum within 
the old form of regulation (Panitch and Konings, 2009, pp. 68–69 emphasis added). 
 
The regulatory and financial frameworks and controls, which the Swedish authorities had relied 
upon since the Second World War to control the flow of funds to preferential sectors of the 
economy (such as housing), were becoming increasingly strained during the 1970s and 1980s. As 
we saw in the previous chapter, during 1970s, the government had pursued expansionary fiscal 
policies (Jonung, 1994, p. 368) and currency devaluations in order to promote growth and 
industrial competitiveness. These did not have the desired outcomes. Instead, local government 
budgets were squeezed, inflation was rampant (stoking demand for higher wages) the so-called 
twin deficits (the budget deficit and in the balance of payments deficit) spiralled out of control 
and, what is more, there was a rapid growth of evasion, undermining both the tax system and the 
system of credit controls (Jonung, 1994, p. 368). Quite simply, basic forms of regulatory arbitrage 
were rendering the Swedish system of capital controls obsolete at the level of financial services, 
industrial firms, and households. Swedish economist and Nobel laureate, Gunnar Myrdal (1978), 
even mused whether Sweden had become a population of swindlers (translated in Bergh, 2014, 
p. 38). How should we explain these dynamics? 
 
The growth and role of finance companies 
 
 Besides the unfavourable macroeconomic milieu, with rising costs and new spheres of 
global competition undermining export-oriented Swedish firms, a significant problem facing 
Swedish commerce during this period was the ballooning public debt which had been incurred by 
the state’s attempts to ameliorate lagging productivity and demand during the 1970s. Banks were 
compelled to hold government bonds under the regulatory frameworks constructed after the War 
and, as this debt steadily increased, they were necessitated to increase their government security 
portfolios as part of their liquidity quotas. This, in turn, meant that lending to the private sector 
and households was, to some extent, checked (Gerding, 2014, p. 288; Drees and Pazarbaşioğlu, 
1995). It was at this moment that an assemblage of institutions operating in the so-called grey 
credit market131 (Gerding, 2014) began to gain market share rapidly. These institutions were not 
beholden to the same regulatory frameworks as banks and were not required to hold government 
securities. They would play an important role in the extension of credit in the Swedish economy 
and within a relatively short space of time, assisted in transforming the Swedish financial system; 
and with it housing and the built environment.  
 Finance companies were not a novelty of this period; nor had these institutions been 
                                               
 
131 Henceforth referred to as the shadow-banking system. 
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created with the specific intention of manoeuvring the economic and regulatory uncertainties of 
the 1970s and 1980s. Whilst they had existed in various guises since the 1960s, their rates of 
growth, both in terms of absolute number and credit volumes, were striking during the 1980s. In 
1970 there were around 67 finance companies in operation in Sweden, but by 1988 this number 
totalled nearly 300 (Gerding, 2014, p. 288). These institutions did not carry out uniform tasks and 
can broadly be placed into three categories:  independent, bank-owned, and supplier-owned 
(Jennergren, 2002, p. 4). It is the independent and bank-owned finance companies, and their 
interactions, which concern us here. 
 Finance companies may not have been regulated like the banks and mortgage institutions, 
but that is not to say that they were not subject to regulations. The independent finance companies 
were not permitted to take deposits or issue bonds; unlike banks, which were strictly regulated in 
this regard prior to 1982. In lieu of this, a large proportion of finance companies’ funding was 
attained by a combination of promissory note and unsecured loans and so-called investment 
certificates (marknadbevis). The former accounted for roughly 50 per cent of their funding and 
latter around 30 per cent (Jennergren, 2002, p. 5). These certificates had incredibly short 
maturities of around 90 days or less (ibid.). These companies were engaged in range of activities 
from instalment finance and leasing directed towards different firms, to extending credit and hire 
purchase finance (similar to leasing) to households (Svenska Bankföreningen, 2010).  
 While it is possible to appreciate the absolute lending volumes of these companies (see 
Figure 5.2), the extent of their lending to households and commercial and residential property 
firms is somewhat difficult to establish. This is, in part, due to the nature of the shadow banking 
system, of which they were part, and the lack of associated data in terms of lending breakdown132. 
However, we do know that much of their corporate financing (both directly and indirectly) was 
directed towards the construction and real estate sectors (Jaffee, 1994, p. 90) and that they were 
active in investing in real estate companies more generally (Englund, 2015, p. 16). As the 1980s 
wore on, they were even key investors in real estate loans with so-called low priority claims 
(Englund, 2015, p. 11), which, in contemporary parlance, would be termed subprime lending. 
These institutions provided a new source of finance, outside of the hitherto formal channels, and 
directed large volumes of credit towards developers, real estate companies and the construction 
industry. Indeed, these institutions, and their interactions with banks and equity markets, played 
a central role in augmenting the financial capacity of developers and construction firms, 
facilitating leveraged investment on a scale unprecedented hitherto in the post-War era in Sweden. 
 L. Peter Jennergren notes that, ‘…finance companies became involved in high risk 
lending with … junior claims on collaterals in connection with real estate projects’ (Jennergren, 
                                               
 
132 Even outside of the shadow banking system, as Jaffee (1994, p. 87) argues, ‘Swedish bank statistics do not identify 
real estate loans as a separate lending category’ 
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2002, p. 5) adding, ‘[t]hey also started financing investments in shares’ (ibid.). Whilst their 
investments were multifarious, then, they were core enablers of the increased liquidity throughout 
the 1980s and their role in extending the domestic credit base during this decade was not 
insignificant.  Indeed, by the year-end in 1988, it is estimated that finance companies accounted 
for ten per cent of the total credit stock in Sweden (Drees and Pazarbaşioğlu, 1998, p. 10).  Beyond 
this sizable quantitative measure, though, it is their practices and behaviours, which would have 
the most enduring significance on Swedish finance, developers and households. 
 Despite being in direct competition with the finance companies, the so-called regulated 
banking sector was also their principal source of finance. Investment certificates were issued 
under loan programme agreements and banks would typically guarantee these certificates before 
selling them to institutional investors (ibid.). Banks were thus able to generate income via the 
finance companies and refresh tranches of their balance sheets, creating secondary markets. 
However, as a result of this interaction, banks became exposed to substantial credit risk (Englund, 
1999, p. 85). Banks also created their own finance companies (bank-owned) in order to navigate 
the complexities (and uncertainties) of the regulatory environment. The extent of the growth of 
finance companies’ lending can be seen in Figure 5.2. 
 
Figure 5.2. Lending from Banks, Mortgage Institutions, and Finance Companies 
(% change) 
 
 
Source: Wallander (1994), cited in Englund (1999) 
 
 Thus, in an era of ostensibly stringent regulatory controls (Englund, 1999; Andersen, 
2011; Gerding, 2014), which included a broad gamut of restrictions on bond emissions, ceilings 
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on bank deposit rates, requirements for banks to hold government and housing bonds, and ceilings 
on bank loan rates (Drees and Pazarbaşioğlu, 1998, p. 10), the banks were able to use finance 
companies, not beholden to these same rules and practices. Quite simply, finance companies and 
banks were able to avoid the constraints implied by the formal rules (Agell and Berg, 1996, p. 
596). These non-bank financial intermediaries operating outside the traditional banking system 
(ibid.), then, played a significant, and increasingly important, role in overcoming regulatory 
constraints and, crucially, directing credit towards commercial and residential real estate. 
 This, understandably, created a dilemma for regulators. Steffen Andersen  notes that, by 
this stage in the early 1980s, ‘…the Riksbank had concluded that its elaborate rate system of 
controls and “friendly discussion” with the banks had lost whatever effect they originally might 
have had’ (Andersen, 2011, p. 259). This is when internal struggles within the Social Democrats 
came to the fore vis-à-vis appropriate policy responses. How should they respond to these 
practices? 
 
Deregulation 
 
 Louis W. Pauly (2008, p. 263) notes of the global political economy of the early 1970s 
that, ‘…capital controls were, with good empirical evidence, depicted as increasingly ineffective’, 
adding, ‘[f]or industrialized counties, they were indeed obsolescent, if not never entirely 
obsolete’. Nowhere was this truer than in Sweden during the late-1970s and 1980s. Indeed, for 
the first time in decades, the public and private sectors in Sweden were increasingly borrowing 
in currencies not denominated in SEK, which further reduced the efficacy of controls (Jonung, 
1994, pp. 363–364), and the effects of this regulatory obsolescence would be felt across all sectors 
of the economy.  
 As we have seen, the shadow banking system, which the banks were increasingly 
operating within (and had direct exposure to) were undermining the authorities’ ability to control 
the money supply (Ryner, 2002, p. 150). There could have been three responses to this impasse. 
First, the government and central bank could have done nothing. This was the least plausible 
option, seeing as the finance companies were, in effect, assisting in undermining the state’s ability 
to generate revenue. Notwithstanding this course of action, then, there were two other plausible 
options. They could either have attempted to regulate the finance companies to the same degree 
as the banks, thus creating a more level playing field, or they could aim to create a level playing 
field using alternative methods: By changing the regulatory position of the banks to bring them 
closer to the model of the shadow banking system. The authorities’ response was the latter. This 
process did not occur overnight, as Table 5.2 (below) illustrates, but none of the changes 
documented below would not be reversed. 
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Table 5.2. Chronology of financial liberalisation in Sweden, 1978-1990 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Drees and Pazarbaşioğlu (1998, p. 10) 
 
 The years 1982, 1983 and 1985 stand out as significant here, as ceilings on new bond 
issues were removed, liquidity quotas were abolished and ceilings on bank loan rates were lifted. 
This essentially gave private financial institutions almost free rein to expand the credit stock. 
More significantly still, in 1983, banks were no longer compelled to hold government and housing 
bonds. This was, as Ryner (2002, p. 161) has noted, a fatal blow to social democratic regulation, 
which spiralling deficits and Sweden’s deteriorating balance of payments had fuelled. One of the 
consequences of these programmes is evident in Figure 5.2 (above). Banks began to increase their 
lending and claw back market share from finance companies. Further, in 1985, the state created 
SBAB, a state-owned mortgage financing agency, which was given responsibility for financing 
‘higher risk’ housing loans (Bengt Turner, 1999, pp. 684–685) that were previously financed 
through the government budget (SBAB, 2018). By the mid-1980s, the credit boom was in full 
1978  Ceilings on bank deposit interest rates were abolished. 
1980  Ceilings on issuing rates for private sector bonds were lifted. 
Controls on lending rates for insurance companies were removed. 
A tax on bank issues of certificates of deposit was removed. 
Foreigners were allowed to hold Swedish shares. 
1982 Ceilings on new bond issues by private companies removed. 
1983 Requirements on banks to hold government and housing bonds to 
meet liquidity quotas were abolished. Use of liquidity ratios to guide 
bank lending was discontinued and replaced by recommended 
growth rates for lending. 
1983 Requirements on banks to hold government and housing bonds to 
meet liquidity quotas were abolished. Use of liquidity ratios to guide 
bank lending was discontinued and replaced by recommended 
growth rates for lending. 
1985 Ceilings on bank loan rates lifted. 
1986 
 
 
Placement ratios for banks and insurance companies were 
abolished. 
Foreign banks allowed to establish subsidiaries in Sweden.  
1986-
88 
 
Foreign exchange controls on stock transactions relaxed. 
1988-
89 
Swedish residents permitted to buy foreign shares. 
1989 Non-Swedish nationals allowed to buy interest-bearing assets  
denominated in SEK. 
Remaining foreign exchange controls removed. 
1990 Foreign banks permitted to operate through branch offices and are 
entitled to participate in Riksbank’s clearing system on the same 
terms as Swedish banks. 
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swing and banks, finance companies and the state were extending credit to construction firms, 
households, and real estate companies in a manner, hitherto, unprecedented. Why did the Social 
Democrats pursue this course of action? 
 There were other alternatives on the Social Democrat’s table. One such alternative was 
the implementation of the wage-earner funds proposed by the unions and advocated by LO 
economist, Rudolf Meidner, whose basic idea was to, ‘…skim the excess profits and transfer them 
from the capital owners into the collective ownership of the employees’ (Meidner, 1993, p. 217). 
In short: the proposal advocated a shift from democratic socialism to forthright socialism. Despite 
lacklustre attempts to implement this, little ever came of the wage-earner funds, from the 
perspective of the staunch socialists within the Social Democrats133. These funds were treated as 
more of a symbolic gesture rather than a serious policy programme (Ryner, 2002, p. 167). In any 
case, the programme of reforms adopted around this time rendered the implementation of 
socialisation somewhat redundant. What was occurring within the corridors of power?  
 Tensions reportedly rose in a conversation between the Social Democrat Prime Minister, 
Olof Palme and his Finance Minister, Kjell-Olof Feldt, concerning the reformulation of regulatory 
frameworks and the pace of regulatory change in 1985. Feldt had argued that the existing policy 
frameworks to channel capital and investments to housing and other priority sectors were futile 
and counter-productive. An irate Palme reportedly chastised Feldt thus: Do as you please. I still 
don’t understand anything! (translated in Andersen, 2011, p. 260). As Palme was assassinated 
walking home from the cinema with his wife in February of the following year, it is difficult to 
fully gauge the level of disagreement between him and his finance minister during this exchange. 
However, Feldt has subsequently been explicit about the implications of these regulatory changes 
in his memoirs: 
 
The political meaning was crystal clear: it meant that social democracy, after decades of 
resistance, abandoned one of its most symbolic bastions for managing the Swedish economy 
to the market powers. Although the management during recent years had been just that, i.e. 
symbolic, it was still a major concession to the neo-liberal ideology which we as social 
democrats had spent so many years fighting (Feldt, 1991, translated in Jonung, Kiander and 
Vartia, 2009, p. 66 emphasis added). 
 
Such was the apparent exasperation of policy makers at the time. The source of this frustration, 
as noted above, was surprisingly simple: ‘…the old system permitted a number of straightforward 
tax arbitrage operations, which undermined the tax base and stimulated borrowing’ (Agell, Berg 
and Edin, 1995, p. 276). Agell, Berg and Edin elucidate this point, arguing the following: 
 
                                               
 
133 Indeed, the policy initiative could be argued to have been counter-productive. It helped to mobilise the Employers’ 
Confederations against the unions and SAP and to disrupt the otherwise reasonably solidaristic wage policy and 
corporatist structure of industrial relations. See Ryner (2002, p. 150-151) for more detailed analysis. 
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A […] major impetus for the reform was the multitude of tax avoidance operations available 
under the old system. While often quite complicated in appearance, many of these operations 
relied on the simple idea of generating a net taxable income loss by purchasing lowly taxed 
assets with borrowed money, and deducting the interest expenses (Agell, Berg and Edin, 
1995, p. 279). 
 
The regulatory checks on financial institutions and households were ineffective and unpopular 
with households and policy makers alike. As Ryner  notes, ‘…markets were deregulated because 
the Central Bank no longer had the capacity to sustain such regulation’ (Ryner, 2002, p. 126, 
emphasis added). Steffen Andersen argues likewise that the core policy changes (such as the 
abolition of liquidity ratios requirements for banks abolished in 1983, and the removal of bank 
lending ceilings in 1985) were, ‘…a recognition by the Riksbank that by the early 1980s, the 
elaborate cobweb of controls it had set up no longer served their original purposes’ (Andersen, 
2011, p. 26). Whilst they may well have been counter-productive, however, this is not the entire 
story. Indeed, the programme of reforms enacted throughout the 1980s was not merely a simple 
de facto acknowledgement of financial developments hitherto.  
 Whilst regulatory arbitrage, rising incomes and tax reforms played an important role in 
boosting household consumption in housing and other durable goods, it is also important to 
consider the motivation of regulators to increase bank profits (Gerding, 2014, p. 288; Jaffee, 1994, 
p. 89), and the macroeconomic implications of this. The reforms principally served to help two 
categories of actors: those working within finance (at home and abroad), and middle- and high-
income households who had already become moderately adept at decreasing their tax burdens 
(see Chapter IV). However, the reforms also went further than this, essentially opening up the 
Swedish credit market to foreign competition. Deregulation, thus, went further than the activities 
which financial actors and high-income households had engaged in hitherto. The state, having 
been viewed as a manager of market powers, (Feldt, 1991) for so long, was now an enabler and 
promoter of these powers and, in the process, was actively assisting a speculative economic boom.  
 Further assistance of direct significance to stimulating economic activity in housing 
would also be forthcoming beyond the sphere of financial regulation. In 1983, the Palme 
government introduced the ROT-avdrag system (Renovering, Ombyggnad, Tillbyggnad = 
Repairs, Conversion, Extension); an initiative designed to promote dwelling improvement. This 
programme made repair, conversion and extension work tax deductible and was indicative not 
only of a shift in policy towards supporting renovation activity (Clark and Gullberg, 1991, p. 
502), but also of the state’s willingness to further stimulate the construction industry in an era of 
low productivity growth (Jacobson, 1986, p. 183; Priemus and Metselaar, 1993). 
 Berg and Edin  note that the peak of this boom is evident from an analysis of consumption 
expenditures, which, to a great extent, were  ‘…driven by strong growth in purchases of durables’ 
(Berg and Edin, 1995, p. 285). It is no coincidence that, following the major waves of regulatory 
reform and tax changes, housing construction trebled between 1985 and 1991 and private 
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construction increased fivefold (ESO, 2002). In the short term, at least, the ability of private 
business concerns and households to readily access credit did boost commercial and residential 
construction, and  this state-assisted credit boom unleashed a debt-fuelled wave of consumption 
in housing and durable goods, which was accompanied by an employment increase in the 
construction sector of 20 per cent (ILO, 2018) from 1985 to 1990. This, in turn, was supplemented 
by an increase of employment in the financial service sector of 20 per cent during the same period 
(Engwall, 1994). Astonishingly, banks increased their balance-sheet size 90 per cent of GNP in 
1985 to 200 per cent in 1989 (Davis, 1995, p. 256). 
 For the first time, Sweden now had more of its population employed in the services and 
government sectors than all other sectors combined. This was a significant politico-economic 
transformation, which would not be reversed. Figure 5.3, below, charts these employment 
changes over the course of nearly four decades. The solid grey areas (of varying shades) represent 
the service and government sectors, whereas the patterned areas represent non-service sectors and 
industries. 
 
Figure 5.3. Labour Market Trends in Sweden, 1970-2008 
 
 
Source: ILO (2018) 
 
 What we witness from the 1970s onwards, then, is the tertiarisation of the Swedish 
economy. During the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, the pace of urbanisation in Sweden accelerated. In 
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1960, around 73 per cent of Sweden’s population was classified as urban. By 1990, however, that 
figure was closer to 85 per cent (SCB, 2011). The decline in the rural population was driven by 
diminishing employment opportunities in manufacturing, agriculture, and the rural public sector, 
the effects of which - to some extent - were offset by the growth in retail and other consumer-
oriented services in urban areas (Hedlund and Lundholm, 2015, p. 130). Martin Hedlund and 
Emma Lundholm note that, ‘…a consumption-oriented, knowledge-intensive service sector 
limited the absorptive capacity in rural areas, which spurred the large increase in urbanisation 
between […] 1960 and 1980’ (ibid.). Indeed, these dual processes of economic restructuring and 
accelerated urbanisation inevitably had ramifications for Sweden’s major cities and - as I noted 
in the previous chapter, and as I will make clear below – the increased urban housing demand 
would create upward pressure on house prices during the late 1970s and, particularly, during the 
1980s housing finance revolution. 
 
Households & House prices  
 
 Thus far in this section, there has been little mention of households. This is quite simply 
because we cannot speak of the effects of financial system mutability on households without first 
understanding the sources and drivers of said mutability. Only when we have done this can we 
truly gauge the significance of these changes in relation to households’ and the implication of this 
for housing and the built environment. By the mid- to late-1980s, household consumption was 
one the most important drivers of GDP growth, as Figure 5.4 shows.  
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Figure 5.4. Household consumption and GDP (real four-quarter percentage changes) 
 
 
Source: Englund (2015, p. 55) 
 
 Agell & Berg, (1996, p. 583) note that, with regard to deregulations of direct relevance 
for household borrowing, most changes took place between 1983 and 1985. As Peter Englund 
(2015, p. 10) argues, ‘[d]eregulation opened up new opportunities for competition over market 
shares’ (emphasis added). This competition did not occur in a vacuum in spite of household 
preferences. Englund further adds that it was mortgage lending, which had been most directly hit 
by the regulations. Indeed, lending by mortgage institutions increased by 167 per cent between 
1985 and 1990 (ibid.). Demand for mortgage credit, then, became insatiable. The new regulatory 
milieu allowed this to some extent but, in many ways, it was a continuation of trends already 
noted above (see Chapter IV). The effects of this on per capita growth rates, consumption, wage-
income and debt can be observed in Table 5.3. 
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Table 5.3. Growth rates of consumption, disposable income, and debt ratios (1980-94) 
 
 Per capita growth rates  
Gross 
household 
debt to 
disposable 
income 
 
Gross 
household 
debt to 
total 
household 
wealth 
 
Total 
consumption 
expenditures 
 
Pure 
consumption 
 
 
 
Nondurable 
consumption 
and services 
 
 
 
Disposable 
income 
 
1980 -0.010  0.008 -0,006  0.026  0.981  0.291 
1981 -0.003  0.009  0.001 -0.020  0.988  0.222 
1982  0.007  0.001  0.000 -0.032  1.038  0.229 
1983 -0.020 -0.009 -0.013 -0.013  1.037  0.228 
1984  0.013  0.013  0.012  0.013  1.054  0.237 
1985  0.025  0.018  0.022  0.026  1.033  0.233 
1986  0.041  0.010  0.022  0.030  1.128  0.244 
1987  0.041  0.018  0.020 -0.000  1.207  0.252 
1988  0.019  0.019  0.009 -0.001  1.354  0.256 
1989 -0.002  0.011 -0.001 -0.003  1.358  0.244 
1990 -0.006  0.018  0.003  0.037  1.250  0.231 
1991  0.003  0.017  0.005  0.040  1.079  0.216 
1992 -0.020  0.009  0.005  0.029  1.007  0.212 
1993 -0.043 -0.044 -0.027 -0.042  0.975  0.206 
1994 -0.003 -0.011  0.000  0.017  0.916  0.199 
Source: Agell and Berg (1996, p. 585) 
 
 What Table 5.3 illustrates is the household dynamics of the boom and bust cycle 
throughout the 1980s and early-1990s. The consumption was driven by a combination of rising 
incomes (simulated by higher wages and tax reforms lowering the marginal tax rate) and the 
increase in the supply of credit. The evidence for the latter is clear from the data in the sixth 
column: gross household debt in relation to disposable income. What is surprising about this is 
that the levels of household debt were high even before the reforms in tax and financial regulation. 
Indeed, in comparison to other industrially mature economies (including the USA) Swedish 
households were carrying nearly twice as much debt in relation to disposable income.  
 Thus, a combination of policy, practice, financial arbitrage and regulatory change in 
response to said arbitrage resulted in a situation whereby, as Englund (1999, p. 83) notes, 
‘Swedish households on aggregate were among the least credit-constrained within the OECD 
group of countries’. This view is supported by Jappelli and Pagano, (1989) and Agell and Berg 
(1996). The effects on housing were that house prices across Sweden rose as a function of 
increased demand. Despite stimulating construction in both the commercial and residential real 
estate sectors, the growth of mortgage loans far outstripped housing supply, leading to a rise in 
house prices. During the 1980s in Sweden, then, the increase in the supply of mortgage credit did 
not function to increase affordability but aggravate it. These socioeconomic dynamics are best 
summed up by Jan Bohlin (2014, p. 46): 
Deregulation in the 1980s altered the behaviour of prospective buyers. Prior to the 1980s, 
properties had often been valued from a “building contractor perspective”: the income from 
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tenants’ rents should comfortably exceed running expenses and capital costs. In the 1980s, 
this gave way to a more forward-looking perspective; the value of a property was now seen 
as being equal to the sum of future incomes from owning it, discounted to present value by a 
rate of interest that represented the required rate of return. It was not uncommon to add in a 
future rest value of the property at the end of the horizon. Applying this perspective made 
many properties appear to be undervalued in the first half of the 1980s, which set the stage 
for the rapid price rise in the decade’s second half. Banks and other financial institutes 
considered that loans to buyers, often specialised property companies, were secure, since 
prices were rising rapidly for the properties which buyers could pledge. 
 
The Figures below illustrate the effects of this building contractor perspective on house prices. 
Figure 5.5 reveals country-level and major city-level trends over a twenty-year period; whereas 
Figure 5.6 provides a regional, county-level overview of prices. 
 
Figure 5.5. Real estate price index in Sweden's three main city regions, 1975-1994 (1981=100) 
 
 
Source: SCB 
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Figure 5.6. Real estate price index in Sweden's regions, 1975-1994 (1981=100) 
 
 
Source: SCB 
 
 The altered behavior (sic.) which Bohlin identifies affected prices across Sweden from 
the mid-1980s and was assisted by the changes in financial and regulatory structure outlined 
above. Whilst house-price increases were more acute in the major cities (increasing over 150 per 
cent in real terms over the course of the decade) elsewhere similar trends were repeated. The 
increase in the credit stock was being directed towards housing in depressed economic regions 
such as Northern Central Sweden and Central Norrland, where the population was declining; the 
same regions where rental apartments which had been constructed in the 1970s and early-1980s 
were lying empty (see Chapter IV). Even in Central and Upper Norrland, prices increased by over 
75 per cent in real terms over the course of the 1980s. A basic regional analysis of house prices 
and net dwellings is presented in Figure 5.7. 
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Figure 5.7. Net increase in dwellings and house prices in the Swedish regions between 1980 
and 1990 (% change) 
 
 
Source: Folk och bostadsräkningar, (1984 & 1990) & SCB 
 
 Whilst house prices increased everywhere across the decade, and expectedly more so in 
Stockholm, the net regional housing stock increase appears to bear only a very weak relation to 
prices, and at low levels of significance. If we assume house prices to be a function of demand, 
then clearly housing supply was decoupled from this during the 1980s. Indeed, if we remove 
Stockholm County from this model, the coefficient of determination (r2) falls away to 0.04. The 
relationship between the net housing stock and house prices throughout the 1980s regionally in 
Sweden, then, was out of step.  
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5.2. The bust, the bailout and Dannell  
 
Sweden, during the mid- to late-1980s, experienced rapid domestic expansion, which was in 
marked contrast to the previous decade. However, the construction and consumption boom 
driving this expansion would prove to be all too temporary. The frenzied mortgage lending of the 
banks (and the liquidity which the finance companies had helped to generate), in combination 
with generous state-sponsored subsidies to the construction industry, owner-occupiers and tenant-
owners, had assisted in pushing up asset prices in both commercial and residential real estate, 
despite the growth in housing supply. This, in turn, promoted the utilisation of rising asset values 
as collateral for further borrowing within the private and household sectors (Jonung, 2008, p. 19). 
As long as prices were increasing, this speculative strategy could work. But the longer this process 
continued, the more it resembled what Hyman Minsky would refer to as Ponzi finance. The 
speculative ratchet effect, which propelled the Swedish economy of the late-1980s, would 
eventually run out of steam and, the state, banks, construction industry, and households would be 
woefully unprepared for the imminent evaporation of their collateral base (Dougherty, 2008). 
Without doubt, the housing and finance landscape that emerged following the crisis was a 
transformed one. A series of bankruptcies, mergers and vertical integrations would lead to even 
greater concentration in the banking and construction sectors, and this would have long-term 
implications for the entrenchment of the Swedish housing finance complex.  
 
The bust and the bailout… 
 
 Whilst it was not well known at the time, a number of finance companies began to 
experience liquidity difficulties in the first few months of 1990s. In the spring of 1990, Sweden’s 
largest finance company, Nyckeln, (The Key) reported that a number of clients in both Sweden 
and Britain were unable to honour their contracts (Jennergren, 2002, p. 7). At the time, it was not 
evident that a systemic crisis was in the offing, but by September of that same year, as commercial 
real estate prices began to fall, Nyckeln found itself unable to extend maturing investment 
certificates (marknadsbevis). The country’s largest finance company was essentially insolvent 
and this, unsurprisingly, prompted a run on Nyckeln, with investors refusing to reinvest and 
scrambling to salvage whatever collateral they could (ibid.). According to Karl-Henrik Pettersson 
(CEO of Sweden’s largest savings bank at the time, Första Sparbanken), before this point, ‘…not 
a single person – not any banking chief executives, nor the Financial Services Authority, nor the 
head of the Riksbank, nor Sweden’s Finance Minister’ were aware of the risks of a financial 
bubble under way’ (Pettersson, 1993, p. 11 my translation). Indeed, at an annual meeting of The 
Swedish Banker’s Association (Svenska Bankföreningen), in 1990, they could not understand 
how the ‘cream’ of the finance companies (Nyckeln) had landed itself in so much trouble (Svenska 
Bankföreningen 1990, (translated in Jennergren, 2002, p. 26). Whilst notoriously difficult to 
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empirically observe ex-ante, in hindsight, the term ‘disaster myopia’ seems to provide a fitting 
description of financial insiders’ attitudes during this period. 
 Nyckeln defaulted in October 1990, as the market for investment certificates dissolved. It 
was closely followed by the defaults of two other major finance companies, Beijer Capital, and 
Obligentia, over the following six weeks (Jennergren, 2002, p. 7). Whilst these companies had 
invested heavily in commercial real estate, they had also been central to extending liquidity to 
residential building concerns and real estate companies, and mortgage and savings banks were 
also heavily exposed to them (Jes-Iversen & Sjögren, 2014, p. 14). It was during this era, that the 
savings banks strayed dramatically from their original remit of providing mortgage loans and 
other services originated on the basis of customers’ deposits. Instead these institutions took huge 
credit risks, lending ‘extensively to large corporate clients and real estate companies’, despite 
having no real history or experience of such investments (Jes-Iversen and Sjögren, 2014, p. 14). 
Significantly, they became much less reliant on deposits as the basis of their lending and, instead, 
turned to publicly listed companies and international investors (Östman, 2009, p. 12), much like 
commercial banks. 
 The crisis within the finance company sector, then, had serious ramifications for the entire 
Swedish housing and finance system. As interest rates rose following the reunification of 
Germany, credit demand was stifled further, and banks became more restrictive in their lending 
(Jes-Iversen and Sjögren, 2014, p. 15), which had further devastating effects on finance 
companies, those investing in them, and the real estate projects they collectively financed. 
  Nycklen was declared bankrupt on 8th January 1991 (Dagens Nyheter, 1994), which 
accelerated the panic within the nascent Swedish housing finance complex. This was followed by 
a series of defaults in the finance company sector. Cabanco defaulted in November of the same 
year, filing for bankruptcy in August of the following year (Dagens Nyheter, 1992c), and the 
parent company of finance company Gamlestaden, Noble, was forced to transfer its shareholdings 
to one of Sweden’s largest banks, Nordbanken, in the summer of 1991 (Drees and Pazarbaşioğlu, 
1995, p. 42). This was just the beginning, however, and the finance company crisis would not 
remain confined to this sector. Indeed, as the previous section made clear, despite being in direct 
competition, the main Swedish banks were integrally linked and highly exposed to the finance 
companies. SEB Banken’s and Första Sparbanken’s exposure to Cabanco alone was in the realm 
of hundreds of millions of kronor (Dagens Nyheter, 1992c).  
 Much like the subprime crisis which would originate in the USA over a decade and a half 
later, there was little transparency in the Swedish financial system, and the extent of banks’ 
exposure to losses on investment certificates and other securities was not immediately clear. The 
major Swedish banks soon began to suffer huge losses, including losses on loans to finance 
companies and real estate companies (Jaffee, 1994, pp. 90–91). By Autumn it became evident 
that two of the six major banks, Första Sparbanken and Nordbanken, needed new capital 
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(Englund, 1999, p. 91). The takeover of Gamlestaden by the latter proved to be a colossal mistake. 
As the largest shareholder in Nordbanken, the government contributed 4.2 billion of a 5.2 billion 
kronor equity issue (Drees and Pazarbaşioğlu, 1995, p. 43). In order to alleviate the former’s 
financial difficulties, the state provided 3.5 billion kronor loan guarantees to enabled Första 
Sparbanken to meet their capital requirements (Drees &, Pazarbaşioğlu, 1995, p. 43; Englund, 
1999, p. 91). However, the problems in these two heavily exposed banks, and the extent of the 
state’s bailouts, would not end there. 
 By the summer of 1991 the economic maelstrom was well underway. The Social 
Democrats were voted out of power in the midst of a recession in the Autumn and, for the first 
time in over half a century, a Conservative, of aristocratic lineage, Carl Bildt, became Sweden’s 
Prime Minister. The Moderates had run on a pro-homeownership platform, declaring in their 
manifesto that: ‘Everyone will be able to own their homes!’ (Moderaterna, 1991). They also made 
an important policy commitment to allow conversions of public rental housing (allmännytta) into 
cooperatives134. This was inspired by Margaret Thatcher’s Right-to-Buy scheme, but was also an 
expansion of the pre-existing legislation of 1982, which allowed private tenants to convert their 
rental buildings in cooperative-owned units (see Chapter IV). Perhaps more significantly, 
however, it was the institutional crystallisation of what speculators like Adam Backström had, 
since early-1970s, been engaging in at the fringes of the law.  
 Housing conversions such as these have the potential to profoundly change tenure 
composition. Indeed, while freehold ownership of single-family dwellings barely increased 
following the dramatic growth in this tenure form during the 1970s (see Chapter IV), cooperative 
ownership increased from 14% nationwide in 1970 to 18% in 2000. And this change has been 
more pronounced in city-regions. Roger Andersson and Lena Magnusson Turner (2014) note that 
in areas where the Moderates have had overall municipal control, such as Stockholm, the share 
of public housing has decline from 32% in 1990 to 18% in 2010, largely due to conversions. 
 The logic in the Moderates’ manifesto, then, was unabashedly set out vis-à-vis housing 
policy: ‘Lower taxes, increased competition and less bureaucracy force down housing costs’ 
(ibid.). Ambitious as their programme for government was, the economy the Moderates 
encountered when coming to power was undoubtedly the worse any party had inherited since the 
1930s. The finance company crisis and an insolvent banking sector precipitated a liquidity crisis, 
which, in turn, was followed by the worst recession in Sweden in nearly 70 years. Households 
began to deleverage, and the savings rate went positive for the first time in almost a decade. Figure 
5.8, below, illustrates what is conventionally known as a credit crunch. Whilst the crisis had a 
                                               
 
134 ‘Those renters who want to will be able to purchase their apartments from the municipal companies’ (Moderaterna, 
1991). 
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huge impact on the growth of the credit stock, though, the worst was not felt until 1992-93, when 
the phenomenal credit growth of the 1980s came to an abrupt end. 
 
Figure 5.8. Annual Growth Rate of the Volume of Credit in Sweden, 1985-95 (%) 
 
 
 
 
Source: Jonung, Kiander and Vartia (2009) 
 
 Despite being bailed out only one year earlier, by the Spring of 1992, it became evident 
that Nordbanken and Första Sparbanken were in further trouble (Drees &, Pazarbaşioğlu, 1995, 
p. 43)135. This lead to drastic measures by the new government, which bought out all the existing 
shareholders of Nordbanken for SKr 2.1 billion (Englund, 1999, p. 92). Following this, 
Nordbanken was restructured. A ‘bad bank’, Securum, was created to deal with the non-
performing loans, with a book value of SKr 67 billion (Drees and Pazarbaşioğlu, 1995, p. 43), 
and what was left of Nordbanken (the ‘good bank’) was left with the performing loans, supported 
by SKr 10 billion of loan guarantees (ibid.). Securum was also injected with SKr 24 billion of 
equity capital to cover further expected losses. The ailing savings bank, Första Sparbanken, on 
the other hand, was rescued by interest free loans totalling SKr 7.3 billion from other savings 
banks, guaranteed by the government (Andersen, 2011, p. 267). The composition of the Swedish 
banking sector, which had changed so much in the last decade, was continuing to change apace. 
Throughout the mid-twentieth century, the savings banks, along with the bond-based mortgage 
                                               
 
135 As well as losses related to the failure of other finance companies, in April the Stockholm-based finance company, 
Independent (formally Infina) was declared bankrupt, owing 50 million kronor to Nordbanken (Dagens Nyheter, 
1992a). 
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institutions and the state, had been key sources of credit for the residential housing sector. 
However, as evidenced in Figure 5.9, following the banking crisis, the savings banks began to be 
squeezed, and commercial banks were dominating the Swedish finance system to a degree not 
witnessed since the 1920s. 
 
Figure 5.9. Number of savings banks and commercial banks in selective years, 1985–2010. 
 
 
Source: Jes-Iversen and Sjögren (2014, p. 19) 
 
 
 Despite these phenomenal bailouts and consolidations, however, the Swedish banking 
system was still reeling. In the Autumn of 1992, the conservative-led coalition was faced with 
another major bank failure, as well as a currency crisis. Gota AB (owners of Sweden’s fourth 
largest bank, Gota Bank) had experienced heavy losses throughout the course of the crisis and it 
had become clear that it was unable to meet its capital adequacy requirements (Drees and 
Pazarbaşioğlu, 1995, p. 43). Gota AB were declared bankrupt in September and Gota Bank was 
nationalised with all non-performing loans being transferred to Securum. What was left of Gota’s 
performing assets were merged into Nordbanken (Andersen, 2011, p. 267).  
 Following this bailout, the hitherto piecemeal approach to crisis management was 
supplanted by a more drastic, durable one. Sweden was in the midst of the ERM Crisis when Gota 
Bank collapsed and the Riksbank had had to raise the overnight interest rates to 500 per cent in 
order to defend the krona in the aftermath of the UK’s and Italy’s departure from the European 
Exchange Rate Mechanism (Englund, 2015, p. 22). Following this, the government announced a 
general bank guarantee. This unprecedented measure was intended to allay fears of a total 
financial system collapse and ‘…played a crucial role in securing continued international funding 
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for the Swedish banks’ (ibid.). In December, the government passed the motion through 
parliament, which provided a general guarantee to all banks and finance institutions with a 
Swedish charter (Drees and Pazarbaşioğlu, 1995, p. 43). The Swedish government, then, had 
become the underwriter of the entire Swedish financial system, significantly, with cross-party 
support (Ryner, 2002, p. 153).  
 The following year, in 1993, the state created the Bank Support Agency 
(Bankstödsnämnden). All major banks, with the sole exception of Handelsbanken, received 
support in some form or another. By the end of 1993, the credit losses of banks had amounted to 
a staggering SKr 200 billion with the fiscal cost to the state estimated to have reached 3.6 per cent 
of GDP (although this figure is contested136). Table 5.4, below, taken from Kurtuluş Gemici, 
(2016), places this in recent historical perspective. Significantly, this table shows that the 
economic contraction in Sweden resulting from the banking crisis was more severe than that in 
the USA following the GFC. 
 
Table 5.4. The Big Five Crises and the Great Recession 
 
 Decline in 
house prices 
Output loss Fiscal Cost Peak 
NPLs 
Increase 
in Public 
Debt 
(% GDP) (% GDP) (% GDP) 
Finland (1991-95) -50.4 69.6 12.8 13 43.6 
Japan (1997-2001) -40.2 45 14 35 41.7 
Norway (1991-93 -41.5 5.1 2.7 16.4 19.2 
Spain (1977-81) -33.3 58.5 5.6 5.8 3.8 
Sweden (1991-95) -31.7 32.9 3.6 13 36.2 
USA (2007-11) -33.8 30.6 4.5 5 23.6 
 
N.B. NPLs refer to non-preforming loans 
Source: Gemici (2016, p. 18) 
 
 A dramatic growth in unemployment also accompanied the crisis (see Figure 5.10, 
below). Having committed to a policy of sustaining near full employment throughout the post-
War years, Sweden’s unemployment rate would never again, hitherto, reach the low levels which 
had been so central to its political economic model throughout most of the second half of the 
twentieth century. That such high levels of unemployment would and could be politically 
‘tolerated’ henceforth, marked a profound paradigmatic shift. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
 
136 Steffen Andersen (2011, p. 267) notes that most of the costs have now been recouped.   
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Figure 5.10. Harmonised Unemployment Rate in selected Northern European countries, 1985-
2015 
 
 
Source: OECD (2018a) 
 
 The causes and inputs which fuelled the banking crisis in Sweden have been likened to 
those in the USA in the run-up to the Great Recession (Krugman and Wells, 2010). Indeed, there 
are several commonalities, often cited in relation to both crises: loose regulatory oversight; 
speculation in real estate; irresponsible lending practices by an unscrupulous financial elite; over-
indebted households; financial innovation; disaster myopia, and woefully inadequate instruments 
for calculating and assessing risk. None of these assessments are incorrect per se. While, in 
Sweden, many of the bankruptcies and losses were related to lending on commercial real estate 
(and foreclosures were generally far fewer), the objects of speculation were, broadly speaking, 
similar. Both residential housing construction and house prices boomed137 in response to 
increased credit liquidity and subsequently abruptly slumped soon thereafter (with prices 
preceding the slump in construction). Yet the consequences (for housing in particular) were not 
so similar and, qualitatively, there were obvious differences.  
 Sweden embarked almost immediately on the path of austerity retrenchment reforms with 
cross-party support (Ryner, 2002, p. 153). But it was not only retrenchment in social insurance 
that was affected. Unlike in the USA, which had long since abandoned supply-side subsidies in 
favour of demand-side tax breaks to homeowners, nearly 10 per cent of Sweden’s total state 
                                               
 
137 Construction investment increased by around 20 per cent in Sweden between 1986 and 1990  
(Dagens Nyheter, 1992b). 
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expenditure was spent on housing subsidies. Indeed, by the late 1980s Sweden was spending over 
SKr 30 billion annually on subsidising the housing industry (Blücher, 2013). This would change. 
 
The Danell Commission and its legacy  
 
 The banking crisis hit Sweden hard. The speculative frenzy in lending directed towards 
commercial and residential real estate which had developed during the mid-1980s had created a 
bust that would have lasting consequences for housing and the built environment. State debt and 
unemployment grew dramatically in the immediate aftermath and both the private sector and 
households responded to this economic uncertainly by deleveraging. House prices fell 
precipitously from their previous peaks and commercial real estate prices dropped even further. 
In terms of housing supply the effects, expectedly, lagged slightly. However, by 1994 housing 
construction had sunk to levels not seen since the German occupation of neighbouring Norway 
and Denmark in 1940. 
 During the crisis, there was general cross-party recognition that the cost of housing 
subsidies had become an unsustainable fiscal burden on the state (Borg, 2004, p. 141; Sørvoll, 
2013, p. 444). Indeed, as the former head of the Swedish National Housing Board, Gösta Blücher 
(2013), noted in a debate article in the Swedish daily, Dagens Nyheter: subsidies had exploded 
throughout the 1980s, reaching a staggering SKr 36 billion in 1993 (Turner and Whitehead, 2002, 
p. 207). In a time of fiscal restraint and austerity, a steep reduction in housing subsidies became 
a core target in the strategy of deficit reduction; in no small part because the effects on housing 
supply would be lagged and the complexities of the subsidy system were not well understood by 
the average voter (Lindbom, 2001). In December 1991, the government set up a commission led 
by a special investigator tasked with the responsibility of submitting proposals for state aid for 
housing funding (SOU, 1992, p. 3 author’s translation). The special investigator was Georg 
Danell, a man who had been party secretary for Moderaterna during the early 1980s, and assistant 
to the housing minister in the Centre Party-led coalition of the late-1970s. 
 Danell had one objective: to reduce and ultimately remove housing subsidies. He was 
successful. By 2002, subsidies had been reduced to SKr 2 billion and by the middle of the 2000s, 
interest subsidies for new construction had all but ceased. This was a new approach to housing 
which had not been witness since the War years. As Turner and Whitehead (2002, p. 205) note, 
‘[t]his turned out to be the first decisive step in reducing general subsidies and moving towards 
more targeted subsidies for both households and localities’. The structure of subsidies would 
change, then, from having any semblance of supply-side support, to a more marginal, targeted 
system which focused solely on the demand-side. However, it would be a mistake to think that, 
at this stage, Public Housing was still the universalist model which the Social Democrats had 
championed during the mid-twentieth century. Indeed, a study by Anna-Lisa Lindén (1989) found 
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that, throughout the 1980s, low income groups, women, young people, and the elderly had 
become increasingly overrepresented in Public Housing. Danell did not cause this trend shift, but 
his proposed reforms would certainly amplify them. 
 Danell presented his findings in May 1992 and they were, by and large, adopted. There 
were, however, consequences to achieving the goal of subsidy reduction. In the Autumn of 1992, 
following the implementation of Danell’s reforms to steadily reduce the interest subsidy to zero 
by the 2000s, the residential construction industry scrambled to begin projects before the new 
funding formula came into effect. It is estimated that around 12,000 foundations were built in 
1992 merely so that construction firms could benefit from the old system of subsidies (Dagens 
Nyheter, 2015a). However, many of these foundations (Danell foundations: Danellgropar) 
remained just that (ibid.). Residential construction collapsed shortly thereafter and would not 
recover to pre-crisis levels for over twenty years.   
 Despite consensus surrounding the diagnosis of a housing subsidy malady, there was no 
such consensus (initially at least) concerning the remedy. In 1993, the Social Democrats 
vehemently opposed the implementation of this Commission’s findings. Oskar Lindkvist (the 
Social Democrat’s vice chairman of the Housing Committee) had explicitly admonished Danell’s 
findings, saying that he would rip up the interest allowance system proposed by Danell (FBIS, 
1993, p. 54). This opposition would be short-lived, however.  
 The Social Democrats returned to power in 1994 with the Swedish economy still vying 
for the unflattering position of sick man of Europe. Yet, as Clark and Johnson  note, ‘[r]emarkably 
little was done to reconstruct housing legislation and policy administration’ (Clark and Johnson, 
2009, p. 181). Indeed, the Ministry of Housing, which the Moderates abolished between 1991 and 
1993, would not be resurrected, and the Finance Minister Göran Persson (who became Prime 
Minister in 1996) completed the dismantling of state support to housing as a central part of the 
reorganisation of state finances (Dagens Nyheter, 2007). Housing costs increased substantially as 
a consequence (Turner and Whitehead, 2002).  
 Intriguingly, the Social Democrats went even further than Danell. In 1996 a government 
commission (SOU, 1996) was set up to establish whether housing subsidies should remain neutral 
(as I have indicated, the claim to neutrality was already a misnomer by the late-1970s). This 
pointed to a way forward whereby housing could become a net contributor to the state’s finances, 
rather than dependent on government subsidies (Whitehead, 2003, p. 59). This goal was achieved 
quickly. Karin Hedin et al (2012, p. 445) note that: ‘…the housing sector went from being a net 
burden on state finances … in the late 1980s to providing a net income of roughly 31 billion 
crowns ten years later’, adding, ‘[t]his process involved nothing less than a major redistribution 
of national income’. Furthermore, between 1995 and 2009 there was a 70 per cent decrease in the 
number of households eligible to claim housing allowances (Christophers, 2013, p. 11). Figure 
5.11 charts the development of this reduction in housing subsidies. Note the dramatic reduction 
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post 1996; the year Göran Persson became Prime Minister. 
 
Figure 5.11. State real estate taxes and housing subsides, 1992–2012  
 
Source: Holmqvist and Magnusson Turner (2014) 
 
 Danell’s name will forever be associated with the fallout from the introduction of his 
subsidy programme and the Danellgropar which proliferated throughout Sweden. Yet, in many 
ways, his reform proposals worked better than he could have possibly imagined. In the short-
term, they were implemented by the Bildt government with few amendments. But, from a longer-
term perspective, the Social Democrats not only took the subsidy reduction programme forward 
but augmented it. Danell now works for the Brussels-based Swedish consultancy, PR and lobby 
firm KREAB, with his former boss, Carl Bildt. KREAB’s business model is based on the mantra 
of solving problems and maximising opportunities (KREAB, 2018). The housing reforms several 
of KREAB’s current employees implemented certainly solved one problem: housing subsidies, 
which constituted a sizable share of Sweden’s fiscal deficit, were reduced markedly and this 
reduction, as Turner and Whitehead argue, helped Sweden to maintain the Maastricht 
convergence criteria (Turner and Whitehead, 2002, p. 202). However, by solving one problem, 
they created others. 
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5.3. The Recovery, the next debt-fuelled bubble, and sectoral concentration 
 
We have built too much and our building sector is too large. It should be reduced. 
 
Nils Lundgren, Chief Economist at Nordbanken, (Dagens Nyheter, 1992b) 
 
 
The road to recovery in Sweden following the early-1990s banking crisis was arduous. What we 
witness during this period is substantial deleveraging across all sectors, but especially among 
households (see Figure 5.12). This occurred in, arguably, the most austere environment an 
industrially mature economy had been subjected to since the Second World War (Erixon, 2011, 
p. 272), which challenges the causal logics of scholars who posit a relationship between social 
expenditure retrenchment and rising household debt (see Introduction & Chapter I). Indeed, as is 
evident Figure 5.12, the reverse dynamic was true. As wages and the economy expanded during 
the 1980s, so too did household debt; and as wages stagnated and the economy contracted in the 
early-1990s, so too did household debt.  
 
Figure 5.12. Household & Government debt as a share of GDP 1980-2014 
 
 
 
 Source: Waldenström (2015) and Riksgälden (2018) 
 
 Had lessons been learned from the banking crisis? According to Steffen Andersen: yes. 
Andersen claims that ‘[i]f the crisis of the 1990s was agonizing, it taught everybody a lesson’, 
adding, ‘[i]t probably helped Sweden come through the 2007-2009 crisis much easier than many 
other countries did’ (Andersen, 2011, p. 248). Andersen is not alone in this assessment. Indeed, 
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on the government’s official site of Sweden, in an article called, ‘How Sweden created a model 
economy’(Sutherland, 2013), the author writes that, ‘[t]he road back to … success [following the 
financial crisis] was not easy for Sweden. But by pursuing inventive and courageous reforms and 
sticking to them, Sweden has transformed its economy and stayed strong in the face of the new 
global recession’. This assessment may, or may not, be true. Yes, Sweden weathered the GFC far 
better than most – and Sweden would be held up as an exemplar of crisis and economic 
management during the GFC (The Economist, 2013). Further, house price declines in Sweden 
during the Great Recession were negligible (see Figure 5.13, below). However, unlike other 
countries, there was no deleveraging and household debt has continued to grow. This obviously 
implies a degree of risk, as many economists, international, and domestic organisations have 
highlighted (see Introduction).  
 In terms of legacies, despite the painful collective memories of the banking crisis, 
Swedish households had experienced phenomenal and unprecedented house price growth 
throughout the 1980s. Some households had benefited from this, others had not. But as long as 
there are ‘winners’ there will be people ready and willing to try to emulate them and, following 
the rapid decline in house prices, much of the housing stock in 1994 was looking undervalued. 
Similarly, the financial sector was now dominated by new actors who knew that inordinate sums 
could be made from speculation in housing and commercial real estate markets. To these actors 
too, house prices (which had fallen precipitously, but not as much as commercial real estate) were 
undervalued following the crisis. The era of housing and consumption-based growth, then, did 
not end with the banking crisis of the early-1990s. This was more of a glitch; a developmental 
growing pain in the establishment of a bona fide housing finance complex. Indeed, the trends we 
witnessed in the 1980s (the growth and dominance of finance and financial actors; the associated 
commodification of housing; spiralling household debt; an increasingly concentrated construction 
sector; and a shift in households’ tenure preferences) would, after an extremely brief intermezzo, 
return with an increased dynamism, supported by new financial flows, increasingly from abroad.  
 These credit flows would bolster house price growth which, since the recovery in the 
mid-1990s, has been nothing short of phenomenal (even unprecedented in a Western European 
economy). Indeed, as Figure 5.13 attests, house price growth since the mid-1990s makes the boom 
and bust cycle of the late-1980s and early-1990s look like a minor blip in an otherwise meteoric 
trajectory. Similarly, with rents, the steep upward trajectory in real rents, beginning in the mid-
1980s, has continued unabated (see Figure 5.14). 
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Figure 5.13. Real estate price index 
Index 1981=100 
 
 
Source: SCB 
 
Figure 5.14. Rents and general price level (1969-2017) 
Index 1969=100 
 
 
 
Source: SCB 
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 Yet, despite these trajectories in house prices and rents, Sweden (between 1993 and 2015) 
was the single biggest construction laggard in Europe. This is a puzzle that many housing 
economists fail to come to terms with. High prices and rents should, we are told, lead to an 
increase in housing supply (Emanuelsson, 2015). Indeed, the lack of housing construction leads 
some commentators to suggest that the only reason prices in Sweden are so high is because of 
fundamentals: if little is being built then, naturally, prices and rents will be high. Such assessments 
are usually accompanied by explanations as to why construction output is so low: too much 
planning regulation (Lind, 2003) and rent controls (Wilhelmsson, Andersson and Klingborg, 
2011) are recurring themes here. In this view, the state (both locally and nationally) and so-called 
NIMBYism is deemed to be the culprit of constrained housing supply. While there may be at least 
some element of truth to this, such appraisals are generally extremely circumscribed and partial 
in their arguments against the current regulatorily frameworks vis-à-vis rents and planning 
(Christophers, 2013, p. 20).  
 A central narrative in Sweden is that the Swedish systems of so-called ‘soft rent control’ 
(see Chapters III & IV), and planning deters developers from building. The common solutions 
advanced by neoclassical scholars and commentators, then, is to limit the planning process, 
remove rent restrictions and build more. Whilst I have stated these assessments rather brusquely 
(some might argue flippantly), theoretically, these diagnoses and prescriptions are well embedded 
in neoclassical economic analysis both in Sweden and further afield (Arnott, 1995; Glaeser and 
Luttmer, 2003; Lind, 2003; Jenkins, 2009; Wilhelmsson, Andersson and Klingborg, 2011; 
Lindbeck, 2013). And these proposed solutions have had an impact in Sweden. Indeed, the Public 
Municipal Housing Companies Act of 2011 (Allbolagen), stipulating that Municipal Housing 
Companies should operate according to business principles (affärsmässiga principer) and the 
regulation of 2014 ushering in lower housing standards, can be seen as a step in support of these 
neoclassical (or neoliberal) narratives and prescriptions (Grundström and Molina, 2016, p. 328). 
The following section seeks to explore why such analyses are misdirected, and how many of the 
solutions to increasing housing supply and affordability - as espoused by neoclassical 
commentators - ignore the fundamental importance of sectoral concentration in constraining 
housing supply and exacerbating housing affordability. 
 
Sectoral concentration in the construction industry 
 
 Nils Lundgren, Chief Economist at Nordbanken, declared in the midst of the Swedish 
banking crisis in 1992 that Sweden had built too much and that the building sector should be 
reduced. His wish came true. Residential housing completions collapsed following the banking 
crisis (see Figure 5.15) and with this collapse - linked to the dynamics of the housing cycle and 
exacerbated by Danell’s reforms – that same year, nearly 3,000 construction companies filed for 
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bankruptcy in Swedish District Courts (SCB, 1997). That figure was still staggeringly high the 
following year with 2,425 bankruptcies filed nationally (ibid.). These failures were also part of 
an accompanying trend of vertical integrations and takeovers (Dickens et al., 1985). The 
consequences of this were that the Swedish housebuilding industry became more concentrated 
than ever by the mid-1990s. 
 According to a government statement issued prior to the GFC, ‘[t]he goal for housing is 
long-term well-functioning housing markets where consumer demand meets a supply of housing 
which corresponds to their needs” (Swedish Government 2007d, 15, translated in Hedin et al., 
2012, p. 458). If that is the goal, it has palpably failed. On an efficiently-functioning market, 
supply is expected to increase when prices rise as a function of increased demand (Emanuelsson, 
2015, p. 58). Clearly, however, the Swedish housing market is dysfunctional and anything but 
efficiently-functioning; and as I showed quantitatively in the previous chapter, this had even been 
the case throughout much of the 1970s and 1980s.  
 Figure 5.15 depicts the decline in housing output across tenure categories. What is 
striking about the data in this figure is not only the absolute decline of aggregate construction, but 
also the shift in housing tenure composition. As a share of total construction, more owner-
occupied and cooperative housing - owner-occupied, leasehold apartments in all but name 
(Boleat, 1985, p. 259) - is being constructed post-1999 than at any point before the 1980s. 
Meanwhile, the construction of rental housing has collapsed and is near all-time lows. The 
housing crash in the early-1990s and the policy responses to said crash can explain some of these 
dynamics: a sector reliant on subsidies and cheap credit had had both withdrawn, but there are 
other explanations beyond this.  
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Figure 5.15. Housing completions by tenure, 1991-2013 
 
 
 
 Source: SCB 
 
 Robert Emanuelsson, in a report commissioned by the Riksbank, notes that, ‘…the 
construction industry in Sweden is characterised by a shortage of competition with major entry 
barriers and a small number of large participants, making it difficult for new companies to become 
established’ (Emanuelsson, 2015, p. 62). He adds, ‘[t]he large construction companies can thus 
make use of their oligopoly position and charge higher prices, which holds back construction’ 
(ibid. emphasis added). This assessment of the contemporary housebuilding industry in Sweden 
supports my analysis in Chapter IV into anti-competitive behaviour and rising construction costs. 
Further, it opens up an avenue of enquiry that is not often trodden in housing economics or 
political economy more generally. As I noted in this and the previous chapter, the adverse effects 
of ever-growing construction sector concentration, vis-à-vis housing supply, were not fully 
realised during the 1980s, as loosening credit conditions (initially at least) had helped to stimulate 
construction. However, the changes in financial structure explored above also intensified the trend 
towards takeovers and mergers, which, according to Barlow and King (1992, p. 390) accentuated 
the oligopolistic nature of Swedish housebuilding. Following the crisis of the early-1990s, then, 
adverse effects would be felt.  
 Before I elaborate on this, let us return briefly to the notion that housing supply is 
restricted due to too much regulation, in both the rental market and planning system, which 
ostensibly makes residential rental housing construction simply unprofitable. Whilst these 
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contentions may contain a degree of truth, in relation to the former, the divergence between rents 
and consumer prices, that began in the 1970s (observable in Figure 5.14), casts at least some 
doubt on this assessment. Further doubt is cast on this assessment by the Swedish housing 
economist Hans Lind (2003). In his analysis of rents during the period 1995-2001, he finds that 
rent regulation had a very limited impact on the supply of new rental dwellings. In relation to 
planning, an analysis of building permits and housing completions between 2000 and 2016 reveals 
that the ratio of planning permits to completions is only negative in four of the 17 years; i.e. more 
permits were granted than residential buildings were constructed in 13 of the last 17 years (SCB, 
2018). Controlling for the lag between permissions and completions, substantially more permits 
were granted than buildings completed in the past 17 years (average ratio = 1.12). This casts some 
doubt on the contention that the planning process is too restrictive, and supports the findings of a 
special investigation by Dagens Nyheter into the residential construction industry in 2016, which 
found that it is the construction firms, and not the municipalities, slowing the construction process 
down in order to maintain prices (Örstadius, 2016b). 
 Intriguingly, whilst trend construction in residential housing, (at least prior to 2015) has 
been at record lows, NCC have boasted an increase in total shareholder return of 79.2 per cent 
over the past 5 years (NCC, 2018); Peab, in the five-year period between 1st January 2012 to 31st 
December 2016 provided a total return on Peab’s B share of 160.3 percent (Peab, 2017) and in 
the first quarter of 2018 claimed to have a record high order backlog (Peab, 2018). Not wanting 
to be outdone, Skanska, in 2015, claimed it was aiming for the highest total return for shareholders 
in its sector (Reuters, 2015)138. Part of this can be explained with reference to international 
expansions and increased profitability in markets outside Sweden, and the growth of shareholder 
value ideologies (Belfrage and Kalifatides, 2018), but not all. Indeed, with the exception of 
Skanska, Sweden is the main market for the other Big Four. Their dominance in the domestic 
housing construction, is evidenced in Figure 5.16. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
 
138 Skanska has since, however, issued profit warnings due to substantial project write-downs in the USA (Milne, 2018). 
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Figure 5.16. The Four Largest Construction Companies’ share of housing construction in 
Sweden, selected years, (2002-2013) 
 
 
Source: SOU (2015, p. 122) 
 
The recession of the early-1990s, by eliminating weaker competition, provided an impromptu 
round of rationalisation in an industry which was already extremely concentrated by international 
standards (see Chapter IV). As a result, it became even more so. While this tendency has declined 
somewhat over the last decade, it is still pronounced, as Figure 5.16 illustrates. Indeed, 
nationwide, in 2002, 36 per cent of the housing completions were produced by the Big Four. In 
order to put that figure in context, the top 400 housebuilder’s share of residential housebuilding 
in the USA, was only 32 per cent (Ball, 2008). Within the OECD, only Britain comes close to 
such levels of concentration, with the top four housebuilders producing 29 per cent of the 
residential housing stock in 2002 (ibid). 
 Regionally in Sweden, however, the picture is even more pronounced. Astonishingly, in 
2013 in the city of Karlstad (a city of over 60,000 inhabitants), 100 per cent of residential housing 
was provided by just three construction companies. 
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Table 5.5. Residential housing construction share of the Big Three139 in Swedish city regions 
and nationwide, (2002 & 2013) 
   
A-Region          2002     2013 
Gothenburg           48 %     23 % 
Malmö/Lund/Trelleborg                    75 %     34 % 
Umeå           97 %     64 % 
Linköping          91 %     65 % 
Örebro                     100 %     45 % 
Uppsala          60 %     58 % 
Växjö         100 %     78 % 
Stockholm/Södertälje                     24 %     28 % 
Karlstad          92 %   100 % 
Norlänge/Falun                    100 %     85 % 
Sweden                       36 %     22 % 
Source: SOU (2015) 
 
The index of construction sector concentration in Table 5.5 reveals a reduction in concentration 
between 2002 and 2013, but it is almost unprecedented in Europe for three companies to be so 
dominant: again, only Britain comes close, with the trend in sectoral concentration increasing 
following the recessions of the early 1990s and the Great Recession following the GFC (Archer 
and Cole, 2014b). One possible consequence of this level of concentration can be observed in 
Figure 5.17 below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
 
139 The Big Four minus Skanska. 
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Figure 5.17. Share of Dwellings built after 2000, by NUTS level 3 region, (2011) 
 
 
Source: Eurostat 
 
 Note that the areas which have produced the most housing in Sweden since 2000 are also 
those where construction sector concentration is lower (i.e. Stockholm and Malmö) since the 
early-2000s. Tom Archer and Ian Cole (2014a, 2016) and Michael Ball (2008) have found 
similarly in the UK, but in order to make a more general causal claim about the relationship 
between construction sector concentration and residential housing output over time, further 
comparative quantitative and/or case-study analysis would be required which, unfortunately, is 
not within the scope of this thesis.  
 While the building booms in Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Greece are more than evident 
from Figure 5.17, so too is it evident that Sweden, since 2000, has been the housing construction 
laggard of Europe. No other country in the European Union produced so little housing 
proportionately in relation to the existing housing stock between 2000-2011. Throughout the Euro 
Area, investment in residential housing sits at around 6 per cent of GDP, whereas, as evidenced 
in Figure 5.18 (below), current Swedish investment in residential housing is less than half that. 
Financial flows are now predominantly directed towards the consumption of homes, but no 
 
 
 
200 
commensurate increase in production, at least prior to 2015, appears to have materialised. The 
volumes of credit directed towards housing have risen exponentially on the demand side (see 
Figure 5.19), at a time when investment in housing and infrastructure is near historic lows. As a 
consequence, house prises, and therefore household debt, have ballooned.  
 
Figure 5.18. Investment in housing and infrastructure in Sweden as a share of GDP, 1950-2013  
 
 
 
Housing investment share of GDP 
Infrastructure investment share of GDP 
Source: Sveriges Byggindustrier (2015) 
 
 
 The degree of concentration in the Swedish housebuilding industry is no coincidence: it 
is, as I argued in the previous chapter, an ancillary of the Swedish model. Indeed, industrial 
concentration (across all sectors) was central to the Rehn-Meidner model (see Chapters III & IV). 
Stagnating and weak firms were ‘punished’ (Ryner, 2002, p. 86) by the enforcement of higher 
wages and active labour market policies, which helped to redirect labour and capital away from 
unprofitable firms and towards the expansion of successful sectors (ibid.). This, as Michael Ball 
(2014, p. 38) notes, produced ‘…huge vertically-integrated industrialised firms [that came] to 
dominate the industry under state patronage’ (emphasis added). Whilst Ball (ibid) noted, during 
the 1980s, that this had benefits in terms of streamlining production (as Rehn and Meidner had 
hoped) the demerits are more than observable following the banking crisis of the early-1990s 
which these firms, with the help of banking and finance company sectors, helped to precipitate. 
The concatenation of intense industrial concentration, and the changes in financial structure which 
took place during the 1980s is key to understanding the entrenchment of Sweden’s housing 
finance complex and the palpable dysfunctionality inherent in the contemporary Swedish housing 
system. 
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 It is worth noting here that the dynamics of the housing crisis which is said to exist today 
in Sweden, are not altogether similar to those of the late-1980s and early-1990s. The anatomy of 
the 1980s and 1990s housing boom and bust, as we have seen, was more akin to those which 
would unfold in Ireland and Spain in the lead up to the GFC. Indeed, as evidenced in Figure 5.19, 
investment in housing during the height of this boom (c. 1990) would rise to levels not witnessed 
since the Million Homes Programme was in full swing. The anticipation of future price rises, 
then, was one characterised as much by the construction sector’s expectations of exponential real 
estate growth, as it was by households’. Today, however, the housing landscape in Sweden is 
defined by one of low investment on the supply-side, but insatiable household demand, fuelled 
by unprecedented mortgage liquidity. It is not easy to capture this dynamic graphically, but Figure 
5.19 provides a suitable illustration for our purposes. 
 
Figure 5.19. Housing Production and Household Debt, 1938-2014 
 
 
Source: SCB & Waldenström (2015a) 
 
 The above figure captures the relationship between building output and household debt 
over the period covered in Chapters III-V. The housing industrial complex, as I made clear, did 
not develop overnight but is visible in Figure 5.19 from the early-1940s onwards. Housing 
production and investment were high (peaking in 1971) and relative levels of household debt were 
low. This was a system, as noted here and in the previous two chapters, characterised by high 
levels of residential housing production at low marginal rates of profit, which limited both 
households’ and construction firms’ exposure to financial risk. From the mid-1970s, however, 
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
1.1
0
20000
40000
60000
80000
100000
120000
19
38
19
41
19
44
19
47
19
50
19
53
19
56
19
59
19
62
19
65
19
68
19
71
19
74
19
77
19
80
19
83
19
86
19
89
19
92
19
95
19
98
20
01
20
04
20
07
20
10
20
13
Total production Total Household Liabilities to GDP
 
 
 
202 
following the completion of the Million Homes Programme, production and investment slumps, 
and households take on ever-more debt. This is when we can observe the rise of the housing 
finance complex. Initially, it is evident that, by the mid-1980s, this complex stimulated household 
demand and, with it, housing production. However, following the cataclysmic banking crisis of 
the early-1990s, a different dynamic emerges: debt grows exponentially, with no discernible 
relationship to housing supply in what is essentially an inverse of the dynamic observable prior 
to the 1970s. Far from destroying the housing finance complex, then, the banking crisis of the 
early-1990s was the prelude to an unprecedented boom in household debt and house prices. 
 
5.4. The long boom: The Global Financial Crisis, household debt & 
inequality 
 
I think the young generation in Sweden has forgotten that we had a crisis in the early 90s 
and they believe that house prices will always go up and that is one of the reasons that it is 
so dangerous now. If everyone is expecting that prices can't go down, that they must go up, 
then that is a very clear sign that there is a bubble 
 
Jan Nylander, SVT News' economic correspondent (Sveriges Radio, 2015) 
 
No banks failed in Sweden during the GFC. House-prices remained buoyant and consumer 
demand strong in the midst of the worst global economic dislocation since the Second World 
War. What is more, government debt reduced over the period 2007-2012 in Sweden (Jonung, 
2014). It is tempting to conclude, then, that previous experience and reforms of the ilk described 
above had given Sweden a degree of imperviousness. Sweden avoided the worst ills of the GFC 
and numerous scholars and commentators have argue that the experience of the early-1990s had 
played a positive role in mitigating the worst effects of the GFC (Andersen, 2011; Sutherland, 
2013), with the Washington Post referring to Sweden as ‘the rock star of the recovery’ 
(Washington Post, 2011), and the Economist holding Sweden up as a paragon of fiscal prudence 
(The Economist, 2013).  
  The Governor of Sweden’s central bank said in an interview to the Washington Post that, 
‘[i]f you don’t have a fiscal problem, you have more degree of freedom’, adding that ‘[t]his time 
around, the issue was not ever even close to being about solvency’ (Irwin, 2011). This is said to 
have given Sweden a degree of safe haven status (Popper, 2012), not enjoyed by the likes of 
Britain or the Eurozone countries in the immediate aftermath of the GFC. Despite turning 
negative, investor´s appetite for Swedish government and mortgage bonds remained robust. 
Indeed, the Swedish covered bond market was hailed by the Royal Bank of Scotland as a ‘safe 
havens in stormy conditions’ in 2011 (ASCB, 2011). However, this had implications for house 
prices and household debt. Unlike the experience in most countries where there was substantial 
deleveraging by households after the GFC, both house prices and household debt increased 
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substantially after 2009, continuing an unprecedented trend of credit expansion and debt; the 
consequences of which have been far reaching.  
 
Figure 5.20. Share of total MFI lending in Sweden (%), 1975-2018 
 
 
Source: SCB 
 
 One such significance is the widening gap between bank lending to non-financial 
corporations and households in Sweden. This phenomenon sits comfortably with what many 
scholars would describe as financialisation. Costas Lapavitsas’ definition that, 
‘…financialisation, reflect[s] the increasing involvement of individuals in the financial system 
and the concomitant rise in individual debts’ (Lapavitsas, 2009, p. 118) is, then, reflected in Figure 
5.20, which provides a unique breakdown of quarterly MFI lending to non-financial corporations 
and households since the mid-1970s. Furthermore, when we consider the drivers of contemporary 
GDP growth in Sweden (see Figure 5.21, below), households’ increasing involvement in financial 
systems is clearly a core driver. 
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Figure 5.21. Contributions to change in GDP, percentage units, 2012-2017 
 
 
Source: SCB 
 
 Financialisation in Sweden, however, has combined with a system of income related 
support, generous unemployment benefits, pensions, and universal health care, to produce one of 
the most unprecedented and robust housing booms in recent history (Englund, 2011). A common 
view that, ‘[t]he overall effect of rising living costs, stagnating private sources of income and 
declin[ing] state support has been a reliance on debt to bridge the gap between income and the 
cost of essential goods and services’ (Montgomerie, 2010), then, does not sit particularly neatly 
with the Swedish case (or at least not yet). The processes scholars describe in the USA, and 
elsewhere, do not operate by the same mechanisms in Sweden or, indeed, elsewhere in 
Scandinavia. What we see in the Swedish context is more an example of middle and high-income 
groups leveraging themselves as incomes grow and as state support has remained (broadly 
speaking) robust; and this is replicated throughout Scandinavia, which is home to the most 
indebted households of any region of Europe.  
 Somewhat paradoxically, it could be stated that the very edifices which have historically 
provided Swedes with such high living standards (high wages, a generous welfare system) and 
the high taxes supporting this system have actually exacerbated the ballooning of household debt. 
However, the fallout from any marked decline in house prices, and associated credit crunch and 
bank failures could be no less severe because of this. Indeed, some scholars have raised concerns 
that ‘…most studies of Swedish political economy are too optimistic about the condition and 
-6.0
-5.0
-4.0
-3.0
-2.0
-1.0
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Househ. consump. Governm. consump. Gross fixed cap. formation
Change in inventories Net exports of goods and services GDP, actual volume change
 
 
 
205 
prospects of the reformed Swedish model’ (Belfrage and Kalifatides, 2018), and there is certainly 
more than a grain of truth to this assessment. 
 
Household Debt & Inequality 
 
 Before I conclude, it is necessary to consider the effects of the aforementioned 
transformations on households. Thomas Piketty (2014) famously argued that when the rate of 
return on capital exceeds that of overall growth in economic output and wages (r>g), inequality 
is the corollary. Household consumption and gross fixed capital formation are not evenly 
accessed, and thus the growth in the credit stock in Sweden and households’ uneven consumption 
of housing and other assets has implications for inequality in modern Sweden (as elsewhere). 
 It has become a key assumption within IPE literature that a confluence of declining 
welfare provisions and stagnant real-wages have contributed to the need for low and middle-
income groups (particularly in the USA) to resort to credit in order to sustain basic living 
standards (Rajan, 2011). This hypothesis, which views the dramatic rise of household debt as an 
economic corollary of declining living standards and growing income inequality has become a 
defining feature of prevalent understandings of the associations between neoliberalism and debt 
in the field of IPE (Panitch & Gindin, 2011, p. 12).  
 In light of this hypothesis, the Swedish experience (as I have noted above) is intriguing. 
Thus far, I have focused on aggregate household debt volumes in Sweden. Using a more fine-
grained approach, however, yields even more unexpected results. As Figure 5.22 shows, it is the 
wealthiest households who have leveraged themselves the most, with the top income decile (that 
is, those households earning over $6,000 per month), having borrowed the most in proportion to 
their incomes.  
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Figure 5.22. Average debt-to-income ratio in different income groups, 2014 
 
 
Note: The thresholds for the income deciles are 1: SEK 0 – SEK 20,626, 2: SEK 20,626 – SEK 24,473, 3: SEK 
24,473 – SEK 29,100, 4: SEK 29,100 – SEK 34,342, 5: SEK 34,342 – SEK 39,155, 6: SEK 39,155 – SEK 43,576, 7: 
SEK 43,576 – SEK 48,188, 8: SEK 48,188 – SEK 54,167, 9: SEK 54,167 – SEK 63,709, and 10: SEK 63,709 – 
 
Source: Finans Inspektionen (sample data) 
 
 In no small part due to the housing finance revolution of the 1980s, but also due to the 
structure of housing subsidies and tax benefits available to homeowners, Sweden is now a country 
of homeowners, with over 96 per cent of owner-occupiers having a mortgage (the highest figure 
in the EU). As my analysis has made clear, that Swedish households are carrying so much debt 
today is not a novel feature of the Swedish political economy. Indeed, Swedish households have 
been institutionally stimulated to take on debt for over 40 years now. In many ways, this has been 
central to the post-1960s Swedish model. The main difference today is the scale which modern 
innovations in finance and regulatory structure have allowed.  
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Figure 5.23. Proportion of total debts per income decile for indebted households (%), 2014 
 
 
 
Source: Winstrand and Ölcer (2014) 
 
 Figure 5.23 illustrates the sheer scale of lending to the wealthiest Swedish households as 
a proportion of total debts. Meanwhile, lower incomes groups, immigrants and refugees, who are 
increasingly at the fringes of the housing finance complex, are experiencing a state of permanent 
crisis and are left with little alternative but to rent in poor suburban Million Homes-era apartments. 
In a previous era, this would not necessarily have been detrimental, but today, rental 
accommodation in Sweden is residualised, expensive and vindictive. Nordfelt (1999) has found 
that, throughout the 1990s, single mothers were disproportionately affected by evictions from 
public and private rental accommodation and, since then, a wave of so-called renovictions (the 
process of evicting tenants through renovating their apartments and increasing their rents by up 
to 50 per cent) has swept the country, aggressively displacing lower income groups and forcing 
them from ‘desirable’ inner-city areas; and those households whose relative position within the 
housing finance complex is weak are paying the price. 
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Figure 5.24. Average housing expenditure per household for different forms of occupancy  
 
 
Source: SCB 
 
 Figure 5.24 shows that it is renters who are proportionally spending more of their income 
on rent than owner-occupiers. This trend is driven by a combination of the increasing 
overrepresentation of lower income groups in rental housing and rising rents, on the one hand; 
and generous tax incentives to tenant-owners and owner-occupiers, on the other. If tenure 
neutrality exists in Sweden today, it is in name only. The consequences of this are that Sweden’s 
biggest cities, since the 1980s, have become among the most segregated in Europe (Sernhede, 
Thörn and Thörn, 2016); with unemployment, poverty and urban uprisings (such as the 
Stockholm riots in 2013) puncturing the stereotypes perpetuated about modern Swedish  urban 
life, both at home and abroad.  
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5.5. Concluding remarks  
 
 
We have created a financial system in which housing bonds are the cornerstone, inpart, due 
to the fact that we have low government debt compared to many other countries. But it means 
that the risks surrounding the Swedish housing market are about far more than households 
and their consumption. 
 
Stefan Ingves, Governor of Sveriges Riksbank, 18th November 2015140 
 
 
This chapter has investigated the institutional crystallisation of what I have termed the housing 
finance complex; defined here as the generation of financial capacity which (seemingly) 
relentlessly stimulates housing demand, without a commensurate stimulation in investment in 
housing supply. In so doing, I have tried to highlight how changes in financial structure 
fundamentally transformed the Swedish housing system from the 1980s onwards, on both the 
demand- and supply-side.  
 What has been produced is a model of political economy which is increasingly reliant on 
debt-fuelled consumption in order to generate growth, and where housing bonds have become the 
cornerstone of the financial system (Ingves, 2015). This development has had little to do with 
declining welfare or wages, and more to do with the dominant role of finance and construction 
capital in the modern Swedish political economy. The effects of this dominance, as I have made 
clear, are not inert, and the present housing system serves to magnify socioeconomic inequalities 
and entrench the interests of a narrow stratum of actors within the financial service and real estate 
industries. It receives its political ‘legitimacy’ (for now at least) by enriching property owners 
and middle- and high-income homeowners but has had the effect of pitching rich against poor, 
old against young, and established residents against newcomers. Given these outcomes, and if we 
extrapolate from current trends, it is difficult to imagine how such a system can remain socially, 
politically, and financially tenable over the medium term. 
 As I documented in this chapter and Chapter IV, the housing finance complex emerged 
embryonically in the immediate aftermath of the completion of the Million Homes Programme in 
the mid-1970s. This complex was not a result of express intention or political calculation per se, 
but of (more or less) gradual changes in the structure of finance and an accretion of contingent 
policies programmes which attempted to manage and (later) foster these changes; none of which 
were inevitable. These began in the 1970s and accelerated throughout the course of the 1980s 
under the patronage of the Social Democrats.  
 As noted in the introduction, scholars often argue that the neoliberal system of housing 
regulation in Sweden was a product of the Bildt government during the early-1990s (Hedin et al., 
                                               
 
140 Cited in an article in Svenka Dagbladet (Andrén Meiton, 2015) 
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2012). However, this argument stands only if we assume that changes in the structure and 
regulation of housing finance have a passive impact on housing systems. I have made the case 
here that, in terms of regulation with direct relevance to housing, such a system of what could be 
described as neoliberal regulation was, more or less, established by the time Bildt came to power 
in 1991141. The main legacy of the Bildt era was the Danell System and the importance of this 
should not be underplayed. Indeed, as I noted in section 5.2, there is a reason little was done to 
reverse or even halt the progression of this system. Expanding the Danell System became an 
expedient means for the Social Democrats to regain economic ‘credibility’ following a crisis 
which happened on their watch. While Jón Rúnar Sveinsson  notes, then, that the Social 
Democrats, ‘…did not in any significant way try to turn back the wheel’ (Sveinsson, 2000, p. 
167), I would argue that a more appropriate analogy would be to say that they actually helped to 
accelerate the revolutions.  
 This chapter has made the case that systems of housing and finance cannot be viewed in 
isolation of one another: they are intrinsically and necessarily bound in all advanced industrial 
economies. The changes in finance from the 1970s onwards  inexorably transformed the structure 
of Sweden’s housing system; and the effects were profound on both the supply- and the demand-
side. The palpable loss of state control over the flow and direction of credit during the 1970s and 
1980s occurred at the same time as construction capital, developers and finance gained power; 
and this was no coincidence. The new channels empowered private actors, whilst prima facie 
diminishing the agency of the state, but the state was by no means a wretched bystander in this 
process. Whilst no-one in government had envisaged the dynamic potential of a housing finance 
complex during the 1970s and much of the early-1980s, the state was still central to its creation 
and, following the boom of the mid- to late-1980s and crisis of the early-1990s, successive 
governments were keen to harness its politico-economic potential. 
 Once this potential is harnessed, however, it can be difficult to control. Swedish policy 
makers (as elsewhere) have become effective patrons of house-price inflation and instrumental in 
the process of converting the Swedish economy to a ‘housing economy’ increasingly reliant on 
debt–fuelled consumption. This consumption, although politically and economically expedient, 
has consequences, however. Indeed, in response to warnings of a housing bubble made at an IMF 
meeting in Washington in 2015, the Social Democrat Swedish Finance Minister, Magdalena 
Andersson, responded by stating that, ‘…although I am not averse to a tightening, any changes 
must be made carefully as it affects households’ finances. If there are major changes, prices can 
be affected, which in turn affects consumption and hence GDP growth’ (Magdalena Andersson 
                                               
 
141 As Meidner notes, ‘[w]hen the social democratic government was replaced by a new bourgeois coalition in 1991, 
the model was already in a process of erosion and decay’ (Meidner, 1993, p. 220). 
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cited in Arenander, 2015). Tellingly, shortly after Andersson made this statement, the Financial 
Services Authority (FI) withdrew their proposals to limit mortgage durations142. 
 On the supply side, the construction industry, which has historically been immensely 
powerful in Sweden, was able to exploit new financial flows outside of state-subsidised circuits 
from the 1980s onwards. New flows from finance companies, banks and a range of investors 
(institutional and non) enabled the construction industry to become even more concentrated and 
powerful. This quiet revolution enabled them to re-write the rules of the game and occurred in the 
context of diminishing municipal land banks and a growing municipal reliance on private 
investors to finance projects (see Chapter IV). The consequences of this, as we have seen, are that 
the construction industry is now able to dictate, to a greater degree than at any point since the 
1930s, what is being built, where, and crucially, how much. This system of production is one 
characterised by low volumes of high-end housing production, at high marginal rates of profit; 
but the necessary conditions for such a system are not merely confined to financial flows directed 
towards construction firms and developers 
 On the demand side, households also responded to the new incentives and opportunities 
that changes in the structure and composition of housing finance created. However, not all 
households would be in a position to exploit these opportunities. Let us not forget the axiom that 
one household’s house-price rise is another’s deteriorating affordability; and as prices have risen 
as a function of increased demand across Sweden (generated by unprecedented mortgage liquidity 
following the early-1990s crisis), so too has debt. This explosion of debt has led to a nation 
seemingly obsessed with house price rises and whose very financial system is inextricably tied to 
the housing market. Supported by the mortgage tax relief system, high-income households have 
been able to leverage themselves to a significantly greater degree than lower and middle-income 
households, and this demand has helped to facilitate the high-end housing production construction 
firms and developers in Sweden so cherish. All the while, the balance of housing production has 
tipped away from the supply of affordable rental buildings, and towards the construction and 
conversion of co-operative units and single-family dwellings. From the zenith of being heralded 
as one of the most effective housing systems in the world in the 1980s (Grundström and Molina, 
2016), the Swedish housing system has now, indeed, become monstrous (Christophers, 2013). 
 
 
 
 
                                               
 
142 These were eventually introduced the following year, however. 
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Conclusion. Where are we now? 
 
The planes of utopia and of reality never coincide.  
The ideal cannot be institutionalised, nor the institution idealised.  
 
Edward H. Carr (1981) 
 
The Swedes themselves are not entirely sure what they have done right. 
 
Paul Krugman (1999) 
 
 
This thesis has endeavoured to chronicle the remarkable, and in many ways unlikely, development 
of one of the world’s most prosperous and egalitarian societies, using the co-evolution of housing 
and finance systems as the fulcrum of my analysis. A central point which I have made throughout 
is that changes in the composition of housing finance are invariably preludes to changes in 
behaviours on both the housing demand- and supply-side. The contemporary burgeoning of 
housing credit on the demand-side is one facet of this and, as I noted in Chapter V, this also 
establishes and reinforces new logics and imperatives on the housing supply-side. As such, we 
cannot fully grasp the nature of housing systems - and households’ preferences within said 
systems - without first attempting to understand the systems of finance and production 
underpinning them, and their interactions. Whilst analysing policy formations of direct relevance 
to housing, and how political ideologies inform these, are perfectly rational and worthwhile 
undertakings when seeking to understand housing system dynamics, what I have attempted to 
show here is that these alone are not enough.  
 Throughout this thesis, I have highlighted the apparent reticence of scholars to take the 
spheres of housing finance and housing production seriously, arguing that, contemporarily, this 
might help to explain why many housing scholars and political economists have been so slow to 
identify the changes in Sweden’s housing and finance systems which I detailed in Chapters IV & 
V. Latterly, I identified two groups of scholars: those who understand that changes had occurred 
from the early-1990s onwards and claim that these can be understood with reference to the 
neoliberal reforms of the bourgeois coalition in the early-1990s; and those who seem to think 
there were few or no changes in Sweden’s housing system during the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. 
The task of Chapter I was to try to understand this reticence; and the task of the subsequent 
chapters was to explore why it has been so problematic for both historical and contemporary 
understandings of Sweden’s housing and finance systems. By failing to take the institutional 
spheres of housing finance and production seriously, what I discovered is that scholars had 
intellectually ‘boxed themselves’ into a view of housing which was characterised by dichotomies 
between social and liberal markets, welfarist vs. non-welfarist states, and renters vs. homeowners. 
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 I found many studies of Swedish housing, then, to be akin to what Brett Christophers and 
Manuel Aalbers (2014) have referred to as housing-as-policy; whereby the sphere of housing is 
ostensibly reducible to housing policy, housing tenure trends and - often in combination with 
these two spheres - welfare state reforms. While many of the policies and institutions in Sweden 
today appear, prima facie, similar to those that had existed throughout the mid-twentieth century, 
the other elements which make up a housing system - and their impacts on housing system 
outcomes – have so often been glossed over, leaving the impression of Swedish housing as a 
figuratively frozen landscape (Esping-Andersen, 1996). Indeed, Robert Cox (2004) notes that, 
the most distinctive characteristic of the Swedish model today is the “stickiness” of its reputation, 
rather than the institutions and policies that make up the model, and this assessment seems to 
apply aptly to many scholarly views of housing in Sweden throughout much of the last 30 years. 
 The original impetus behind this thesis was the desire to understand a simple puzzle 
regarding the contemporary relationships between neoliberalism, housing, and household debt in 
a country with one of the most generous welfare systems in the world: Why was it that households 
in Sweden, and other advanced social democratic states, were more indebted than their 
counterparts in the USA or Great Britain? The longer I mused over this, the more it became 
evident that housing was the central component for understanding this phenomenon; and with this 
realisation, the less it seemed like a puzzle. Indeed, this is only puzzling if we assume, as many 
scholars do, that the contemporary burgeoning of household debt throughout ‘Anglo-America’ 
and the OECD is a logical corollary of declining welfare provisions and wages (Cutler and Waine, 
2001; Brewer, Clark and Wakefield, 2002; Montgomerie, 2007, 2009, 2010; Lapavitsas, 2009; 
Krippner, 2011; Panitch and Gindin, 2011; Montgomerie and Büdenbender, 2015). 
 The problem with this (predominantly) Anglo-centric theory is that, even in the USA, the 
empirical support for a welfare-debt trade-off is questionable. Moritz Kuhn, Moritz Schularick 
and Ulrike Steins (2015) have found, from a comprehensive analysis of long-run Survey of 
Consumer Finances data that, ‘[r]elative to income, household debt tripled since 1950, but this is 
predominantly an (upper) middle-class phenomenon, linked to rising mortgage borrowing’. They 
further claim that, ‘[t]he share of debt held by households below the 80th percentile of the income 
distribution has fallen’ (Kuhn, Schularick and Steins, 2015, pp. 1–2). These findings are not 
unlike the dynamics I have highlighted in Sweden. Indeed, as I showed in Chapter V, the vast 
majority of borrowing in Sweden is among middle and high-income groups and, as Mattias 
Persson (2009, p. 134) of the Riksbank’s Financial Stability Department claimed in a report 
following the GFC, ‘[t]he most vulnerable households [in Sweden] – those that have no financial 
cushion for unexpected expenses – are largely debt-free’. But this does not mean that because 
there is ostensibly no subprime sector in Sweden (or at least not as discernible as in the USA) that 
the high-indebtedness of households does not pose a risk to financial or macro-economic stability.  
As the Banking Crisis of the early-1990s illustrated, highly-leveraged speculative investment, 
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even when it is commercial actors and wealthy households engaging therein, are more than 
sufficient to generate cataclysmic financial and economic dislocations. 
 Instead of pursing a line of enquiry fused to existing literature on neoliberalism and 
financialisation, then, this thesis has attempted to situate the current era of rampant household 
debt and asset-price inflation within a wider historical context in order to understand housing 
system development in Sweden more broadly. In the Introduction, I outlined some of the core 
tenets which have been said to characterise the Swedish housing model for much of the mid- to 
late-twentieth and early twenty-first centuries and, further, showed how this system of housing 
was so revered by scholars and commentators (both domestic and international). I then contrasted 
these idealised views of Swedish housing with the reality facing many households today in order 
to highlight the juxtaposition in housing outcomes. More than simply wanting to understand what 
had led to the housing system dysfunction we witness in Sweden today, however, I was also keen 
to understand what gave rise to the social market housing system which placed Sweden firmly on 
the global housing map in the first place. It is my contention that if we want to truly understand 
how the trajectories of phenomena such as neoliberalism and financialisation transform housing 
systems, then we need to first understand the systems they are said to be changing; and this we 
can only do, I believe, with thoroughgoing historically grounded, empirical research. 
 A central argument of this thesis has been that housing finance – how it is mobilised, how 
it is distributed, and by whom - matters to the constitution of housing systems on both the demand- 
and supply-side. What I have attempted to highlight throughout this work, then, is the importance 
of focusing on capacities and, significantly, the means by which capacities are generated, 
negotiated, and sustained or undermined. Chapter II explored how the creation of the savings 
banks and bond-issuing mortgage banks during the early and mid-nineteenth century by actors 
attempting to resolve capital mobilisation imperatives - in the face of robust population growth 
and the growing demands of agricultural modernisation - created a housing finance system which 
would endure for well over a century; how the birth of the co-operative housing associations - 
which sought to overcome the usurious practices of rapacious speculators with bottom-up savings 
and housing construction initiatives - produced a co-operative housing sector which would 
become the largest in the world; and, finally, how the establishment of the state’s urban mortgage 
bank, and state housing finance subsidies during the early twentieth century to overcome the 
burgeoning demand for credit as Sweden’s cities expanded, would provide the template for the 
mid-twentieth century system of state-sponsored housing finance. The examples provided here 
were the outcomes of solutions to particular types of capital mobilisation imperatives faced by a 
range of actors in Sweden and, while it would not have been evident at the time, all left enduring 
institutional legacies which would coalesce to produce a nascent housing industrial complex 
which was revered throughout the Western world.  
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 Having explored the emergence and growth of key components of Sweden’s housing and 
finance systems in Chapter II, Chapter III then illustrated how a wartime economy and the 
establishment of the AP system in 1959 - which effectively socialised the nation’s savings - 
permitted Sweden to build away the housing shortages of the past, facilitating the creation a bona 
fide housing industrial complex. I argued that the phenomenal housing programmes of the mid-
twentieth century were only possible because of the control the state had developed vis-à-vis 
which actors had access to housing finance, and on what terms. As long as effective capital 
controls derived from Sweden’s planned wartime economy were in place, the state could 
determine the extent to which Swedish households’ savings and pensions were directed towards 
housing production through the AP funds’ purchasing of mortgage bonds, and compliment this 
with a system of direct loans and subsidies from government coffers. Furthermore, as long as 
profits were assured under this elaborate system of controls, the construction industry could, as 
Billing, Olsson and Stigendal note (1992, p. 294), ‘…accumulate capital through carrying on 
industrial production and not through property speculation’. Whether by accident, or design, this 
intricate complex became one of the most efficient the world had ever known. 
 As we saw in Chapters III & IV, the state controlled the purse strings, whereas the 
municipalities controlled the planning side (where, when and how much) throughout the early 
post-War decades. What construction firms got in return was cheap and secure, long-term finance 
(Barlow and King, 1992). This synergetic relationship, - in tandem with technical innovations 
emanating from the cooperative sector, a model of industrial labour relations which benefitted 
concentrated firms, and state-sponsored rationalisation - was central to the creation of Sweden’s 
housing industrial complex. However, this was a tentative and uneasy arrangement between 
capital and labour, which would prove to be all too prone to inflation shocks, regulatory arbitrage, 
and, as Rudolf Meidner (1993, p. 220) noted, a willingness of successive governments to tolerate 
periods of excess demand in the product and labour markets. As one of the key architects of this 
system, Meidner would later argue: 
 
The destabilizing effects of this inflation-prone policy [the toleration of excess demand] were 
obvious already in the 1970s but became fatal in the 1980s: profits skyrocketed, speculation 
pushed property values to unsustainable heights, growth came to a stand-still and Swedish 
competitiveness faltered (Meidner, 1993, p. 220). 
 
As I demonstrated in Chapters IV and V, the quid pro quo between construction and finance 
capital, the unions, and the state, which had endured successfully from the Saltsjöbaden 
agreement of the late-1930s until the early 1970s, began to break down thereafter. With this 
breakdown, the housing industrial complex would be fatally undermined and new speculative 
dynamics emerged which were anathema to the ideals of full employment, economic stability, 
and high-volume housing production at low marginal rates of profit. 
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 The capacities which the state had accreted throughout the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries vis-à-vis planning and finance, would not go unchallenged, particularly when the profits 
of Swedish finance and construction capital came under pressure during the 1970s, and Swedish 
construction firms were able to channel new financial flows from actors outside of state-
sponsored circuits. Following the demise of strict domestic and international capital controls, on 
which the Swedish model of political economy and housing finance had so much depended 
(Ryner, 2002; Belfrage, 2011), the growth of finance companies would gradually and inexorably 
undermine the capacity of the state to control the flow and direction of credit to housing. This 
change in financial composition would change the rules of the game by which housing was 
produced, consumed and distributed. 
 In an age of inflation and declining profitability143, the major banks and construction 
firms were able to utilise new financial conduits, which systematically undermined the systems 
of housing finance, production and distribution that had enabled the housing industrial complex 
and, with it, it’s most (in)famous achievement: The Million Homes Programme. In combination 
with households’ growing appetite for debt-fuelled housing consumption, and the state’s 
tolerance for excess demand (Meidner, 1993) throughout the 1970s and 1980s, one complex was 
gradually replaced by another: a housing finance complex. Whereas the creation of the housing 
industrial complex implied the gradual accretion of capacities for residential housing production, 
the housing finance complex, by contrast, can best be defined by financial capacity generation 
which (seemingly) relentlessly stimulates housing demand, without any commensurate 
stimulation in output; and in which the housing that is produced is done so at high marginal rates 
of profit.   
 No matter how sticky housing and finance system development may appear to be, then, 
no institution(s) or system(s) of housing production and exchange is immutable. The story of 
capacity generation vis-à-vis housing and finance in Sweden during the twentieth century, is not, 
as I have made clear, solely about the state. Indeed, throughout this thesis, I set out to interrogate 
many scholarly preconceptions surrounding the developmental trajectories of the Swedish 
housing and finance systems. From questioning core assumptions relating to how liberal and 
social market forms of governance affected housing and finance system development during the 
nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries,  on the one hand, to emphasising the centrality of 
housing finance system development - and the state’s role therein - in engendering particular 
practices and behaviours which, in turn, shape housing system dynamics and attitudes to housing 
risk on both the demand- and supply-side, on the other; this thesis has sought to position housing 
                                               
 
143 As Claes Belfrage notes of the 1970s: ‘with profit rates under threat, capital’s support for the Swedish model was 
falling away (Belfrage, 2011, p. 122). 
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and finance systems as historical objects of enquiry whose path-dependent, co-evolutionary 
dynamics can never be fully appreciated in isolation of each other, or, indeed, of broader political-
economic trends. In the process, I have attempted to question core tenets regarding the 
relationships between state and market, (neo)liberal and social democratic governance, supply 
and demand, and housing, welfare and household debt, arguing that none of these sets, in 
isolation, is sufficient for understanding housing system development, or contemporary housing 
system change in Sweden, or elsewhere. 
 At the methodological plane, I have attempted to demonstrate the benefits of applying a 
historicist approach to the study of housing and finance; one which views these systems as 
historically embedded in broader societal relations, where the role of the state (both national and 
local), finance, construction capital, and households, are viewed as inextricably linked drivers of 
development, and not as atomised units with their own impermeable developmental logics. The 
production, consumption and distribution of residential housing do not exist independently of the 
finance systems they inhabit, and what I have tried to illustrate throughout these pages is that the 
demand for finance from both the producers and consumers of housing, and the role of the state 
in mediating these demands, creates the fulcrum wherein class and sectoral dynamics play out to 
produce uniquely contingent, path-dependent outcomes. 
 Applying a historicist approach is relevant not only for satisfying historical intrigue or 
carping over the interpretation of historical events, but also for understanding potential future 
pathways and trajectories. So often, policy makers and commentators criticise the lack of political 
will  to solve the present housing crisis in Sweden (Al-Dewany, 2015). Scholars and 
commentators on the Left argue for a return to a Golden Era-style of government-driven social 
housing programmes (Nordén, 2015); while those on the Right, who favour more neoclassical 
solutions claim that regulatory burdens, a municipal monopoly on planning and land use and 
NIMBYism are the root causes of ballooning housing costs (Eklund, 2014). Both camps are united 
in the conviction that we need to build more housing, but whereas the former views active state 
involvement as the solution, and neoliberal retrenchment (or marketisation) as the problem, the 
latter views the state as the cause of the current housing-related ills, and more market as the 
solution. In my view, both assessments are misguided. The supposedly iron cast laws of economic 
supply-and-demand very rarely apply to the realm of housing, and by examining the longue durée 
of housing system development in Sweden I have (hopefully) made the case that reducing the 
housing question to dichotomous variables (state vs. market; supply vs. demand) is intellectually 
and practically unfruitful. 
 It is easy to say: We need to build more good quality, affordable housing. But how we do 
this is a different matter. Swedes ‘enjoy’ more residential floor space per capita (47 m2 per 
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resident), on aggregate, than any other nation in Europe bar Denmark144. The issue, then, is more 
one of distribution and allocation, than housing supply per se, as the geographer, Danny Dorling 
(2014), has argued of the housing crisis in Britain. Perhaps rather disappointingly, what I 
discovered by delving into Sweden’s historical housing and finance timeline, was that while 
political will may, per se, be necessary for the recreation of a Golden Era-style system of housing, 
it is by no means sufficient. The question as to whether it would be possible (or even desirable) 
to recreate the housing prosperity of the Million Homes Programme years looms large here. How 
could such a system of housing (or indeed political economy) be (re)created and sustained when 
the collective memories and strictures of hardship, and the geopolitical upheavals of war and 
revolution on Sweden’s doorstep, are so distant?  
 As profound as this question is, the thesis has given no concrete answer. Recent research 
has suggested that there is little cause for optimism. According to Walter Scheidel’s (2017) 
seminal book, The Great Leveler, only violent shocks significantly lessen inequality (housing or 
otherwise). It has been beyond the scope of this thesis to delve into normative prescriptive 
assessments, but what I will say here is that this view is perhaps a little too pessimistic; and a 
history of Sweden’s housing timeline can help us to understand why. It is tempting to view the 
trajectories of twentieth century history societies as a series of traumas whereby violent 
proletarian uprisings and the spectre of communism were enough to transform the elites in the 
West to giving muted concession to their working classes. However, as Paul Mason (2017) notes, 
between these poles grew social democracy. Indeed, as Marquis Childs claimed, prior to the 
Second World War (see Chapters II & III), Sweden managed to chart a middle way, and there is 
nothing to stop them (or others) doing so again. We will not be able to look to the same actors 
and constellations of interests to recreate the past. We should learn from the Social Democrats 
and co-operative and labour movements of the early twentieth century in Sweden and elsewhere, 
but we should not be bound by their actions or think that we can ape them – for that would be to 
misunderstand a crucial lesson from history. As Mark Twain once purportedly quipped: history 
does not repeat itself, but it sure does rhyme!  
 One source of optimism is that, while there is little agreement on solutions to the housing 
crisis (as I have explored) there is, at least, widespread acknowledgement that the current housing 
system in Sweden is dysfunctional. The current policy formulation for a ‘well-functioning 
housing markets where consumer demand meets a supply of housing which corresponds to their 
needs’ (translated in Hedin et al., 2012, p. 458) in Sweden, clearly, falls remarkably short of 
serving the needs of many Swedish households today, as nearly all commentators agree. With 
developers building primarily for affluent households, and sitting on land with building 
                                               
 
144 This is a crude measure, which calculates the total residential floor space per capita. 
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permissions while prices rise (Örstadius, 2016a), they have exposed the seeming inability of the 
private sector to supply affordable and accessible housing in Sweden. Further, housing co-
operatives, having once been the backbone of what could be termed decommodified housing 
provision, are now obstacles to the very creation of such provision. The rental ‘controls’ and 
rental corporatism, which have, variously, characterised Sweden’s rental market throughout the 
twentieth century, are, today, wholly inadequate, and too easily circumventable (Baeten et al., 
2017); and what measures the government have taken to promote affordability and access have, 
since the 1980s, served to exacerbate these perturbing trends. Indeed, much as in Great Britain, 
demand-side stimuli appear to have had the sole effect of pushing up prices, without having a 
commensurate impact on supply145. 
 Whilst this thesis has provided methodological and theoretical insights and attempted to 
forge a political economy framework for the historical analysis of housing and finance systems, 
I also hope that it has filled empirical gaps, which other scholars may be able to draw from and 
take forward. Much time has gone into the creation of consistent and harmonised time series 
ranging from demographic data, to mortgage and savings banks’ lending shares. I have also 
compiled data pertaining to the net flows of finance to housing over time, and regional data which 
explores the relationship between construction, building stock and house prices. Further research 
should aim for more robust quantitative analysis of the historical data and trends I have presented 
longitudinally in order to test some of the causal relationships I have hypothesised, and the 
approach I have developed here would not be incompatible with comparative-historical methods. 
I hope that the data I have compiled will provide the basis and inspiration for further research, not 
just into Swedish and Nordic housing systems, but also further afield. 
 Finally, this thesis has aimed to have both scholarly and policy significance. In relation 
to the former, the project has assembled, aggregated and harmonised data relating to the flow and 
direction of credit throughout much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in Sweden. Further, 
theoretically, it has demonstrated the importance of analysing the composition of housing finance 
in relation to housing system development, both historically and contemporarily; and how this 
affects the production, exchange and distribution of housing. As an ancillary to this relationship, 
I have shown that there is more to the processes of neoliberalism and financialisation than meets 
the eye, both in Sweden and elsewhere. Income related support, generous unemployment benefits, 
pensions, and universal health care combined, mean that the processes of neoliberalism and 
financialisation scholars describe in the USA (and elsewhere) do not operate by the same 
                                               
 
145 As ex-member of the Bank of England's monetary policy committee, Adam Posen noted of Britain, ‘The idea of 
pumping up credit for middle to upper-middle class people to spend more on housing, when people have already spent 
too much on housing, is dysfunctional’ (BBC, 2014). Indeed, with cost of borrowing even lower in Sweden than in 
Britain, and mortgage tax deduction still entrenched in government housing policy (unlike Britain), this dysfunctional 
idea is clearly alive and well in Sweden today.  
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mechanisms in Sweden, or, indeed, elsewhere in Scandinavia. If a Swedish resident becomes 
unemployed (and has unemployment insurance), the chances of their home being repossessed, or 
them falling into rent arrears is slim. Likewise, the concept of medical debt is a foreign one to 
Swedish and most Western European households. Income and (particularly) wealth inequality has 
been growing apace in Sweden over the past twenty years (Roine and Waldenström, 2009), but 
middle and high-income households have never had it so good. While the model of welfare in 
Sweden today is not what it was in the 1970s, by OECD standards, Swedes still enjoy one of the 
most comprehensive, redistributive welfare states in the world (OECD, 2018b). In combination 
with this nigh universal social security, then, households above the median income range have 
been able to leverage themselves to ever-greater degrees in an era of unprecedently cheap credit. 
One could argue that, by international comparison, Swedish households have been spoilt by a 
combination of generous social protections and an abundance of credit! But, of course, not all 
households are as spoilt as others. 
 In relation to policy, the thesis has shown in the context of Sweden that increased access 
to housing credit has done little to ease affordability and, further, that taking the long view, 
burgeoning levels of household debt appear to be little related to declining welfare provisions, 
and more an embracing of debt by the middle and upper classes. This compliments the findings 
of recent analyses conducted in the USA (Kuhn and Schularick, 2015) and elsewhere (Kohl, 
2018b). While these findings do not downplay the impacts or hardship of overleveraging and 
worsening affordability on low-income groups, they do suggest that the rising debts of low-
income groups are not the driving forces behind the recent phenomenal increases in household 
debt in Sweden and elsewhere. However, this is not to say that these trends do not create 
inequalities through other channels, such as growing wealth inequality, housing precarity, 
growing segmentation, and macroeconomic imbalances. Housing has been central to augmenting 
these tendencies, and Sweden’s political economy has harnessed them increasingly since the 
Global Financial Crisis. 
 Capital income, of which housing is key, has become ever more central to Sweden’s 
political economy (as elsewhere), over the past 30 years and, while a focus on income inequality 
may put Sweden in a flattering light, the internationalisation of wealthy Swedes’ asset holdings 
means that – to quote Jesper Roine and Daniel Waldenström (2009a, p. 154) – ‘…official statistics 
are likely to underestimate the recent increase in wealth concentration, possibly quite 
substantially’. Indeed, according to a study by Frank A. Cowell, Eleni Karagiannaki and Abigail 
McKnight (2012, p. 1), despite being one of the most equal countries in terms of income 
distribution, ‘Sweden is ranked as one of the most unequal countries in terms of wealth, even 
more so than the US’. Indeed, in 2012, the top 10 per cent of wealthy households in Sweden 
owned 47.7 of gross housing assets; higher than in the UK or the US (Cowell, Karagiannaki and 
McKnight, 2012, p. 22). While Roine and Waldenström (2009a, p. 169) have argued that increases 
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in real estate values since the 1980s have reduced wealth inequality in some regards, (as many 
Swedes own their homes), this is a highly precarious and uneven means by which to compress 
wealth inequalities.  
 In terms of future policy implications, the historical record shows that, while undoubtedly 
a necessary condition for many of the successful and lauded housing and finance programmes of 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in Sweden, state support was often not sufficient per se.  
Indeed, whether we look at the savings banks of the early nineteenth century (the first of which 
was established by a Prussian-born merchant); the mortgage associations which formed across 
the country less than two decades later (the first of which was established by members of the 
Scanian nobility); the philanthropic individuals and organisations which encouraged the 
egnahemsrörelse (Own home movement); or the cooperative movement of the early twentieth 
century; we find that the state’s involvement was, on the whole, not anterior to these initiatives, 
but posterior. In other words, state actors should not think they can simply ‘solve’ the current 
housing crisis alone but, instead, should look to draw upon socially sustainable and innovative 
housing solutions both at home and abroad, much as they did during the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries. 
 Progressive politicians and stakeholders in Sweden should be looking to do two things 
presently. First, attempts should be made to transform the existing nexus of housing-related 
institutions to make them more socially accountable and democratic. This transformation should 
extend from political parties and cooperative housing associations, to hyresgästsföreningen (The 
Swedish Union of Tenants) and SABO (The Swedish Association of Public Housing 
Companies)146. There should be a cessation of cooperative conversions at subsidised rates, 
mortgage tax relief should be phased out in favour of more universal subsidies which promote 
affordable housebuilding, and the notion that Public Housing Companies should be run on the 
basis of generating long-term profits should be abandoned. That being said, transforming the 
existing nexus of housing institutions will also need to extend beyond such measures. As this 
thesis has made clear, housing finance needs to be transformed too, and this task is not as simple 
as merely introducing new policies or measures. Magnus Billing, the chief executive of one of 
Sweden’s largest pension funds, Alecta,  has suggested a way forward here, maintaining in a 
debate article in Dagens Industri that his pension fund, ‘…wants to allocate additional capital to 
sustainable investments’ in housing and infrastructure, but adding that, ‘…we would need the 
                                               
 
146 Hans Lind notes of the latter two that the Tenants’ Union’s current resistance to rent increases within SABO’s older 
rental stock places a stranglehold on new supply, effectively abandoning the rent pooling principle and reinforcing an 
insider-outsider dynamic within Sweden’s rental system (Lind, 2014, pp. 94-95). To overcome this obstructive 
dynamic, hyresgästsföreningen need to not merely consult their own members, but also reach out to prospective tenants 
and those on housing waiting lists too. 
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help of government to make it possible for a sustainable society and a sustainable pension system’ 
(Billing, 2017, author’s translation). Alecta has invested approximately SEK 13 billion in green 
bonds earmarked for environmentally-friendly investments (ibid.), but Billing argues that the 
market is currently ‘too small’ (ibid.). This is where, as in previous eras, the state could actively 
foster the development of new circuits of capital to be directed towards socially and 
environmentally sustainable housing investment, acting, in effect, as a market shaper (Mazzucato, 
2018), and incrementally shifting financial resources away from the demand-side, and towards 
supply. This would have the effect of increasing the public housing stock and puncturing the 
pernicious expectation that house price rises can continue ad infinitum. 
 Second, the central state and municipalities should look to foster new, bottom-up 
initiatives which aim to promote affordable and accessible housing across tenures. There are 
promising initiatives in this regard. Organisations such as Bokoop are reinvigorating the 
cooperative movement, bringing it more into line with the promises and principles of the early 
cooperative pioneers a century ago. An organisation from the west coast of Sweden, 
Egenhusfabriken, is drawing upon the ethos of the egnahemsrörelse, and helping immigrants, the 
elderly, and young people to produce housing through collective endeavours. While these are 
merely two, nascent examples - and while they may not individually make headway - the ideas 
underpinning the work of these organisations (and others like them) are certainly promising and 
worthy of patronage. The election manifesto of Vänsterpartiet, published on 27th March ahead of 
the Swedish general election in October 2018, claims that, ‘…society must regain its initiative 
and restore democratic influence and responsibility over housing supply’ (Vänsterpartiet, 2018). 
This ambition should be uncontroversial, but such action will require a broad-based coalition of 
political parties and civil society organisations, as well as the active involvement of elements of 
the finance and construction sectors, in order to be realised. 
 I explained in the introduction to this thesis that the current housing crisis in Sweden is 
one which is currently not marked by systemic financial instability or economic crisis. This is a 
crisis of supply, affordability and accessibility, which are the corollaries of the generation of a 
housing finance complex, and it has given oxygen to those wishing to exploit it for political gain. 
The far-right Swedish Democrats are currently making political capital from the housing crisis in 
Sweden, claiming that it is Sweden’s immigration policy which lies at the heart of the housing 
crisis. While there is robust empirical evidence to the contrary (Andersson and Dahlberg, 2018), 
dissatisfaction with the current Swedish housing system means that this message has found an 
audience.  
 It has not been within the purview of this thesis to make predictive claims but, at present, 
there is little indication that the processes and trends of worsening affordability and accessibility 
will be reversed any time soon. Sven Steinmo (2003, p. 44) once lamented the possibility that 
what he termed ‘growing ethnic heterogeneity’ would, one day, ‘…undermine the traditional 
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‘nordic’ Swede’s willingness to pay taxes for social programmes that may increasingly go to 
racial and ethnic minorities’. Writing in 2003, he added: ‘At this point, however, we see little 
direct evidence of this problem erupting in Sweden to anything like the same extent seen in several 
other European countries. The sky is not falling in in Sweden, at least not yet’. The far-right 
Swedish Democrats are currently polling just behind the Social Democrats, with a general election 
due in October 2018 and, as in the UK, this formerly fringe organisation has transformed the 
centre-right. Not since the emergence of the Social Democrats over one hundred years ago has a 
political party in Sweden enjoyed so much political success, and so quickly. With house prices at 
records highs, and middle and high-income households more indebted than ever before, growing 
wealth inequality, housing precarity and ethnic segmentation are putting strain on the social fabric 
of Sweden. The risks of a systemic financial and economic dislocation have rarely, since the late-
1980s, been greater and, in an era when nationalism in Europe is resurgent, a dislocation of such 
magnitude would have profound socioeconomic, and political consequences, both nationally and 
regionally.  
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